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This dissertation investigates how healthcare provider networks are formed and their
effects on patient health outcomes. The first chapter explores three types of hospital net-
works that are intended to improve coordination of patient care across different hospitals:
integrated delivery systems, accountable care organizations, and electronic health records.
Using 2007-2017 Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society IT data and
Medicare data on accountable care organizations and hospital quality, I document several
interesting patterns regarding the formation and potential effects of these networks in the
United States. I find correlations consistent with assortative matching where higher qual-
ity hospitals match with higher quality groups, which may be inefficient if there are peer
effects that mean higher quality groups could have more substantial influence on lower
quality hospitals that have more room to improve. I show that accountable care organiza-
tions appear to be strategic about the network formation process, omitting hospitals that
are natural members. They may do so for anticompetitive reasons–ordinary least square
regressions find that accountable care organizationmarket concentration is negatively cor-
related with hospital quality. These regressions additionally point to the need for caution
in advocating for a unified electronic health record, as hospital quality is positively cor-
related with regional electronic health record market concentration–which is related to
coordination abilities–but negatively correlated with national concentration–which is re-
lated to competition.
The second chapter takes inspiration from the descriptive results of the first chapter
and establishes a causal effect of electronic health record networks at the patient level. I hy-
pothesize that systematic, reliable transfer of patient medical history can improve clinical
decisions and thus health outcomes, especially during medical emergencies. Thus, I iden-
tify patients who had emergency cardiovascular episodes in 2007-2014 Medicare claims
and use a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the causal effect of their primary
care and emergency hospitals being in the same electronic health record network. I find
that electronic health record compatibility decreases the mortality rate but increases the
rate of other bad health outcomes by approximately the same amount, suggesting that
compatibility makes it easier for patients to survive given poor health but does not overall
improve health otherwise. This result highlights the importance of analyzing the effects of
healthcare treatments on both the rates of mortality and negative outcomes in survivors.
Only looking at the rate of negative outcomes in survivors, electronic health record com-
patibility would have appeared to be a harmful treatment, while it was actually reducing
mortality.
The third chapter moves from hospital networks, which have only one type of agent, to
look at physician-insurer networks, represented by a two-sided many-to-many matching
market. I use Healthgrades andNational Committee for Quality Assurance consumer rat-
ings data to collect physician and insurance plan characteristics, respectively. Descriptive
statistics indicate that higher quality physicians are in more insurance networks, while
higher quality plans tend to be more restricted in the numbers of physicians they accept.
There is a mild correlation between physician and plan quality, but there are many pos-
sible explanations for it. To test if it is due to assortative matching and to better under-
stand how physicians and insurers decide with whom to contract, I estimate a structural
many-to-manymatchingmodel using thematchingmaximum score estimator. Data qual-
ity and quantity appear to be obstacles in obtaining precise estimates, so I leave further
exploration of this topic to future research.
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Chapter 1
Causes and Effects of Hospital Networks
1.1 Introduction
Different healthcare providers often must work together to diagnose and treat a pa-
tient. For example, when a patient has cancer, their primary care physician may notice
an anomaly that causes them to order an MRI from a radiologist and/or a biopsy from
a surgeon to test for cancer. If the patient is diagnosed with cancer, they then go to an
oncologist who prescribes radiation and/or chemotherapy and possibly a surgeon for ad-
ditional specific surgeries. At each stage, the doctor needs to know the patient’s health
history and the results of previous stages to choose the optimal course of action. In the
U.S., with different specialists separated in their own hospitals and group practices, there
is often no smooth pipeline for the relevant information to flow through, causing patients
to receive fragmented, sub-optimal care. Clark et al. [2012] lists ways in which transitions
of care can negatively affect patients, including communication breakdowns (which can
be caused by institutional cultures that do not promote teamwork and respect or the lack
of standardization in transfer procedures), patient education breakdowns (where patients
and caregivers do not receive enough explanation about what to do), and accountability
breakdowns (where a patient visitingmultiple specialists does not have one physicianwho
is responsible for ensuring that the whole team is aware of what its members are doing).
Several innovations in the past few decades have attempted to improve the coordi-
nation of care across healthcare providers, including integrated delivery systems (sys-
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tems), accountable care organizations (ACOs), and electronic health records (EHRs), each
of which constitutes a network of hospitals and physicians that overlap and are correlated
but not empirically equivalent. A system unites healthcare providers under one legal and
financial parent entity. An ACO is a group of providers that jointly sign a contract with an
insurer providing them with financial incentives to provide efficient care. Providers with
the same EHR brands or an EHR brand with health information exchange (HIE) capabil-
ities can share patient information with other providers with the relevant software. The
ability of an EHR software to send patient information to other providers is referred to as
interoperability.
Yurkiewicz [2018] writes from the perspective of a Stanford University hospital physi-
cian, providing the example of one of her hospital patients who was readmitted multiple
times because his nursing facility could not easily access her care instructions (e.g., for
higher insulin doses to take care of elevated blood glucose levels due to a recent infec-
tion), so they did not follow them. The promise of a healthcare provider network is that it
will be more unified in its technologies and/or institutional processes and that each of its
memberswill have a shared stake in howpatients do after being transferred to othermem-
bers. Different network types address different issues in coordination, so being inmultiple
network types together may be necessary for hospitals to maximize coordination. Indeed,
even if EHRs were universally interoperable, solving the technological feasibility prob-
lem, hospitals without centralized leadership may not develop the institutional processes
necessary for actually making use of existing interoperability. They may not even want to
share information with each other unless they have a shared financial stake. For example,
Miller and Tucker [2014] finds that larger hospital systems are more likely to share pa-
tient information within their networks but less likely to share patient information with
external hospitals.
Maximal hospital coordination may not be optimal for patients. Unifying healthcare
providers may provide benefits in terms of the coordination of patient care, but hospital
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networks can interact with competition in the healthcare provision and technology mar-
kets in complex ways. Hospital consolidation into systems started in the 1990s and has
continued until present day, serving as a counterbalance to insurer market power [Gaynor
et al., 2015, Dafny et al., 2019]. Medicare carefully developed its own ACO program to
have numerous provisions to protect against the potential anticompetitive effects of ACOs.
Competition among EHR software vendors fragments the EHR softwaremarket, reducing
hospitals’ ability to send each other information, but also may encourage EHR vendors to
increase the quality of their products. The antitrust question for any merger is whether
the improvement in efficiency and effectiveness exists and would be worth the increase in
market power.
In this paper, I explore how system, EHR, and ACO networks form, evolve, and af-
fect hospital quality, in order to better understand the benefits and costs of these types of
mergers and connections. I characterize the three network types and their relationships to
each other and hospital quality measures. I start to look at the effect of networks on qual-
ity, relative to the effects of a hospital’s own characteristics. In Section 1.2, I describe the
different network types and review related literature. In Section 1.3, I describe the data.
In Section 1.4, I describe the empirical framework I will use to examine hospital networks.
In Section 1.5, I describe patterns in hospital network formation. In Section 1.5.1, I
show descriptively that the different network types are correlated and interact with each
other. Systemmembership appears to drive ACOmembership and EHR connections, and
ACO membership also appears to motivate EHR connections. Interestingly, not all hospi-
tals in the same system are also in the same ACO–sometimes same-system hospitals are
left out of the ACO, or, rarely, they are in a different ACO. The former indicates possible
gaming on the part of ACOs, since the financial rewards offered in their contracts depend
on measures of members’ quality and cost efficiency. In Section 1.5.2, I provide evidence
of assortativematching. I empirically reject amatchingmodel inwhich there is a universal
index of quality on both the hospital and group sides of the matching market. Seemingly
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unrelated (SUR) regressions do, however, reveal strong correlations between the quality
and characteristics of one side with those of the other. Matching on quality exhibits pos-
itive assortativity, with higher quality hospitals matching to groups with higher mean
qualities.
In Sections 1.6 and 1.7, I present a preliminary look at the potential effects of hospital
networks. In Section 1.6, I demonstrate possible sources of externalities in hospital net-
work formation, via the channel of market concentration. SUR regressions indicate that
national EHR market concentration (which represents software vendor market power) is
positively correlatedwith quality, while regional concentration (which represents interop-
erability) is negatively correlatedwith quality. This result indicates thatwhile therewould
be benefits frommandating a single universal EHR vendor, they would be outweighed by
the negative anticompetitive effect. Thus, while universal interoperability has been so far
technologically difficult to achieve with multiple vendors, it may be the most beneficial
way to achieve interoperability.
In Section 1.7, I examine whether there are peer effects in hospital networks. SUR re-
gressions show that lags of mean group quality are positively correlated with a joining
hospital’s contemporary quality, suggesting that groups influence new hospitals that join
them. Regressions of a hospital’s change in quality after joining a group on the error from
predicting its previous quality using the assortativity estimates exhibit strong positive cor-
relation, providing further evidence that the positive correlations between hospital and
group quality are due not only to assortativity, but also to, at least partially, peer effects.
Taken in conjunction with the results from Section 1.5.2, the results of this section indicate
that the current decentralized process for network formation, which is mainly regulated
only to prevent connections, may not generate the optimal quantity or quality of connec-
tions to encourage hospital quality improvements. Since hospitals match with other hos-
pitals that are similar in quality, yet high-quality hospitals can have positive peer effects
on those to which they are connected, high-quality hospitals may not be matching with
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the low-quality hospitals that they might help improve the most. However, any policy to
encourage these connections must still take the anticompetitive effects into consideration.
Section 1.8 concludes. This chapter is largely descriptive and provides only sugges-
tive evidence, seeking to surface interesting patterns and facts rather than trying to make
causal claims. Chapter 2 follows a quasi-experimental approach to estimate the causal
effect of EHR interoperability on health outcomes for patients with acute cardiovascular
conditions. Additional causal statistical designs motivated by the patterns in this chapter
are left to future work.
1.2 Background and Literature Review
In Sections 1.2.1-1.2.3, I describe the different network types and review existing re-
search on how market competition affects their impacts on healthcare cost and quality. In
Section 1.2.4, I review existing research on network formation in general and peer effects
in healthcare.
1.2.1 Systems
Hospital systems are formed through mergers and acquisitions, both horizontal, in-
volving competing hospitals, and vertical, involving outpatient facilities, physician prac-
tices, and other specialty hospitals [Kenen and Richman, 2019]. In this paper, I focus on
acute care hospitals, which are the main type of hospital regulated by Medicare, and so
focus on horizontal consolidation. Becker’s Hospital Review [2013a] notes that hospital
mergers and acquisitions function much like typical corporate mergers and acquisitions,
in which an initiating company will propose a certain acquisition structure, offering the
current shareholders and executives of the target company cash or stock in exchange for
assets or stock. Contracts include exactly which assets and liabilities will be exchanged
and which are explicitly excluded, valuations, and payment terms.
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Gaynor et al. [2015] summarizes the history of hospital consolidation into systems and
related literature. Existing literature argues that the rise of managed care caused the wave
of hospital consolidation that occurred in the 1990s, through increasing the importance of
hospital market power in hospital-insurer negotiations [Fuchs, 2007, Dranove et al., 2002,
Town et al., 2007b]. More recently, hospital system mergers and acquisitions may addi-
tionally be driven by Medicare programs incentivizing quality and cost improvements
through inter-hospital coordination [Kenen and Richman, 2019].
Gaynor and Town [2012] reviews papers that estimate the correlation between hospi-
tal concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), and hospital
prices to insurers, noting that seven out of eight papers published between 2000 and 2011
found a positive correlation. There is also evidence that completed mergers increase hos-
pital prices to insurers [Gaynor and Town, 2012, Dafny, 2009, Dafny et al., 2019]. A sub-
stantial body of structural work corroborates the expected relationship between hospital
bargaining power or mergers and hospital prices [Gowrisankaran et al., 2015, Gaynor and
Vogt, 2003, Ho and Lee, 2017]. There is also evidence that the hospital price increases are
passed on to consumers [Simpson, 2003, Town et al., 2006, 2007a].
1.2.2 ACOs
TheMedicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) is the largest public ACOprogram, rep-
resenting 8.3 million patients by the end of January 2016. Its first contracts went into effect
in 2012, and it has grown since then (Table 1.1). When a group of providers signs anMSSP
contract, Medicare assigns them a population of Medicare beneficiaries for which they
are responsible: beneficiaries who receive a plurality of their primary care from physi-
cians in that ACO. On an annual basis, the ACO receives a share of the savings in patient
expenditures for their assigned population, where savings are measured as compared to
the ACO’s past year’s patient population’s expenditures. Medicare adjusts the expendi-
ture calculation for each year with risk scores to eliminate the incentive for selecting for
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healthier patients, and they base the percentage of savings shared on quality measures to
incentivize effectiveness in addition to cost efficiency.
2013 2014 2015
N SSP ACOs 220 333 392
N Covered Beneficiaries 3,675,263 5,329,831 7,270,233
N Participating Physicians 96,559 128,278 181,552
N Participating PCPs 31,497 42,612 60,634
N Participating Specialists 65,062 85,666 120,918
Table 1.1: MSSP growth.
A few existing papers attempt to show the effect ofMSSP on a broad level. McWilliams
[2016], McWilliams et al. [2016], and Colla et al. [2016] use a difference-in-differences re-
search design to show that Medicare spending was, on average, moderately lower for ben-
eficiaries assigned to various MSSP ACO cohorts and subgroups than for their control
group, in years when the relevant cohort were active ACOs. Similarly, Colla et al. [2016]
and McWilliams et al. [2014] use a difference-in-differences research design to show that
MSSP ACO participation was associated with higher scores on some survey-measured
quality of care measures.
Another segment of the literature points out various potentialACOdesignflaws. Aswani
et al. [2019] propose incorporating incentive payments for investment in addition to the
existing incentive payments for savings. Frandsen and Rebitzer [2014] propose mitigating
team incentive problems with performance bonds and job design. Douven et al. [2015]
propose adjusting the benchmark (towhich performance year expenditures are compared)
in a way to reduce the ratchet effect.1 The incentives identified in the last paper suggest
an avenue through which ACO HHI may influence hospital quality. If an ACO subsumes
most of the hospitals in a region, its hospitals may face less competitive pressure to pro-
1At the end of anMSSPACO’s first performance period of three years, it may apply for a contract renewal
and obtain an additional three years in the program. Since benchmark expenditures for savings calculations
are based on the three years before a performance period, in this second performance period, the benchmark
is based on the first performance period. Thus, in the first performance period, an ACO may not achieve as
much savings as it really can, in order to avoid getting a very low benchmark for the second performance
period. To mitigate this effect, the program rules include an ad hoc benchmark adjustment for ACOs that
were successful in their first three years.
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vide high quality, thus allowing the ratchet effect to incentivize lower quality without a
counterbalance.
There are also numerous public health papers that use more detailed ACO data to
analyze physician leadership, organizational structure, and commercial ACOs [Colla et al.,
2014, McWilliams et al., 2013, Peiris et al., 2016, Ahluwalia et al., 2018, Fraze et al., 2018,
Lewis et al., 2018]. I limit the scope of this paper to hospital characteristics and Medicare
Shared Savings Program ACOs, in order to focus on their interactions with other network
types.
ACOs are similar to systems in that they form groups of healthcare providers with a
shared financial stake. The primary differentiator is that an ACO is held accountable to
at least one specific insurer. Due to their similarities, Medicare designed MSSP to fol-
low antitrust regulations designed by the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission and has since addressed concerns of anticompetitive referral practices by en-
couraging specialists to participate in multiple ACOs [Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2011, 2015, 2018]. A 2011 Federal Trade Commission notice also specified certain
actions that ACOs should not take in order to avoid an antitrust challenge, such as influ-
encing private payers not to recommend specific providers to patients [Becker’s Hospital
Review, 2013b].
There is relatively little existing research on ACOs and competition. Ouayogodé [2017]
finds no significant correlation between ACO cost improvements and physician market
concentration. Harris et al. [2016] notes that physician-sponsored MSSP ACOs have been
more successful than hospital-sponsored ones and suggests that an incentive for hospital-
sponsored ACOs that conflicts with MSSP goals is that they may use the ACO as a way to
gain market share. Feinstein et al. [2015] lists anticompetitive actions that a public ACO
can take against private payers: preventing private payers from encouraging patients to
go to certain healthcare providers or provide them with information on cost and quality,
tying their purchases of ACO services to purchases of external services, and preventing
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providers from contracting with them in addition. Thus, as in all antitrust evaluations,
the benefits of increased coordination from an ACO must be weighed against its poten-
tial anticompetitive effects. I will provide suggestive evidence that hospital-sponsored
ACOs serve more to decrease competition than improve coordination, using the fact that
regional ACO market concentration is more relevant for coordination whereas national
ACO market concentration is more relevant for market power.
1.2.3 EHR
EHR software may have numerous possible abilities, including patient medical his-
tory data storage, transferring patient data to other healthcare providers, diagnostic sug-
gestions, alerts for potentially adverse combinations of medications, and computerized
physician order entry. I focus on patient medical history data storage and transfer. As
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, EHR data transfer abilities have largely been
limited in interoperability. A healthcare provider with one software vendor brand often
cannot use its EHR to send patient information to another healthcare provider with a dif-
ferent EHR brand. This restriction leads to the formation of networks of hospitals with
the same EHR, that can share patient data among themselves.
Chapter 2 discusses related literature on the effects on patient outcomes and hospi-
tal quality measures of general EHR and health information exchange. As will be dis-
cussed further in Chapter 2, Desai [2016] also uses EHR brands to define networks, argu-
ing that hospitals may intentionally choose brands incompatible with their competitors’ to
reduce competition for patients. Abdolrasulnia et al. [2008], Ozdemir et al. [2011], Miller
and Tucker [2014], Adler-Milstein and Jha [2014], and Martinez et al. [2018] also note that
physicians and hospitals have competitive reasons not to adopt EHR or share patient in-
formation even when they are technologically able to do so via EHR. Compatible EHR
may increase competition for patients by reducing patients’ costs of changing providers.
Baker et al. [2015] look at patients in states with laws that imposed ceilings on how much
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a patient could be charged for obtaining their medical records and find that they are much
more likely to switch doctors.
On the empirical side, Abdolrasulnia et al. [2008] find that in a Florida survey of small
physician practices, EHR adoption is positively correlated with the physician concentra-
tion of the practice’s county. Adler-Milstein and Jha [2014] find that a hospital’s partici-
pation in health information exchange with unaffiliated providers is negatively correlated
with for-profit status and market competitiveness and positively correlated with market
share. Ozdemir et al. [2011] and Martinez et al. [2018] analyze models to illustrate the
incentives against health information exchange. Ozdemir et al. [2011] use an economic
model to show that in an environment with heterogeneous providers and myopic con-
sumers, providers have an incentive to not share data even when they have compatible
systems. Martinez et al. [2018] use a game theoretic model to show that small and mid-
sized hospitals may collude to avoid health information exchange for competitive reasons,
but could be persuaded to participate with financial punishments.
Miller and Tucker [2014] derive probit and instrumental variable-probit estimates that
indicate that a hospital’s system size increases the probability of participating in within-
system information exchange and decreases the probability of participating in external
information exchange. The authors hypothesize that the former is due to the internaliza-
tion of network externalities for same-system hospitals, while the latter is due to larger
systems, which are often more expensive, wanting to prevent patients from switching to
cheaper providers. To support the hypothesis that the latter is due to competitive consid-
erations, they show that it only applies to hospitals that accept at least one PPO plan (since
PPO plans are less restrictive than HMO plans, making it easier for PPO-insured patients
to leave), pay above average staff salaries (to keep the clinical strategies of highly skilled
physicians a secret), or are specialty hospitals (to prevent patients from getting follow-up
care outside of the system). Their results are robust to the inclusion of vendor fixed effects
and so account for the possibility that some vendors’ EHR systems have better or worse
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information sharing capabilities.
While hospitals themselves may not want their EHRs to be compatible, the industrial
organization literature also notes that network goods producers, e.g., EHR vendors, may
themselves have competitive reasons to make their products incompatible with those of
other vendors, as incompatibility for network goods locks in early choices and gives an
advantage to firms with larger installed bases [Katz and Shapiro, 1986, Farrell and Klem-
perer, 2007, Chen et al., 2009]. He et al. [2017] develops a model of network goods firms
that set prices for both base products and additional services that may be in or out of net-
work, which may explain why the Epic, a prominent EHR vendor, charged $2.35 for each
patient-year record shared with an external vendor as late as 2015 [Murphy, 2015].
American EHR vendors are fighting for larger slices of a $9.3 billion/year pie: the
EHR Incentive Program had paid over $28 billion to doctors and hospitals from 2011-
2014 [Caldwell, 2015]. Epic, who has one of the highest market shares, made $1.8 billion
in 2014. Pricing information is scarce, but it is public information that they charged Duke
University $700 million and Vanderbilt University $214 million to install their systems
[Arndt, 2017]. In 2014, the U.S. Department of Defense awarded the highly prizedmilitary
healthcare system contract to Cerner, Leidos, and Accenture at a base price of $4.3 billion
[Sullivan, 2015].
1.2.4 Additional Literature
A few papers look at peer effects in healthcare provider networks. Sacarny [2018] and
Nosal [2016b] analyze the effect of physician networks on the diffusion of ideas and prac-
tices, exploiting the fact that a given individual physician often practices at multiple hos-
pitals or group practices, forming another type of network. Sacarny [2018] looks at the
effect on whether physicians code a patient’s type of heart failure in their documentation,
which would increase their Medicare revenue. Nosal [2016b] looks at the effect on adop-
tion of new anti-diabetic drugs. Atasoy et al. [2017] finds that EHR adoption at a hospital is
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associated with decreases in costs for neighboring hospitals. Miller and Tucker [2009] and
Angst et al. [2010] show that EHR adoption is influenced by EHR network externalities .
How hospitals choose their partners is relatively understudied, though there is a large
body of work studying network formation and networks more generally. For a recent
review on the networks literature in economics, see Jackson et al. [2017]. Healthcare
provider networks can be modeled as not only network graphs, but also coalitions or
matching markets. For a recent review on coalitions, research on which has mainly been
from a game theoretical perspective, see Ray and Vohra [2015]. For a recent review on
empirical matching literature, see Chiappori and Salanié [2016].
1.3 Data
Thedata include hospital characteristics (fromMedicareCost Reports), hospital system
membership andEHRbrand selection (from theHealthcare Information andManagement
Systems Society, orHIMSS, IT dataset), MSSPmembership (fromMedicare data), and hos-
pital quality measures (from Medicare Hospital Compare datasets), from 2007-2014. The
hospital identifier used to link these datasets is the CCN (Medicare CertificationNumber).
TheMedicareCost Reports are forms that hospitals fill out annually to informMedicare
of their status. They include information about the type of control (for-profit, non-profit,
or government), whether the hospital is a critical access, disproportionate share (of low-
income patients), or teaching hospital, and whether the hospital has multiple campuses.
Additionally, the reports contain quantity and financial information, such as the number
of beds, number of discharges (total and Medicare), number of patient-days, operating
expenses, patient revenue, and the number of employees on the payroll. There are also
other variables, but I use these because they have the fewest missing observations.
To define the region in which a hospital operates, I use the hospital referral regions
defined by the Dartmouth Atlas Project. The Project maps zip codes to hospital refer-
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ral regions by year and intends them to represent geographic areas with self-contained
healthcare markets. I use the 2010 mapping for all years. Results are similar throughout
for mapping zip codes by year, so I use a fixed mapping for simplicity.
Medicare and the Hospital Quality Alliance developed the public Hospital Compare
datasets to provide consumers with hospital quality information. I use two categories of
Hospital Compare quality measures2: (1) process of care and (2) mortality and readmis-
sions.
The process of caremeasures reflect standards for care established bymedical research.
The advantage of process of care measures over patient outcome measures is that pa-
tient outcomemeasures are subject to patient selection–perhaps excellent hospitals receive
harder cases. Some examples of process of care measures include:
1. the fraction of heart failure patients who received instructions for lifestyle improve-
ments upon discharge
2. the fraction of heart failure patients who received or are scheduled to receive evalu-
ation of their left ventricular systolic function
3. the fraction of heart attack patients who received aspirin within 24 hours of arrival
4. the fraction of pneumonia patients who received antibiotics within 4 hours of arrival
5. average time from arrival to departure in the emergency department.
I use the first two process of care measures, henceforth referred to as HF1 percentage
and HF2 percentage.
The mortality and readmissions measures are patient outcomemeasures. They are the
risk-adjusted 30-day mortality and unplanned readmissions rates for common conditions
such as heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, stroke, and chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease. I use pneumonia and heart failure survival percentages (100 - 100 × mortality
2These are available as raw resources from Medicare or in a cleaner form on Adam Sacarny’s website.
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rate) so that quality is always increasing in the measure, consistent with the process of
care measures used.
The selected Hospital Compare quality measures were chosen for having few missing
observations and the least conceptual ambiguity. Results for other measures are similar,
so they are omitted for parsimony.
Figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 show the distributions of pneumonia survival percentage,
heart failure survival percentage, HF1 percentage, and HF2 percentage, respectively, for
individual hospitals, as well as the distributions of group mean percentages by system,
EHR, and ACO. Overall, the distributions of survival percentages are slightly flatter in
2014 compared to an earlier year (2007 for hospitals, systems, and EHRs; 2012 for ACOs),
while the distributions of HF percentages shifted to the right. The distribution for systems
is not much less distributed than that for individual hospitals, indicating that not only
“high"-quality hospitals form systems. Comparing the EHR distributions to the others,
EHRs face less variation for survival percentages and more variation for HF percentages,
suggesting that they experience higher positive assortative matching for outcome mea-
sures but less or none for process of care measures. Though the distributions of outcome
percentages for ACOs is similar to those for hospitals and other groups, ACOs’ process
measure distributions are substantially shifted to the right, indicating that ACOs collect
hospitals that excel on process measures.
Figure 1.5 shows the numbers of each entity over time. The numbers of individual hos-
pitals and ACOs increased over time, while the numbers of systems and EHRs decreased
over time. Figure 1.6 shows that this decrease in the quantity of system and EHR networks
corresponded to an increase in the average system and EHR network size, suggesting con-
solidation.
Figure 1.6 shows the histograms of hospital counts by network type, indicating how
large each network usually was, by type. The system histogram is restricted to systems
with more than 2 hospitals, while the EHR and ACO histograms are restricted to EHRs
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Figure 1.1: Distributions of pneumonia survival percentages, for hospitals, systems, EHRs, and
ACOs.
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Figure 1.2: Distributions of heart failure survival percentages, for hospitals, systems, EHRs, and
ACOs.
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Figure 1.3: Distributions of HF1 percentages, for hospitals, systems, EHRs, and ACOs.
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Figure 1.4: Distributions of HF2 percentages, for hospitals, systems, EHRs, and ACOs.
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Figure 1.5: Numbers of different entities over time.
and ACOs with more than 1 hospital. The former restriction is because more than half
of systems have 1 or 2 hospitals, and the latter restriction is because few EHRs or ACOs
have only 1 hospital; both restrictions make to-scale histograms more informative. Fig-
ure 1.6 shows that systems were mostly under 50 hospitals, several EHRs had hundreds
of hospitals, and ACOs were generally much smaller, with fewer than 15 hospitals. The
distributions of system and EHR network sizes shifted toward larger numbers from 2007
to 2014, while the distribution of ACO network sizes spread out from 2012 to 2014.
Figure 1.7 shows the percentage of hospitals in each network type over time. All three
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Figure 1.6: Histograms of hospital counts in each group for each network type.
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Figure 1.7: Percentage of hospitals in each network type, over time.
types are increasing over time, though the EHRpercentage appears to increase at a slightly
faster rate than the systempercentage. The networkmembership datasets contain between
4,300-4,600 hospitals per year and roughly 35,000 hospital-years in total.
Table 1.2 displays the summary statistics of the outcome variables and covariates by
sample. The first column contains means for the full sample of hospital-years that will
be used for statistical analyses, while the remaining columns contain means for the sub-
sample of hospital-years where the hospital joined a specific type of network in that year.
Hospitals that just joined ACOs have relatively high HF Shares, but their survival per-
centages are roughly the same as for the other samples. The ACO subsample also contains
more hospitals that are either nonprofit- or government-run, hospitals with a higher num-
ber of beds, discharges, and patient-days, and hospitals with higher patient revenue and
operating expenses. Note that the full sample in this table contains only around 17,000
hospital-years; this is due to using two lags to try to account for unobserved hospital qual-
ity and also simply because the quality datasets do not contain all of the hospital-years in
the network membership datasets.
Table 1.3 shows the results of SUR regressions of quality variables on each other, across
hospital-years. They are mostly positively correlated with each other, with positive esti-
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics by sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sys EHR ACO
Pneumonia Survival 88.120 88.282 88.227 88.794
Heart Failure Survival 88.406 88.365 88.461 88.610
HF1 Percentage 88.811 87.357 84.039 94.076
HF2 Percentage 95.873 95.951 93.491 99.359
In System 0.611 1.000 0.615 0.862
Has EHR 0.791 0.798 1.000 0.814




EHR National HHI 761.447 . . .
EHR Regional HHI 1946.368 . . .
System National HHI 34.563 . . .
System Regional HHI 1291.919 . . .
ACO National HHI 2.388 . . .
ACO Regional HHI 753.492 . . .
Year 2010.997 2011.315 2010.673 2013.441
Not For-Profit 0.809 0.846 0.831 0.935
Critical Access 0.131 0.267 0.242 0.062
Disproportionate Share 0.750 0.597 0.638 0.800
Teaching Hospital 0.296 0.207 0.239 0.505
Number of Beds 215.436 151.126 173.954 275.392
Operating Expenses 199.559 135.416 161.218 305.219
Patient Revenue 640.764 423.435 508.592 999.716
Discharges - Total 0.907 0.605 0.724 1.222
Discharges - Medicare 0.298 0.206 0.243 0.387
Patient-Days - Total 4.231 2.683 3.345 5.852
Observations 16948 610 1687 370
Column (1) shows summary statistics for the full sample. Column (2) shows summary
statistics for hospital-years where a hospital joined a system network. Column (3) shows
summary statistics for hospital-years where a hospital joined an EHR network. Column
(4) shows summary statistics for hospital-years where a hospital joined an ACO network.
Operating expenses and patient revenue are in millions, while discharges, patient
days-visits, and employees are in tens of thousands.
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mates at the 0.1% level of statistical significance. However, HF1 Percentage and Heart
Failure Survival are negatively correlated. There are various possible explanations in-
volving omitted variables; since they are both positively correlated with the other two
outcome variables, it is still sensible to assume that higher values of all variables imply
higher underlying true hospital quality, though the presence of additional results that go
in different directions for different outcomes should not be too surprising. Note that the
HF Share variables are not that useful for predicting survival percentages, having small
coefficients, while the survival percentages have much larger coefficients for predicting
the HF Share variables, suggesting that the presence of high HF Shares is necessary but
not sufficient for a hospital to have high survival rates.
Table 1.3: SUR regressions of quality variables on each other.
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Pneumonia Survival 0.59709*** 0.19231*** 0.22964***
[0.00556] [0.05723] [0.04264]
Heart Failure Survival 0.81567*** -0.55738*** 0.28613***
[0.00759] [0.06688] [0.04988]
HF1 Percentage 0.00346*** -0.00734*** 0.62795***
[0.00103] [0.00088] [0.00420]




Since I have multiple dependent variables of interest for each given specification, I use
seemingly unrelated (SUR) regression to estimate a system of equations. With multiple
dependent variables, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is consistent but not effi-
cient. SUR is equivalent to OLS when the errors are uncorrelated across equations and all
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equations have the same independent variables.










where i indexes observations, l indexes Sks the set of independent variables for k in spec-
ification s, xli is the value of independent variable l for i, and ε
ks
i is the observation-level
shock.
Stacking the dependent variables for one specification s results in the equation





In all results tables, one star indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; two at the
5% level; and three at the 0.1% level.
1.5 Network Formation
Past work on hospital networks has focused on one network type at a time, ignoring
potential interactions. There has also been relatively little work on what hospitals look
for in groups that they may join or what groups look for in potential member hospitals.
Section 1.5.1 discusses patterns inwhen hospitals joinmultiple network types, and Section
1.5.2 provides evidence of assortative matching for each network type.
1.5.1 Interactions between Network Types
Table 1.4 shows the shares of hospital pair-years in the same network for each network
type, conditional on being in the same network for a given network type. Table 1.5 shows
the shares of hospital pair-years with a switch to being in the same network for each type,
conditional on having a switch to being in the same network for a given type. For com-
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parison, they also show the unconditional probabilities of being in the same network or
switching to the same network for each network type. Being in the same network for a
given type makes it much more likely to be in the same network for one or both of the
other types.
Notably, out of hospital pairs in the same ACO, 72.1% are also in the same system,
compared to only 0.4% being in the same system overall. ACOs are thus largely composed
of hospitals that are already in the same system, though it is not necessarily the case that
if one hospital is in a given system and ACO, all of the other hospitals in that system are
also in the same ACO. There are 1,611,044 pair-years where at least one hospital in the pair
is in an ACO and the pair is in the same system. 8,199 of these pair-years are not both in
the same ACO, with even 664 being in two different ACOs.3 In some sense, ACOs are the
strictest network type, since being in the same ACO results on a 46.9% probability of being
in the same network for all three types, compared to 0.3% for being in the same system,
which is the next highest probability.
Out of hospital pairs in the same system or ACO, roughly 50% also have the same
EHR, compared to 7.9% having the same EHR overall. Out of pair-years that switched to
being in the same system or ACO, 12.3% and 9.4%, respectively, also switched to the same
EHR, compared to 1.6% of overall pairs switching to the same EHR. While the other dif-
ferences between conditional and unconditional probabilities are similar in relative terms,
suggesting correlation among all of the network types, the differences for the probability
of having the same EHR or switching to the same EHR are the substantially larger in abso-
lute terms. This suggests that system and ACO network formation drives a large portion
of EHR network formation.
3Looking at the differences in pneumonia survival percentage between hospitals that were left out of
an ACO (i.e., in the same system as a hospital in an ACO, but not in any ACO themselves) and the ACOs
that they were left out of, the mean and median differences are -0.15. The max difference is 5.3, and the
minimum difference is -6.8. Thus, there are both hospitals that are better than the ACO that excluded them
and hospitals that are worse than the ACO that excluded them, with some skew toward leaving out lower
quality hospitals. As will be discussed in Section 1.5.2, there are different incentives that could cause an
ACO to leave out better or worse hospitals.
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Table 1.4: Shares of hospital pair-years in the same network for a given type, conditional
on being in the same network for another type.
Pr(Sys=1) Pr(EHR=1) Pr(ACO=1) Pr(all=1)
Sys=1 1.0 0.4927900907 0.0052159977 0.0033887135
EHR=1 0.0227900937 1.0 0.0001686667 0.0001567180
ACO=1 0.7213878819 0.5044018643 1.0 0.4686690833





The columns specify the shares of hospital pair-years in each network type. The rows
specify which subset the shares are for: those in the same system, those with the same
EHR, those in the same ACO, or the total sample.
1.5.2 Assortative Matching
On top of the possibility of providing more integrated care, there are different incen-
tives for a hospital to join a network group, or for a network group to accept a hospital, for
the different network types. EHRs differ in that the EHR network group of hospitals does
not have control over which hospitals join it; the EHR vendor and individual hospitals
make the decision. Systems give healthcare providers market power against insurers in
general, so they may prefer to collect the highest quality hospitals they can attract to gain
the most market power. ACOs have a similar implicit incentive, but they also have explicit
incentives in their ACO contracts with insurers.
MSSP ACOs in particular have their financial reward tied to how much all members
manage to reduce their costs relative to previous years. Thus, they may prefer to either
contract with higher quality hospitals, because it is easier to coordinate with them or for
market power, or lower quality hospitals, because they have more room to reduce costs.
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Table 1.5: Shares of hospital pair-years that have switched to the same network for a
given type, conditional on having switched to being in the same network for another
type.
Pr(Sys=1) Pr(EHR=1) Pr(ACO=1) Pr(all=1)
Sys=1 1.0000000000 0.1317704426 0.0008388089 0.0006986900
EHR=1 0.0028484762 1.0000000000 0.0001010269 0.0000160352
ACO=1 0.0576923077 0.1823444284 1.0000000000 0.0149476831





The columns specify the shares of hospital pair-years that have switched to each network
type. The rows specify which subset the shares are for: those that have switched to the
same system, those that have switched to the same EHR, those that have switched to the
same ACO, or the total sample. For each column, the share is conditional on not having
been in the same such group in the previous year, since by definition, those who were in
the same such group in the previous year cannot switch to being in the same such group
in the current year.
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The fact that ACOs are largely built on existing systems but omit some systemmembers, as
mentioned in Section 1.5.1, suggests that ACOs do think about membership strategically.
To analyze matching patterns between hospitals and existing network entities, I follow
Chiappori et al. [2012] in running SUR regressions of a hospital’s variables on those of
the network group it is joining. To estimate how different characteristics affect the util-
ity generated, the two-sided matching model in Chiappori et al. [2012] assumes that the
utility that a person gets from a match follows an additively separable index model, i.e.,
that a potential partner’s characteristics affect utility only through their effects on a one-
dimensional index of quality. An empirically testable prediction of this model is that the
marginal rate of substitution between two partner characteristics for a given own charac-






for all (k1, k2, r, t),
where γkt is the coefficient for covariate t in the equation for outcome variable k.
I will strongly reject the null hypothesis that this equivalence holds for my matching
data using the Wald test on my estimates. Thus, the index model is rejected for my data,
and my estimates do not have a structural interpretation, which I leave to future work.
I normalize variables by subtracting the means and dividing by their standard devia-
tions so that the coefficients are comparable both within and across regressions. For the
network mean variables, I subtract the unweighted mean of means and divide by the un-
weighted standard deviation of means. I use variables from the year prior to the year in
which the hospital joined its network. For hospitals that join different groups for the same
network more than once in my time period, I keep only the first observation. For the qual-
ity measure equations (HF1 Percentage, HF2 Percentage, Pneumonia Survival Percentage,
and Heart Failure Survival Percentage), I control for year fixed effects and lags of all the
individual hospital characteristics of interest. For the hospital characteristics equations
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(Not-for-Profit, Critical Access, Discharges, and Revenue Minus Expenses), I control for
the same, excluding the dependent variable. For all equations in my main specification, I
control for lags of whether the hospital is a disproportionate share or teaching hospital, as
well as lags of the number of beds and patient-days. I do not use these controls as depen-
dent variables for the sake of parsimony; results without the controls suggest that results
would be similar if they were included as dependent variables.
Table 1.6 contains the results from SUR regressions of a hospital’s own variables on
its system’s averages of those variables, both from the year before the hospital joins the
system, such that correlations should be due tomatching preferences and not due to effects
on each other. Tables 1.7 and 1.8, respectively, contain the results for hospitals joining EHR
and ACO groups. In these tables, columns represent the individual variable for a hospital
that joined a system, and rows represent the system average.
For systems, there is strong positive assortativity for all of the quality measures and
most of the included characteristics (not-for-profit status, critical access, number of dis-
charges, and estimated profit), with all coefficients being statistically significant and hav-
ing substantial estimates that are between 0.25 and 0.6. Only discharges have a coefficient
that is small in magnitude (0.05).
Comparing across network types, assortativity is weaker for EHRs, with only the es-
timates for HF1 share and not-for-profit status being significant along the diagonal. This
makes intuitive sense since a hospital does not need the agreement of other hospitals in
an EHR group in order to join it. A hospital joins an EHR network when the hospital and
a vendor form an agreement, not when the hospital forms an agreement with other hos-
pitals in the network. However, assortativity may still exist due to other factors such as
EHR vendors specializing and pricing to target different types of hospitals, such as not-
for-profit hospitals. Additionally, EHR software design is more likely to directly affect
process-of-care measures, which track how often certain actions, which may be tracked










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a certain process-of-care measure may choose an EHR that is good at facilitating it, and
it is possible that HF1 share exhibits positive assortativity for EHR matching. Some EHR
assortativity may be due to system and ACO assortativity since hospitals in the same sys-
tem and/or ACO are much more likely to have the same EHR, but the estimates for HF1
share and not-for-profit status are both much smaller in magnitude for systems and ACOs
than for EHRs, so it is not possible for all of the EHR assortativity to be due to system and
ACO assortativity.
Assortativity appears to be slightly weaker for ACOs than for systems, with estimates
that are slightly smaller in magnitude and statistically significant a little less often than
those for systems. This suggests that when it comes toACOmatching, hospitals andACOs
prefer to match with partners with similar quality, though it is not as important as for
hospitals and systems matching with each other. This may be because ACO programs
reward ACOs for improvement, not for sustaining high quality from the beginning. At
the same time, it may be difficult for a high-quality hospital to help a hospital that is of
too-low quality to improve, so that slight positive assortativity still exists.
Since ACOs choose their members on their own, the exhibited positive assortativity
presumably maximizes their private surplus. This may diverge from optimizing social
surplus if a major function of ACOs is to provide their members with market power. This
possibility is analyzed in Section 1.6. It is also possible that negative assortative matching
could produce more social surplus since lower quality hospitals have more room for im-
provement and higher quality hospitals may be more able to help others improve. This
possibility is analyzed in Section 1.7. In general, these results demonstrate that a vital
part in estimating the effect of a network on an individual hospital would be to separate
the peer effects from the correlations due to assortative matching. I attempt to do this in
Section 1.7.
The Wald test for equality of coefficient ratios across equations is rejected for each net-
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work type. I simply test for
γ̂HF SurvMean HF Surv
γ̂HF SurvMean HF1 Perc
=
γ̂HF1 PercMean HF Surv
γ̂HF1 PercMean HF1 Perc
,
which is only one equation that must be true for the index model not to be rejected. For
systems, the test statistic is 844. For EHRs, the test statistic is 3,688. For ACOs, the test
statistic is 261. The cut-off for rejecting the null hypothesis at the 0.1% level for a chi-
squared distribution with 1 degree of freedom is 10.83.
Appendix A.1 contains the results for a specification without controls. For systems
and ACOs, these estimates are qualitatively similar to and not substantially different from
the estimates from the main specification, so it is less likely that the results are primarily
due to omitted variable bias. For EHRs, the specification without controls exhibits more
significant estimates, suggesting that hospitals matchwith EHR networks on quality char-
acteristics only through how their non-quality characteristics affect their quality charac-
teristics. This is consistent with the explanation that EHR vendors target their product
design and sales to specific types of hospitals.
1.6 Network Externalities through Market Concentration
Figure 1.8 shows the distributions of region counts for different network entities. The
majority of systems and ACOs operate in one region, but a substantial number operate
in more than one–often up to 10 for systems or 5 for ACOs. A plurality of EHRs operate
in one region, but the EHR distribution of region counts has a longer right tail, with a
max of 202 regions compared to a max of 61 for systems and 7 for ACOs. There are 306
regions in the data in total. The distributions of region counts for systems and EHRs shift
to larger counts from 2007 to 2014, indicating that more systems and EHRs operate in
more regions over time. This should give systems and EHRs more national market power
as they transcend regional boundaries more often. The ACO distribution shifts to smaller
34
counts from 2012 to 2014. This may be because the largest ACOs started operating as soon
as possible, in 2012, while marginal, smaller ACOs began operating later.
(a) Histogram of region counts for systems.
(b) Histogram of region counts for EHRs. (c) Histogram of region counts for ACOs.
Figure 1.8: Distributions of region counts, for different network entities.




where j indexes firms in Fm, the set of firms in market m, and p jm is the percentage of
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the market that j has in m. It is a measure of market concentration, where a monopoly
would have an HHI of 10,000 and a market with 10 firms with equal market share would
have an HHI of 1,000. The U.S. Department of Justice [2018] uses HHI to evaluate mergers
for antitrust purposes; they consider an HHI of less than 1,500 to indicate a competitive
market, an HHI of 1,500 to 2,500 to be a moderately concentrated market, and an HHI of
over 2,500 to be a highly concentrated market.
FormyHHI calculations, I look at the concentration of hospitals and patient discharges
in the three network types, defining market shares in terms of the percentage of hospitals
and discharges, respectively, that each network entity has. I count hospitals not in given
network type as being in their own one-hospital network for that type.
Figure 1.9 shows the nationalHHI of the three network types over time, by hospital and
discharge concentration. Note that EHR HHI is much more concentrated than either sys-
tem or ACO HHI. This largely reflects the fact that many more hospitals are in any EHR
network at all (Figure 1.7); additionally, EHR networks operate across multiple regions
more often, as depicted in Figure 1.8. All HHIs are increasing over time. Interestingly,
EHR HHI increases throughout the whole time period, while system HHI begins increas-
ingmainly in 2011, the year when a government program promoting EHR use started. For
each type, the discharge HHI is higher than the hospital HHI, which makes sense since
discharges are not uniformly distributed across hospitals.
Figures 1.10 and 1.11 depict HHI levels in each hospital referral region, in 2007 and
2014, for both system and EHR shares of hospitals and discharges. Figure 1.12 depicts
HHI levels by region in 2012 (the earliest year in whichMedicare Shared Savings Program
ACOs existed) and 2014 for ACO shares of hospitals. Dark green, green, and yellow rep-
resent areas of high, moderate, and low market concentration, as categorized by the U.S.
Department of Justice. The figures show that there is variation in where each network
type is highly concentrated and corroborate that the concentration, on average, increased
over time.
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Figure 1.9: Average HHI across regions over time, by network type.
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Figure 1.13 depicts the quantities of hospitals and discharges by region, in 2007 and
2014. For the hospital maps, the dark green areas represent regions with over 50 hospitals,
the green areas represent regions with between 25 and 50 hospitals, and the yellow green
regions represent regions with fewer than 25 hospitals. The corresponding categories for
the discharge maps are over 60,000, between 30,000 and 60,000, and fewer than 30,000.
The minimum number of hospitals in a region in any year is 1, and the maximum is 82.
The minimum number of discharges in a region in any year is 7,955, and the maximum is
95,000.
High concentration in regions on the quantity maps is roughly inversely correlated
with high concentration in regions on the HHI maps. This could be largely mechanical:
for example, a hypothetical region with 1 hospital would necessarily have the maximum
HHI of 10,000. The high hospital quantity regions are the opposite of what might be ex-
pected from population density–i.e., there should be a higher density of hospitals on the
coasts. This may be because the regions are defined so that low density regions are gen-
erally larger in surface area. The minimum number of zip codes in a region is 1, and the
maximum is 72.
Table 1.9 describes possible sources of correlation between different group HHIs and
hospital quality. The top half discusses system and ACO HHIs together since their net-
work structures are more similar, as they are both groups of hospitals that intentionally
connect with each other and they primarily interact with insurers. The bottom half dis-
cusses EHR HHIs separately since hospitals can join EHR networks without the permis-
sion of other hospitals in those networks and since EHR networks interact primarily with
EHR vendors. There are possible explanations for both positive and negative correlations,
for the four sets of coefficients for each network type: regional HHI, national HHI, and
their interactions with being in the relevant network. Each set of coefficients has four co-
efficients, one for each quality measure. Italicized boxes indicate which possible sources
of correlation are consistent with the signs of at least two statistically significant quality
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(a) Hospital HHI, 2007 (b) Hospital HHI, 2014
(c) Discharge HHI, 2007 (d) Discharge HHI, 2014
Figure 1.10: Maps showing HHI of Systems by region.
(a) Hospital HHI, 2007 (b) Hospital HHI, 2014
(c) Discharge HHI, 2007 (d) Discharge HHI, 2014
Figure 1.11: Maps showing HHI of EHRs by region.
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(a) Hospital HHI, 2012 (b) Hospital HHI, 2014
(c) Discharge HHI, 2012 (d) Discharge HHI, 2014
Figure 1.12: Maps showing HHI of ACOs by region.
coefficients. Those italicized with two stars are significant at the 5% level for at least two
quality measures, whereas those italicized with one star are significant at the 10% level
for at least two quality measures.
The potential negative correlation between either EHR regional HHI or EHR national
HHI and quality comes from market power. Standard IO theory predicts that market
power allows firms to increase prices and/or decrease quality. Lower quality EHR (in
terms of the software itself or service in installation and instruction) could decrease hos-
pital quality. EHR regional HHI may be positively correlated with hospital quality since
cooperation at the regional level affects the care of patients who must go to multiple hos-
pitals, which are usually within the same region. EHR national HHI may be positively
correlated with hospital quality through certain EHR vendors expending more effort to
increase EHR quality or generally being better at increasing EHR quality in the first place,
thereby garnering higher market shares.
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(a) Number of Hospitals, 2007 (b) Number of Hospitals, 2014
(c) Number of Discharges, 2007 (d) Number of Discharges, 2014
Figure 1.13: Quantities by region.
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Similarmechanismsmay be atwork for systems andACOs, though their nationalHHIs
should be less likely to be negatively correlated with hospital quality since systems and
ACOs do not compete on a national level as much as EHR vendors do, if at all. As before,
positive correlations between their national HHIs and hospital qualitywould likely be due
to the existence of certain very nationally popular groups being related to the groups’ a
priori high quality. In this case, the popular groups may have a positive effect on their
member hospitals’ quality, or they may simply be allowing high quality hospitals to join
them. These explanations are not separable in this specification and manifest as reverse
causation between the dependent variable, hospital quality, and the independent variable,
national HHIs. Section 1.7 provides some evidence that high quality groups actually in-
fluence the quality of their member hospitals.
The effects of group HHIs may affect only hospitals in those groups, or they may also
have externalities, additionally affecting hospitals not in the relevant network types. Thus,
for each network type, the independent variables of interest include not only its national
and regional HHIs but also their interactions with an indicator for membership in any
group of that network type. National system/ACO concentration can be correlated with
hospital quality through market power against insurers–positively if the system/ACO’s
stronger market power enables it to make insurers cover more services or negatively if it
allows it to raise prices to patients. The balance ofmarket power should affect all hospitals,
not just those in a system/ACO, whereas positive correlations between concentration and
quality due to larger systems/ACOs being able to invest more or due to good hospitals
being more likely to join groups should only exist for hospitals in those groups.
Considering the main intended purpose of an ACO program is to increase coordina-
tion, it may seem that national ACOs, which have providers from multiple regions such
that they do not share patients and thus do not need to coordinate with each other, could
only possibly exist to increase their members’ market power against suppliers and/or
other insurers. While this may be one real incentive to form a national ACO, other in-
42
Table 1.9: Possible sources of correlation between Group HHIs and hospital quality.




Larger systems/ACOs may have
more institutions in place to
further cooperation in general.
Hospital market power against





Hospital market power against
insurers can make insurers cover
more services, allowing patients to
receive better care.** (Sys)
Hospital market power against





Systems/ACOs may focus on
cooperation within themselves, and
this may not benefit all regional
hospitals as much.
Hospital market power against
patients may increase more for
hospitals in systems/ACOs than




Larger systems/ACOs have more resources
for making investments in
technology that can improve quality.
Hospital market power against
insurers may increase more for





More hospitals having EHR or
nearby hospitals having fewer
different brands of EHR might
help all regional hospitals share
patient information.*
Certain brands may specialize in
specific regions, giving them regional
market power and allowing them
to reduce EHR quality, which could
make it harder for hospitals




Certain brands may have gained
popularity by improving their quality.
This could make it easier for any
hospital to cooperate with hospitals
with such EHR brands.
Most brands operate nationally, so
national HHI is the closest
approximation of market power for
EHR vendors, which could allow




Hospital with the same EHR are more
likely to be able to easily send patient
data to each other.
Decreases in EHR quality that come
from EHR vendor market power
may have a greater direct effect on




Certain brands may have gained
popularity by improving their quality.
This might have a larger impact
on hospitals that actually have EHR.
Decreases in EHR quality that come
from EHR vendor market power
may have a greater direct effect on
hospitals that actually have EHR.
centives may include spreading the high fixed cost of starting an ACO across more par-
ticipants, establishing a national brand, and reducing the risk that would come with the
higher statistical variance in smaller patient populations [Blackstone andFuhr, 2016, Japsen,
2018, Betbeze, 2018]. Thus, whether national ACO network concentration is positively or
negatively correlated with hospital quality is an empirical matter.
Table 1.10 contains the results of SUR regressions of quality measures on interactions
between indicators for being in or having just joined certain network types. The results
indicate that quality is generally positively correlated with being in a system or having an
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EHR network and that there are complementarities associated with being in both system
and EHR networks. They also indicate that having just joined such networks is negatively
associated with quality. This is consistent with the results of Dranove et al. [2014], in
which hospitals immediately experience an undesirable increase in costs after adopting
electronic medical records but eventually enjoy a decrease after three years. This phe-
nomenon may be due to the initial difficulties in understanding how to use a new tech-
nology or operate in a new institutional framework.
Table 1.11 contains the results of regressions of hospital quality measures on network
regional and national HHI, controlling for year trends, year fixed effects, and hospital
characteristics (including own quality lags, to try to account for individual variation–
individual fixed effects would be too costly to estimate). Note that the estimates for na-
tional HHIs should be taken with a grain of salt since their varying only by year means
that they are identified off of only 8 points of variation. The magnitudes of the negative
correlations of national EHRHHI are substantially greater than those of the positive corre-
lations of the regional EHRHHI, suggesting that the decrease in EHR quality from having
a monopolist EHR vendor would outweigh the increase in regional network effects from
universal interoperability. EHR vendors are currently working toward achieving interop-
erability across brands, whichwould allow for both EHR competition and interoperability.
While this may be difficult to accomplish technologically, the alternative, a government-
imposed single vendor, would have to be carefully regulated to avoid the negative effects
of monopoly.
National system HHI is mostly positively correlated with hospital quality, while the
results for regional system HHI are slightly negative. National ACO HHI is strongly neg-
atively correlatedwith hospital quality, validating the anticompetitive concerns thatMedi-
care had while designing the ACO program in question.
The results are qualitatively similar when controlling for EHR fixed effects and region
fixed effects and allowing for clustered standard errors, as can be seen in Appendix A.2.
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Table 1.10: SUR regressions of hospital survival percentage and process of care measures
on only network membership variables.
(2)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Join EHR=0 × Join Sys=0 × Join ACO=1 0.18826 -0.17087 0.53962 -0.61658
[0.28762] [0.25208] [2.74508] [1.56807]
Join EHR=0 × Join Sys=1 × Join ACO=0 0.02902 -0.02507 -1.06288* -0.50458
[0.05904] [0.05174] [0.56376] [0.32197]
Join EHR=1 × Join Sys=0 × Join ACO=0 0.02120 0.02629 -1.58583*** 0.00042
[0.03198] [0.02801] [0.30521] [0.17434]
Join EHR=1 × Join Sys=0 × Join ACO=1 0.01095 -0.05542 -1.20497 -3.13665
[0.47486] [0.41621] [4.53246] [2.58912]
Join EHR=1 × Join Sys=1 × Join ACO=0 -0.00311 0.04805 0.28543 0.89091*
[0.08709] [0.07631] [0.83115] [0.47481]
Has EHR=0 × In System=0 × In ACO=1 -0.86560 0.63608 5.28636 1.65003
[0.55823] [0.48912] [5.32700] [3.04300]
Has EHR=0 × In System=1 × In ACO=0 -0.05958 -0.06775** 2.38581*** 1.09541***
[0.03724] [0.03263] [0.35707] [0.20499]
Has EHR=0 × In System=1 × In ACO=1 -0.03414 0.21120 2.95773 1.82061
[0.30956] [0.27130] [2.95476] [1.68798]
Has EHR=1 × In System=0 × In ACO=0 -0.01159 -0.03488 1.81818*** 1.00635***
[0.03176] [0.02783] [0.30328] [0.17382]
Has EHR=1 × In System=0 × In ACO=1 -0.04538 0.20849 1.60182 0.50966
[0.31011] [0.27179] [2.96024] [1.69106]
Has EHR=1 × In System=1 × In ACO=0 -0.03493 -0.06331** 3.01691*** 1.18208***
[0.03171] [0.02779] [0.30508] [0.17559]
Has EHR=1 × In System=1 × In ACO=1 -0.14692 0.14381 2.05253 1.62028
[0.27308] [0.23934] [2.60654] [1.48910]
Dep. var lags 1 and 2 Y
Hospital covariates Y
Year trend Y





Table 1.11: SUR regressions of hospital survival percentage and process of care measures
on network and regional HHIs, as well as network membership variables (1/4).
(3)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
System National HHI -0.10192*** 0.01856* 0.30571** 0.03690
[0.01195] [0.01049] [0.11472] [0.06553]
System Regional HHI -0.00000 0.00001 0.00010 0.00029**
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00021] [0.00012]
System Nat HHI × In System 0.00580 0.00415 -0.05401 -0.01467
[0.00399] [0.00350] [0.03832] [0.02188]
System Reg HHI × In System -0.00003 -0.00003* -0.00010 -0.00030**
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00019] [0.00011]
EHR National HHI 0.00487*** -0.00151** -0.01310** 0.00145
[0.00054] [0.00048] [0.00521] [0.00298]
EHR Regional HHI 0.00001 0.00006*** 0.00038* 0.00021*
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00020] [0.00012]
EHR Nat HHI × Has EHR 0.00022 0.00016 -0.00203 0.00185
[0.00031] [0.00027] [0.00296] [0.00169]
EHR Reg HHI × Has EHR 0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00035* -0.00021*
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00020] [0.00012]
ACO National HHI 0.59819*** 0.58505*** -1.41070** -0.66304*
[0.06723] [0.05901] [0.64583] [0.36904]
ACO Regional HHI 0.00000 -0.00004** -0.00006 -0.00003
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00018] [0.00010]
ACO Nat HHI × In ACO 0.00537 -0.38429** 1.39419 0.20676
[0.20939] [0.18387] [2.01159] [1.14916]
ACO Reg HHI × In ACO -0.00003 0.00001 -0.00019 -0.00006
[0.00006] [0.00005] [0.00055] [0.00032]
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Table 1.11: SUR regressions of hospital survival percentage and process of care measures
on network and regional HHIs, as well as network membership variables, continued
(2/4).
(3)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
In System=0 × Has EHR=0 × In ACO=1 -1.08539 1.56615** 1.23706 1.11167
[0.87868] [0.77148] [8.44019] [4.82123]
In System=0 × Has EHR=1 × In ACO=0 -0.22186 -0.12086 3.81448* -0.07821
[0.22926] [0.20125] [2.20222] [1.25824]
In System=0 × Has EHR=1 × In ACO=1 -0.56654 1.01703 -0.05239 -1.35775
[0.83762] [0.73544] [8.04650] [4.59642]
In System=1 × Has EHR=0 × In ACO=0 -0.20441 -0.14962 4.21390** 1.90129**
[0.13829] [0.12140] [1.33108] [0.76046]
In System=1 × Has EHR=0 × In ACO=1 -0.49115 1.01991 1.44361 2.22306
[0.77308] [0.67879] [7.42707] [4.24247]
In System=1 × Has EHR=1 × In ACO=0 -0.40810 -0.24650 7.00745** 0.94607
[0.26613] [0.23369] [2.55915] [1.46208]
In System=1 × Has EHR=1 × In ACO=1 -0.81974 0.84030 2.83782 0.82073
[0.80474] [0.70659] [7.73122] [4.41635]
Join Sys=0 × Join EHR=0 × Join ACO=1 0.41785 -0.10620 0.76259 -0.33258
[0.32791] [0.28792] [3.14995] [1.79929]
Join Sys=0 × Join EHR=1 × Join ACO=0 -0.00972 0.02984 -1.49635*** -0.03806
[0.03188] [0.02799] [0.30627] [0.17493]
Join Sys=0 × Join EHR=1 × Join ACO=1 0.23024 0.01970 -1.16747 -2.90251
[0.49108] [0.43124] [4.71790] [2.69491]
Join Sys=1 × Join EHR=0 × Join ACO=0 0.02908 -0.02213 -1.06338* -0.51370
[0.05864] [0.05148] [0.56350] [0.32181]
Join Sys=1 × Join EHR=1 × Join ACO=0 0.04399 0.10273 0.15212 0.80017*
[0.08672] [0.07613] [0.83296] [0.47579]
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Table 1.11: SUR regressions of hospital survival percentage and process of care measures
on network and regional HHIs, as well as network membership variables, continued
(3/4).
(3)
PN HF HF1 HF2






Lag =1 0.41634 -0.14012 0.83156 -0.29494






Lag =0 -0.00230 -0.04621* -0.07187 0.23103






Lag =1 1.28313** -0.70410 0.33250 0.09678






Lag =0 0.03247 0.05795 -0.76316 0.35345






Lag =0 0.14538* 0.04459 -0.22285 -0.03166
[0.08805] [0.07730] [0.84571] [0.48317]
Pneumonia Survival Lag 0.83015***
[0.00721]
Pneumonia Survival Lag 2 -0.03131***
[0.00741]
Heart Failure Survival Lag 0.77616***
[0.00727]
Heart Failure Survival Lag 2 0.01217
[0.00751]
HF1 Percentage Lag 0.56549***
[0.00698]
HF1 Percentage Lag 2 0.08143***
[0.00621]
HF2 Percentage Lag 0.60198***
[0.00704]
HF2 Percentage Lag 2 0.19242***
[0.00661]
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Table 1.11: SUR regressions of hospital survival percentage and process of care measures
on network and regional HHIs, as well as network membership variables, continued
(4/4).
(3)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Year 0.01592 -0.08209*** 0.30363** -0.32241***
[0.01267] [0.01114] [0.12352] [0.06981]
Not For-Profit 0.05364** -0.04605** -0.16734 -0.02438
[0.02206] [0.01938] [0.21208] [0.12107]
Critical Access -0.16921*** -0.10083*** -1.16349*** -0.75833***
[0.03420] [0.02998] [0.32744] [0.18967]
Disproportionate Share -0.10734*** -0.06370** -0.01088 0.07425
[0.02520] [0.02205] [0.24076] [0.13752]
Teaching Hospital 0.05247** 0.05361** 0.25513 0.05368
[0.02118] [0.01860] [0.20342] [0.11626]
Number of Beds -0.00024*** -0.00009 -0.00087 -0.00024
[0.00007] [0.00006] [0.00067] [0.00038]
Operating Expenses 0.00011 -0.00018** -0.00040 -0.00013
[0.00008] [0.00007] [0.00080] [0.00046]
Patient Revenue 0.00003 0.00006** 0.00029 -0.00005
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00022] [0.00013]
Discharges - Total 0.04950 -0.01257 0.89116** 0.04988
[0.03535] [0.03104] [0.33998] [0.19425]
Discharges - Medicare 0.05541 -0.04118 1.15765* 0.51386
[0.06562] [0.05749] [0.62908] [0.35967]
Patient-Days - Total -0.00262 0.01788** -0.15426** -0.00828
[0.00678] [0.00596] [0.06523] [0.03726]
Constant -15.94274 182.79513*** -577.46199** 666.54507***
[25.39918] [22.32537] [247.26475] [139.73144]
Dep. var lags 1 and 2 Y
Hospital covariates Y
Year trend Y





1.7 Peer Effects within Networks
Whether there are peer effects within networks is of interest because their existence
makes it possible for negative assortativity to be desirable froma socialwelfare standpoint.
Combined with the positive assortativity exhibited in Section 1.5.2, peer effects would
point to a mechanism through which social welfare and private surplus diverge, possibly
making the current hospital network formation process inefficient for social welfare. To
investigate whether peer effects exist in these networks, I look at the samples of hospital-
years where a hospital first joined a given network type in that year and regress its current
quality on its new network group’s past mean quality, controlling for the hospital’s own
quality lags as well to account for assortativity. The hospital’s current quality may affect
its group’s current mean quality but should not affect the group’s past mean quality, so
positive estimates for the coefficients on past group mean quality provide support for the
existence of peer influence.
Tables 1.12, 1.13, and 1.14 contain the results for specification (4), which has only one
lag and no same-period means of the just-joined groups. There is some statistically sig-
nificant positive correlation between the target hospital’s current quality measures and its
new group’s past mean quality measures, mainly for systems. Puzzlingly, two of the es-
timates for ACOs’ influence coefficients are negative, though one is significant only at the
10% level.
Specification (5), shown in Tables 1.15, 1.16, and 1.17, adds the same-period means
of the just-joined groups, weakening the influence estimates for systems and EHRs but
eliminating the significant negative HF2 share estimate for ACOs and strengthening the
positive heart failure survival estimate forACOs. The same-periodmeans are significantly,
negatively correlated with the target hospital’s quality for heart failure survival and HF2
share, suggesting that the group’s current mean is either dragged down by expending
effort to bolster the target hospital or improved by dragging down the target hospital.
50
Specification (6), shown in Tables 1.18, 1.19, and 1.20, adds two-year lagged variables
to specification (5). Its results are similar to those of (5), though it makes the ACO results
more intuitive by eliminating the last mildly significant negative influence estimate. How-
ever, it makes the EHR results less intuitive by having statistically significant estimates for
both one-year and two-year mean lags for both heart failure survival and HF2 share. For
each of the two measures, the estimates are roughly similar in magnitude but opposite
sign. The same-period mean influence estimates are negative when significant for ACOs
and positive when significant for systems and EHRs, suggesting that quality improve-
ments across hospitals are substitutes within ACOs and complements within systems and
EHRs.
Specifications (15) and (16) are given in Appendix A.3. Respectively, they show the
results for a specification where the means are restricted to hospitals in the just-joined
group that are also in the same region as the target hospital and the results for a specifi-
cation without HHI controls. Their results are qualitatively similar.
Overall, these results indicate that past group means are correlated with current qual-
ity, suggesting that group quality affects the quality of joining hospitals. Since target hos-
pital quality lags are controlled for, it is unlikely that these correlations are due entirely to
assortative matching. To further address assortativity, I also analyze correlations between
quality improvements and deviations from past expected quality. Since all of the network
types exhibit positive assortativity, a hospital joining a great group for any networkwould
be predicted to have higher quality. However, they may fall short of expectations. If such
hospitals experience greater quality improvements than those who joined worse quality
groups, then it would suggest that the group positively influenced such hospitals.
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Table 1.12: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure lags
of the systems they just joined. Specification with one lag, HHI controls, and no
same-period means.
(4)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 0.07036*
[0.03889]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.03204
[0.04445]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 0.12801**
[0.04607]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 0.26687***
[0.04918]
Has EHR=1 × In ACO=0 -0.11501 -0.15982 -0.01707 1.38624*
[0.12350] [0.12017] [1.32542] [0.79617]
Has EHR=1 × In ACO=1 -0.89936 0.51126 -3.54038 1.88292
[0.70215] [0.68033] [7.48536] [4.46626]






Table 1.13: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure lags
of the EHRs they just joined. Specification with one lag, HHI controls, and no
same-period means.
(4)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 0.10808
[0.09837]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.09355
[0.10188]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 0.07141
[0.05767]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 0.13057***
[0.03222]
In System=0 × In ACO=1 -1.53979 -0.13057 4.89397 -0.98505
[1.04975] [0.92290] [11.79025] [6.72726]
In System=1 × In ACO=0 0.03816 -0.11359* 1.12093 1.21994**
[0.07052] [0.06171] [0.81668] [0.46230]
In System=1 × In ACO=1 0.13646 -0.34526 1.67934 0.89461
[0.28322] [0.24930] [3.17649] [1.80023]






Table 1.14: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure lags
of the ACOs they just joined. Specification with one lag, HHI controls, and no
same-period means.
(4)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag -0.14281*
[0.07710]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.28267**
[0.10205]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 0.13845
[0.08740]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag -0.34106***
[0.08851]
In System=0 × Has EHR=1 0.81738 0.30762 3.89381 3.92520***
[0.63642] [0.61968] [4.74702] [0.82771]
In System=1 × Has EHR=0 0.99619 0.34218 3.29545 4.35660***
[0.62995] [0.60913] [4.78704] [0.84144]
In System=1 × Has EHR=1 1.12176* 0.67692 3.94592 4.46325***
[0.63545] [0.61437] [4.86088] [0.86282]






Table 1.15: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure lags
of the systems they just joined. Specification with one lag, HHI controls, and
same-period means.
(5)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 0.07017
[0.07989]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i 0.04870
[0.07627]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.05282
[0.07859]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i -0.06966
[0.07632]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 0.08023
[0.07828]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i 0.19690**
[0.08295]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 0.13452*
[0.08177]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i 0.12102
[0.09714]
Has EHR=1 × In ACO=0 -0.06109 -0.18767 -0.00086 1.90190**
[0.13669] [0.13241] [1.34747] [0.85699]
Has EHR=1 × In ACO=1 -0.90703 0.45382 -6.34819 1.46025
[0.72601] [0.70053] [7.11697] [4.47463]






Table 1.16: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure lags
of the EHRs they just joined. Specification with one lag, HHI controls, and same-period
means.
(5)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 0.32258*
[0.17480]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i -0.20657
[0.15090]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.19239
[0.12868]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i -0.18810
[0.13151]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 0.02433
[0.11969]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i 0.05194
[0.11067]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 0.05995
[0.06299]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i 0.07566
[0.05859]
In System=0 × In ACO=1 -1.36199 -0.16146 5.96104 -1.18270
[1.05693] [0.92211] [11.99395] [6.73092]
In System=1 × In ACO=0 0.03656 -0.10247* 1.11844 1.19066**
[0.07077] [0.06202] [0.81787] [0.46408]
In System=1 × In ACO=1 0.13544 -0.34029 1.67698 0.85570
[0.28317] [0.24903] [3.17715] [1.80121]






Table 1.17: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure lags
of the ACOs they just joined. Specification with one lag, HHI controls, and same-period
means.
(5)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag -0.20454*
[0.12200]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i 0.08809
[0.13580]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.72012***
[0.16958]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i -0.47455**
[0.14954]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 0.11312
[0.09658]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i 0.07087
[0.14274]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag -0.03717
[0.16432]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i -0.29990**
[0.13754]
In System=0 × Has EHR=1 0.85219 0.31262 4.03182 3.57138***
[0.63938] [0.59906] [4.73321] [0.82919]
In System=1 × Has EHR=0 1.01607 0.44942 3.49053 4.06975***
[0.63093] [0.58990] [4.77624] [0.83708]
In System=1 × Has EHR=1 1.15008* 0.70101 4.21359 4.20544***
[0.63746] [0.59401] [4.85718] [0.85589]






Table 1.18: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure lags
of the systems they just joined. Specification with two lags, HHI controls, and
same-period means.
(6)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 0.07908
[0.10270]
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 2 -0.01479
[0.08426]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i 0.05129
[0.07636]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.18481
[0.12269]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 2 -0.12150
[0.08962]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i -0.08656
[0.07719]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag -0.00640
[0.09150]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 2 0.12157*
[0.07171]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i 0.17941**
[0.08739]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag -0.09365
[0.09943]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 2 0.25591***
[0.07246]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i 0.08578
[0.09708]
Has EHR=1 × In ACO=0 -0.05435 -0.15014 0.26596 1.98422**
[0.13944] [0.13349] [1.37107] [0.85516]
Has EHR=1 × In ACO=1 -0.74057 0.52412 -6.63669 0.90364
[0.73214] [0.69278] [7.08989] [4.38859]






Table 1.19: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure lags
of the EHRs they just joined. Specification with two lags, HHI controls, and same-period
means.
(6)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 0.14471
[0.20867]
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 2 0.23314
[0.20005]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i -0.20200
[0.15711]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.35461**
[0.13631]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 2 -0.40199**
[0.14855]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i -0.05506
[0.13783]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag -0.18918
[0.18387]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 2 0.17414
[0.11350]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i 0.07158
[0.11398]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag -0.34496**
[0.11367]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 2 0.33064***
[0.08207]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i 0.12762**
[0.05882]
In System=0 × In ACO=1 -1.29236 -0.01942 11.40090 -4.57491
[1.06079] [0.91256] [12.24872] [6.54791]
In System=1 × In ACO=0 0.02634 -0.09512 0.90503 0.97598**
[0.07138] [0.06195] [0.82119] [0.45411]
In System=1 × In ACO=1 0.04625 -0.31463 1.19508 0.42196
[0.29476] [0.25579] [3.27265] [1.81028]






Table 1.20: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure lags
of the ACOs they just joined. Specification with two lags, HHI controls, and same-period
means.
(6)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag -0.21961
[0.17996]
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 2 0.06532
[0.14457]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i 0.08273
[0.13645]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.59971**
[0.21744]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 2 0.14346
[0.14353]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i -0.44663**
[0.15096]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 0.15892
[0.10956]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 2 0.01887
[0.13799]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i 0.05422
[0.14855]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag -0.26657
[0.16544]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 2 0.29672**
[0.11016]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i -0.47317***
[0.13905]
In System=0 × Has EHR=1 0.97679 -1.31012 -7.28183 4.38513**
[0.87360] [0.80844] [6.83896] [1.41973]
In System=1 × Has EHR=0 1.13762 -1.19405 -8.87717 5.05878***
[0.89798] [0.81206] [6.97872] [1.41191]
In System=1 × Has EHR=1 1.18539 -0.90296 -7.89811 4.89218***
[0.88932] [0.80839] [6.95013] [1.43352]






Let q̂mi, j,t−1 be hospital i’s predicted quality measure m lag from assortativity regression
specification (1), for matching with group j at time t. Let ε̂mi, j,t−1 ≡ q
m
i, j,t−1 − q̂
m
i, j,t−1 be the
residual. Let ∆qmi, j,t ≡ q
m
i, j,t − q
m
i, j,t−1 be the improvement in quality measure m of hospital i
(that is newly in group j at time t) from t − 1 to t. I run the regression






i, j,t−1 + ξ
m
i, j,t (1.1)
for all measures m simultaneously using SUR estimation. Tables 1.21, 1.22, and 1.23
show the results for hospitals that are newly in systems, EHRs, and ACOs, respectively.
All but one of the estimates βm1 are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
The estimates for ACOs have the highest magnitude; systems have the second highest and
EHRs the lowest. Thus, though ACOs exhibit weaker assortativity than systems, hospitals
within ACOs appear to have more influence on each other than hospitals within systems
do.
Table 1.21: SUR regressions of hospitals’ change in quality on the difference between
their predicted past quality (from system assortativity, regression specification (1)) and
their past quality.
(7)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Percentage Percentage
Delta Delta Delta Delta
PN Surv Perc Lag Hat Error 0.32915***
[0.02808]
HF Surv Perc Lag Hat Error 0.29424***
[0.03168]
HF1 Percentage Lag Hat Error 0.29296***
[0.04085]
HF2 Percentage Lag Hat Error 0.16253***
[0.03780]
Constant -0.05035** -0.10374*** 0.02710 -0.03770
[0.02523] [0.02889] [0.02637] [0.02321]
Observations 490
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Table 1.22: SUR regressions of hospitals’ change in quality on the difference between
their predicted past quality (from EHR assortativity, regression specification (1)) and
their past quality.
(7)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Percentage Percentage
Delta Delta Delta Delta
PN Surv Perc Lag Hat Error 0.17644***
[0.01635]
HF Surv Perc Lag Hat Error 0.22318***
[0.01685]
HF1 Percentage Lag Hat Error 0.17642***
[0.02133]
HF2 Percentage Lag Hat Error 0.01475
[0.02030]
Constant -0.07818*** -0.00180 -0.09127*** -0.17629***
[0.01597] [0.01662] [0.01752] [0.01540]
Observations 1,430
Table 1.23: SUR regressions of hospitals’ change in quality on the difference between
their predicted past quality (from ACO assortativity, regression specification (1)) and
their past quality.
(7)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Survival Survival Percentage Percentage
Delta Delta Delta Delta
PN Surv Perc Lag Hat Error 0.34200***
[0.04709]
HF Surv Perc Lag Hat Error 0.24072***
[0.05790]
HF1 Percentage Lag Hat Error 0.72709***
[0.03986]
HF2 Percentage Lag Hat Error 0.86366***
[0.02093]
Constant 0.19131*** -0.07435 0.52860*** 0.37334***




This chapter establishes several patterns of interest regarding hospital network forma-
tion and effects, contributing to a large literature on systems, ACOs, EHRs, and the forma-
tion and effects of general networks. On the formation side, hospitals in the same system
or ACO tend to have the same EHR, but not necessarily vice versa, suggesting that EHR
compatibility is driven by system/ACO affiliation. Of note, a hospital that is in the same
system as a hospital that is also in an ACO may not be a member of that ACO, suggesting
that ACOs strategically select members. Positive assortativity on quality and characteris-
tics exists for all network types, though it is much stronger in systems and ACOs than for
EHR networks. This may exacerbate the anticompetitive effects of groupmembership and
prevent peer effects from having the greatest impact.
Hospital networks have effects through market power and peer effects on members. I
have found that hospital quality is negatively correlated with national ACO market con-
centration and uncorrelated with regional ACO market concentration, suggesting that
ACOs do decrease competition without improving quality. This may be because the focus
of MSSP ACOs is to reduce costs while meeting a minimum quality standard or because
my sample consists of hospital-sponsored ACOs, which have been shown not to have ex-
perienced improvements in existing studies. I have also found that hospital quality is
negatively correlated with national EHR market concentration and positively correlated
with regional EHR concentration, indicating thatwhile better EHR connectivity helps hos-
pitals cooperate, EHR vendor market power can negatively affect hospital outcomes. Fi-
nally, there appear to be mild peer effects within system and EHR groups and substantial
peer effects within ACO groups, where the past mean quality of the group is positively
correlated with a recently joined hospital’s current quality.
The results of this chapter are correlational and suggestive, making no causal claims
but identifying promising topics for further research. Estimating a structural model of
63
associative matching would provide more insight into how hospitals make their network
membership decisions, and a model that allows for multiple network types to be joined
would be novel contribution to the theoretical matching literature. While there is a sub-
stantial literature on the causal effects of system market concentration, there has not yet
been much on EHR or ACO market concentration. Chapter 2 provides a first attempt at
using quasi-experimental variation to quantify the effect of EHR compatibility, which is
increasing in EHR regional market concentration. Finally, a longer term study regarding
peer effects could demonstrate that peer effects are even stronger in later years, as this
chapter only looks at the year immediately after a hospital joins a group. The network for-
mation process surely affects the effects that the resulting networks will have, and the po-
tential effects surely influence what networks arise. Future studies separating the origins




The Effect of Electronic Health Record Interoperability on Patient
Health Outcomes
2.1 Introduction
As people often visit multiple physicians and hospitals in their lifetimes, tales of the
perils of fragmented medical care, where different healthcare providers often do not–or
cannot–share information with each other, are common. As mentioned in Chapter 1,
physician Ilana Yurkiewicz [2018] found patient Michael Champion’s case troubling, as
she discovered over the course of multiple inpatient admissions that he was receiving nei-
ther correct amounts of insulin nor appropriate intravenous nutrition due to difficulties
in transferring his care instructions from his hospital to his nursing facility. It is not un-
common for patients with allergies to receive a treatment to which they are allergic, as
in the case of thirteen-year-old Brooke Dilliplaine, or for emergency contacts to be called
upon to be living, complete medical records for their loved ones, as in the case of Medi-
care administrator Seema Verma, whose husband collapsed, resulting in first responders
and physicians calling her on the phone to ask if she knew his medical history, which was
information that could help save his life [Schulte and Fry, 2019]. She herself then had
to call her husband’s multiple doctors because his medical history was scattered across
providers. Yurkiewicz describes the difficulties of making clinical decisions without a pa-
tient’s medical records:
When a patient with a complex medical history like Michael arrives under my
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care, it’s like opening a book to page 200 and being asked to write page 201.
That can be challenging enough. But on top of that, maybe themiddle ismyste-
riously ripped out, pages 75 to 95 are shuffled, and several chapters don’t even
seem to be part of the same story.
Meanwhile, everyone around me is urging: write now.
Without patientmedical histories, healthcare providers can accidentallymake harmful
clinical decisions that arise from not having access to the patient’s past diagnoses, previ-
ous treatments, existing test results, comorbidities, and allergies. For example, in inpatient
settings, some people may be documented to be allergic to a certain antibiotic and go into
anaphylactic shock if they accidentally receive it, or some peoplemay be on blood thinners
already and be prescribedmore to prevent blood clots, potentially leading to hemorrhagic
conditions. Certain procedures are more dangerous for less healthy patients, so knowing
what comorbidities a patient has is vital for making the best choice of procedure for them.
There is much room for improvement in terms of the quantity of medical errors, many
of which may have been preventable with additional patient medical history information.
Makary and Daniel [2016] conclude from a literature review involving research studies
with data from 1999-2007 that 251,000 Americans per year die due to medical error, mak-
ing it the third leading cause of death in the U.S. They note, however, that this is likely to
be a lower bound because medical errors are not well documented on death certificates
and because the studies looked only at inpatient deaths.
The Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General [2010]
had physicians review the medical records of a random sample of 780Medicare beneficia-
ries, out of 999,645 who completed inpatient stays at acute care hospitals in October 2008.
They determined that 13.1% experienced adverse reactions tomedical care that resulted in
a longer hospital stay, permanent harm, the use of life-sustaining intervention, or mortal-
ity. Another 13.5% experienced temporary harmdue to adverse events. 1.5% of the sample
thus experienced mortality due to an adverse event, mainly from incorrect drug admin-
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istration such as using blood-thinning medication when it should not have been used.
Out of all adverse events, the physician reviewers classified 44% as preventable. One of
the criteria for being preventable is that the healthcare provider could have foreseen the
adverse event given the available information. This preventability rate underscores the
importance of having as much information about the patient as possible. If it is taken
into consideration that the amount of usable information available to physicians can be
increased, even more adverse events could be considered preventable–not by physicians
alone, but by software vendors. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, the healthcare industry
and federal government viewed electronic health records (EHRs), which fewhospitals had
at the time, as the most promising cure for an inefficient industry that not only cost more
than its counterparts in other countries, but also did not provide as good health outcomes.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services created the Office of the Na-
tional Coordinator forHealth Information Technology in 2004 to lead healthcare providers
across the country in adopting, using, and exchanging electronic health records. The
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009
established the Medicare EHR Incentive Program, providing financial incentives to eligi-
ble hospitals for the “meaningful use” of EHR starting in 2011. Meaningful use entails not
only the adoption of certified EHR systems (if not already adopted), but also meeting var-
ious standards for use on an annual basis. Hospitals meeting the standards in each year
have received payments on an annual basis, while hospitals who fell short in 2015 and on
began having their Medicare payments reduced.
The EHR Incentive Program drastically increased the percentage of hospitals with
EHR, fromaround 50% in 2007 to over 80% in 2014, but the increase in information-sharing
abilitywas not commensurate. The program involves three stages, with later stages involv-
ingmore demanding requirements. In each stage, hospitalsmust fulfill a set ofmandatory
requirements, as well as a subset of their choice of optional requirements. One optional
Stage 1 requirement is providing records of care to receiving healthcare providers for at
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least 50% of transferring patients. This becomes a mandatory requirement for Stage 2,
along with requirements that at least 10% of these records are transferred through EHR
and that the hospital demonstrates the ability to transfer electronic records to hospitals
with different EHR vendors. Even though 50% or 10% are not high percentages in terms of
what share of patients are transferred safely, several hospitals have not achieved this stan-
dard. For example, out of roughly 280 acute care hospitals in California, only 50 attested
to Stage 2 in 2014, and only 139 attested to Stage 2 in 2015. Adler-Milstein et al. [2014] notes
that while many hospitals can fulfill several Stage 2 requirements, only around 40% met
standards for sharing summaries of care during transitions in 2013. Adler-Milstein and
Jha [2014] find that only 30% of the respondents to the American Hospital Association’s
2012 survey (administered to all acute-care hospitals) shared patient information with un-
affiliated hospitals (though Furukawa et al. [2013] notes that the percentage is higher, at
51%, for unaffiliated physicians). On the physician side, Furukawa et al. [2014] find that
14% of the physician respondents to the 2009-13 Electronic Health Records Survey shared
patient information with unaffiliated providers.
Patient information-sharing has lagged behind EHR adoption due to both technolog-
ical and competitive reasons. Up until recently, for technological reasons, EHR software
was rarely able to send data between hospitals even if they had the same EHR brand. Even
when some software vendors improved their technology to the point of being able to share
data within their networks, EHRmarket competition, as discussed in Chapter 1, disincen-
tivized making it possible to share across networks. In the 2010s, Epic achieved the best
interoperability rate among hospitals that all use its software, but was publicly criticized
as recently as 2016 for not being more compatible with other vendors [Versel, 2016]. In
October 2019, a medical student at theWashington University of St. Louis conveyed to the
author that their university hospital uses Epic and that the medical staff is relieved when-
ever they learn that a patient transferred to them came from somewhere that uses Epic,
allowing them to receive the patient’s medical history through Epic’s Care Everywhere
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feature.
Initiatives like CommonWell andCarequality (launched in 2013 and 2015, respectively)
have worked toward interoperability across vendors, though progress has been slow due
to the necessity of even more technological innovation–legislation passed in 1999 disal-
lows the government to fund software designed with the use of a universal patient identi-
fier [Caldwell, 2015]–and the expected logistical difficulties of organizing many different
vendors’ efforts–the 2011 Healthcare Information andManagement Systems Society Ana-
lytics Database contained 177 vendors. Without EHR, physicians and healthcare staff have
to manually create and process paper or electronic copies via fax or email when exchang-
ing information with a provider with a different system. Such administrative costs may
be prohibitive in emergency settings.
With EHR incompatibility and fragmentation as the norm embedded in existing hos-
pital technology and processes, patients are lucky if they have physicians who actively
advocate for them in creative, non-institutional ways on an individual basis. Yurkiewicz
[2018] describes having to ask patients “where their prior doctors were, have the patients
sign a release form, fax it to the other hospitals, and receive stacks of papers in return."
She then has to parse hundreds of printed papers to glean relevant information. To ac-
quire MRI or CT scans, she has to even request to be mailed compact discs. She recounts
the story of an oncologist who cold-called every single physician, both those still work-
ing and those retired, in a hospital to get a patient’s biopsy results, as well as the story
of a patient who avoided an invasive procedure by presenting a slip of paper with old
test results that his cardiologist from a decade ago had told him to keep with him at all
times. While these physicians’ efforts are commendable, it is unreasonable to expect over-
burdened physicians to take on this role for every patient they have. When siloed infor-
mation is the institutional norm, individuals cannot completely overcome the barriers on
their own.
Universal EHR interoperability would change the default of no information sharing to
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a default of sharing, by making it possible for it to be almost automatic. However, despite
there being awareness among healthcare providers, IT vendors, and policymakers that
interoperability is important, progress toward the ideal of universal interoperability has
been slow. While anecdotes and advocates have made strong arguments, there has been
little research empirically evaluating the benefits of EHR interoperability, especially for
patient health outcomes. A more systematic understanding of its benefits may allow for a
more appropriate prioritization of achieving it. In this paper, I quantify the effect of EHR
interoperability on Medicare beneficiaries with inpatient episodes due to emergency car-
diovascular conditions, using a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences framework.
I focus on this subpopulation for a few reasons. First, this subpopulation is, intuitively,
one in which we should be more likely to see an effect of EHR compatibility. The ease of
information transfer should affect emergencies more than scheduled procedures, because
during an emergency, the patient’s summary of care record cannot be transferred and
prepared via administrative staff beforehand, as can be done for procedures planned in
advance, e.g., elective knee replacement surgeries.
Second, this subpopulation includes some of the most common and expensive health
problems for Americans, such as heart attacks and strokes. American Heart Association
[2019] looks at data from 2005-2014, finding that around 605,000 Americans experienced
new heart attacks per year, and 200,000 experienced recurrent attacks. Heart attacks cost
$12.1 billion to treat in U.S. hospitals in 2013, making it one of the most expensive condi-
tions. Stroke kills around 142,000 Americans per year, out of the approximately 789,000
who experience a stroke. Cardiovascular disease and stroke are estimated to have $351.2
billion ($213.8 billion in the direct costs of treatment and $137.4 billion in the indirect costs
of lost productivity and mortality).
Third, this subpopulation contains the variation necessary for identification. During
an emergency, the ambulance company to which the patient is assigned is essentially ran-
dom, and the ambulance company chooses the hospital to which to take the patient based
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on distance and the relationship between the ambulance company and the hospital, not
based on patient characteristics [Hull, 2018]. Thus, patient outcomes should be uncor-
related with unobservable treatment hospital quality. Additionally, this randomness en-
sures that at least some patients end up in a treatment hospital that is different from the
primary care hospital where they receive their outpatient care and have most of their pa-
tient history data stored, which makes it possible for the primary and treatment hospitals
to have different, incompatible EHRs.
In Section 2.2, I review the existing literature on related topics, including health infor-
mation exchange, interoperability, and networks and technology. In Section 2.3, I describe
my data and the definition of certain variables of interest.
In Section 2.4, I explain possible sources of endogeneity and provide empirical support
for my identification strategy. I identify the effect of EHR compatibility from variation in
whether the primary care and emergency treatment hospital have the same EHR brand,
which I will argue exogenously changed for a group of hospital pairs in 2011 due to the
EHR Incentive Program. Thus, the treatment group for my difference-in-differences spec-
ifications consists of hospital pairs that never had the same EHR before 2011 and had the
same EHR in 2011 and on. The control group consists of hospital pairs that never had the
same EHR for my data time period of 2007-2014.
In Section 2.5, I present my empirical results. My main difference-in-differences speci-
fication finds a 7%decrease (0.8 percentage points out of an overall rate of 11.5%) in 30-day
mortality rate and a 4% increase (0.8 pp out of an overall rate of 19.6%) in 30-day compli-
cation diagnosis rate. These estimates suggest that treatment group patients who would
have experienced mortality are instead experiencing a non-fatal negative health outcome;
their health is better but not improved to the point of having no subsequent complications.
I fail to reject that the estimates have the samemagnitude, indicating that treatment group
patients who would have experienced complication diagnoses are still experiencing them
at the same rate. Thus, while EHR compatibility appears to reduce mortality, it does not
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seem to reduce medical complications.
Section 2.6 concludes. This chapter uses a quasi-experimental approach to estimate
the causal effect of EHR compatibility on patients, using data at the level of individual
patients. The evidence indicates that EHR compatibility shifts mortality to less negative,
but still negative, health outcomes, without affecting the overall rate of negative outcomes.
This result provides further support for the importance of investigating bothmortality and
illness outcomes in public health studies, since reductions in mortality can actually make
illness measures look worse, as first noted by Almond [2006].
2.2 Literature Review
Dranove et al. [2015] and Adler-Milstein and Jha [2017] show that the EHR Incentive
Program increased hospital EHR adoption. Dranove et al. [2015] uses variation in hos-
pitals’ potential payments for demonstrating meaningful use to show that the govern-
ment’s incentive payments increased adoption and did not just crowd out private invest-
ment. Adler-Milstein and Jha [2017] uses a difference-in-differences identification strategy
where the treatment group is short-term acute care hospitals, which were eligible for the
program, and the control group is ineligible hospitals, estimating a treatment effect of 7.9
percentage points in the adoption rate. The fact that this exogenous policy encouraged
adoption that would otherwise not have happened will be useful for my identification
strategy.
Research on the effects of EHR has produced mixed results. The public health litera-
ture variously documents positive, null, and negative correlations between EHR adoption
and outcomes such as hospital operating costs and patient outcomes; see Buntin et al.
[2011] for a generally positive review and Black et al. [2011] for a more neutral review.
The economics andmanagement literature overall contains more positive results and pro-
vides insight into why correlational studies have shown mixed results. EHR adoption
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alone may not be enough to have an effect, as certain technological complements may be
necessary for using it effectively. It is also difficult to learn how to use a technology, so
outcomes may be worse initially and improve over time. As the EHR Incentive Program’s
emphasis on meaningful use suggests, adoption has not historically guaranteed use. In
the face of patient heterogeneity, it is possible that only certain types experience benefits
fromEHR,making it difficult to detect an effectwhen studying only thewhole population.
Aside from EHR-specific reasons, the economics and management literature may also be
more unified in its evaluation of EHR due to its greater emphasis on the use of quasi-
experimental variation for the identification of causal effects rather than correlations.
Agha [2014] uses a difference-in-differences approach in which the treatment group
is hospitals that ever adopt EHR in her time period of 1998-2005 and the control group
is hospitals that never adopt EHR or always had it in her time period. Variation in adop-
tion timing allows her to control for time trends. She finds that medical record and clinical
decision support software are associatedwith an increase in patient charges but are uncor-
related with mortality, adverse drug events, and readmissions. She suggests it is unlikely
for her results to be due to patient selection on unobservable characteristics because the
case mixes of hospitals do not change significantly after adoption and raising the obser-
vation level from hospitals to counties (at which point patient selection should be less of
an issue) does not affect the results. Additionally, her results are robust to accounting for
other hospital investments that may increase spending. However, she does not account for
hospital selection, which would involve hospitals choosing to adopt EHR based on their
unobservable expectations and characteristics.
Dranove et al. [2014] applies organizational IT adoption research to EHR, focusing on
the necessity of external and internal complements such as the availability of third-party
software and support and the number of programmers employed at the hospital. Their
fixed effects model finds that total operating costs per admission are higher the year after
adoption. However, in IT-intensive locations, they fall to below previous levels by three
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years, while in non-IT-intensive locations, they return to previous levels in subsequent
years. Theymeasure IT intensity by the presence of external complements–specifically, the
share of a county’s firms in IT-using and IT-producing industries. They find that results
do not vary as much by the presence of internal complements. Their results indicate that
time is also an important element in EHR evaluation. Since learning how to use a new
technology takes time, outcomes may be worse at first and then improve.
Lin et al. [2019] point toward another reason for which adoption of EHR is not enough
to guarantee improvement in costs and quality of care: installation of software is not equiv-
alent to its use. Directly related to my proposal, they examine the correlation of EHRIP
meaningful use requirements with a hospital’s performance on process quality measures.
They use a difference-in-differences framework with the treatment group being hospitals
that first attested in 2012 and the control group being hospitals that first attested in 2011.
They use the last quarter of 2011 as the pre-period and the first quarter of 2013 as the
post-period. Their main result is that attestation is associated with an increase in their
aggregate quality measure. Running the same regression with EHR adoption as the main
independent variable instead of meaningful use, they find no effect on quality, so they
argue that the previous literature on the effects of EHR has shown mixed results due to
focusing on adoption instead of use.
Wani and Malhotra [2018] similarly find that meaningful use reduces length of stay
and readmissions while full adoption of EHR does not. They also note that the effect is
magnified for patients who have more comorbidities and require more careful physician
coordination. McCullough et al. [2016] find that electronic medical records and comput-
erized physician order entry decrease mortality for complex patients with diagnoses that
require coordination of care across specialties and thorough clinical information manage-
ment, but not for median patients. Healthier patients have good outcomes regardless of
whether their hospitals have EHRs. Thus, to find EHR effects, it is important to find rele-
vant patient populations to avoid diluting the estimate of the potential effect.
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Miller and Tucker [2011] provide the most convincing quasi-experimental method an-
alyzing the effects of EHR; additionally, they use a compelling dependent variable that
measures an actual health outcome. They use variation in state medical privacy laws to
instrument for EHR adoption and estimate that a 10% increase in the proportion of hos-
pitals in a county that have adopted EHR would reduce neonatal mortality in that county
by 43 neonatal deaths per 100,000 live births (8% of the mean of the neonatal mortality
rate). In contrast, when they use an ordinary least squares regression, they estimate that a
10% increase would reduce neonatal mortality by 16 deaths per 100,000 live births. While
still a significant estimate, the difference in magnitudes suggests that the standard fixed
effects model that is usually estimated in the EHR evaluation literature is biased toward
negative results due to endogeneity issues.
While most of the EHR evaluation literature focuses on the effect of a hospital’s EHR
adoption on its own outcomes, a few studies look at how it affects nearby hospitals. Atasoy
et al. [2017] provide evidence of network effects by estimating a fixed effects model with
lags to find that a hospital’s adoption of EHR is associated with a 1.8% increase in its own
costs in the same year (2.3% over four years), while EHR adoption by other hospitals in
the same hospital service area is associated with a 1% decrease in a hospital’s costs (1.5%
over four years).
Other papers show how network effects are related to the technology adoption deci-
sion. Angst et al. [2010] use a dynamic social contagion framework to analyze the correla-
tion betweenwhen certain hospitals adopt EHR. They find that infectiousness is positively
associated with how well-known a hospital is and negatively associated with its age, and
they find that susceptibility to influence is positively associated with size and age. They
find that spatial proximity is also a factor in the nature of diffusion. Miller and Tucker
[2009] use an instrumental variables approach to analyze how EHR adoption depends on
network effects and state hospital privacy regulation. In states without such regulation,
the adoption by one additional hospital increases the propensity of nearby hospitals to
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adopt by 7%, while in states with such regulation, there is no such network effect. They
estimate that such regulation decreases overall EMR adoption by 24%.
There is little existingwork on interoperability and health information exchange specif-
ically. Desai [2016] finds that hospitals may choose incompatible EHR for competitive rea-
sons. She shows that a hospital with weak market power (defined as its percentage of
patients shared with other hospitals) is less likely to choose a more popular EHR vendor.
She does not look at the effect of incompatibility on healthcare quality or outcomes. Fu-
rukawa et al. [2017] finds a negative correlation between within-system interoperability
and in-hospital adverse drug events. They do not make a causal argument or have a vari-
able for hospital interoperability across systems. I will use the definition in Desai [2016]
of interoperability to be able to look at across-system interoperability, and I will include
adverse drug events in my patient health outcome variable.
The public health and legal literatures are generally supportive of setting a national
standard for EHR interoperability. Walker et al. [2005] estimate that a fully standardized,
nationally interoperable EHR would lead to a net benefit of $77.8 billion per year. They
claim that their estimate is likely to be a lower bound as the only benefit they analyze
is lower costs from reduced duplicate testing; they do not estimate the potential benefits
of improved clinical quality. Sao et al. [2013] discusses past precedent for national stan-
dards, and Christensen and Remler [2009] caution against incentivizing hospitals to adopt
EHR quickly without standards for information sharing capabilities. Chapter 1 provides
a reason for caution in recommending the adoption of a single universal EHR due to the
benefits of competition. This chapter looksmore closely at the clinical benefits of universal
interoperability, which is separable from having a single EHR vendor.
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2.3 Data
I use four datasets1 from 2007-2014: Medicare Research-Identifiable Claims (identifi-
cation of patient healthcare episodes and evaluation of health outcomes), the Medicare
Master Beneficiary Summary File (patient characteristics and date of death, if any), Medi-
careCost Reports (hospital characteristics), and theHIMSSdatabase (hospital EHRvendor
data). I say that a hospital has an EHR in a given year if it has “Live and Operational" or
“To Be Replaced" status in that year. HIMSS contains several types of software; following
Desai [2016], I assume that two hospitals having the same vendor for the “Clinical Data
Repository" application means that their EHRs are compatible. To whatever degree this
is not the case, my results will be an underestimate of the true effect of interoperability.
I focus on patients who have a Medicare inpatient claim with a primary ICD-9 diag-
nosis code equal to one of the most common emergency cardiovascular conditions. These
conditions were selected by considering all 1,813,061 Medicare inpatient claims with a
cardiovascular condition (codes 390-459) in 2013, using Google Search to look up each
ICD-9 code that occurred at least 500 times as the primary diagnosis, and manually as-
sessing whether it is an acute, emergency condition or a chronic condition.2 The list of
selected conditions includes atrial fibrillation, acute myocardial infarction (heart attack),
conditions including cerebral infarction (stroke), embolism, thrombosis, acute on chronic
conditions, and heart failure. The top three most common are atrial fibrillation (216,350
claims), acute subendocardial myocardial infarction (194,916), and unspecified cerebral
artery occlusion with cerebral infarction (170,736).
If a patient receives emergency treatment at the hospital they usually go to for care,
1I also have data on Medicare Shared Savings Program (a public accountable care organization, or ACO,
program) hospital enrollment and data on meaningful use attestation measures. I include a variable for
ACO relationships in all regressions, but it is never significant. I may later use the detailed meaningful use
data, but the variable for attestation does not seem to play a large role in outcomes, so meaningful use does
not appear to be a first-order determinant for outcomes.
2Inmost cases, the categorization of a specific diagnosis is clear from the top search results, which include
the Mayo Clinic, WebMD, and other professional medical sites. In the few less clear cases, I consulted a
medical professional.
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EHR information transfer is not likely to play a large role in their outcome. However, it
may be useful to include these non-transferring patients in the sample to have more data
on hospitals without an EHR barrier, as long as the fact that they were not transferred
is controlled for. Thus, in my sample, I include both transferring, whose primary and
surgical hospitals are not the same hospital, and non-transferring patients, whose primary
and surgical hospitals are the same.
For a given patient-year, I define a patient’s primary hospital to be where they re-
ceived the majority of their outpatient care in the 180 days prior to their inpatient episode
(weighted by procedure costs and excluding claims that could be associatedwith the inpa-
tient episode). Apatient’s surgicalhospital is the hospital atwhich they have their inpatient
claimwith the relevant emergency cardiovascular diagnosis. For a given patient-yearwith
multiple relevant inpatient episodes, I keep only the one that occurred latest in the year.
I control for a patient having an outpatient claim at their primary hospital within a week
before their inpatient claim. These patients’ primary hospitals may have referred them to
their surgical hospitals.
Using a patient’s primary outpatient hospital as their primary care provider, who is
considered to have the most comprehensive medical history for them, is an imperfect but
necessary approximation. It is imperfect because not every patient has an outpatient hos-
pital that they use in this sense–intuitively, patients mainly have primary care physicians,
not primary care hospitals, and mechanically, a substantial proportion of observations
must be dropped due to their lack of a match to an outpatient hospital. After dropping
patient-years without a primary outpatient hospital, 4,777,283 observations out of the to-
tal 7,029,032 (68%) acute cardiovascular patient-years remain. However, the approxima-
tion is necessary because the HIMSS data does not map individual physicians to the EHR
vendors that they use. A fact that makes the substitution of primary care physicians for
primary care hospitals more reasonable is that primary care physicians often primarily
practice at a specific hospital, so many of a patient’s outpatient hospital claims could ac-
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tually be attributed to their primary care physician.
Defining outcome measures is tricky since the usual public health outcome measure,
readmissions rate within 30 or 90 days after the hospital release date, may not be as rel-
evant to this setting. Medical complications (i.e., events where a patient has a negative
reaction to a procedure or drug, whether due to hospital error or happenstance) due to
an emergency that leads to inpatient admission may be more likely to occur during the
same inpatient episode. This is especially true for complications that should be attributed
to not having the patient’s medical history. A death that occurs during the same inpatient
episode is more likely to be due to an error in handling that specific emergency (and thus
due to EHR incompatibility) than a death that occurs at another time. Thus, my main
outcome measures will be the occurrence of a complication diagnosis or mortality on the
day of a patient’s hospital admission or up to 7, 30, and 90 days after their admission date
(instead of their release date). I refer to the complication diagnosis rate as the error rate,
since these complication diagnosis codes are the main codes attributable to hospital error.
A complication diagnosis is said to have occurred if it is any of the first 10 diagnosis
codes on a claim. I chose 10 because in 2009, only up to 10 diagnosis codes are available.
(In later years, up to 25 are available, but usually claims do not have that many diagnosis
codes anyway.) To define an adverse event, I focus on ICD-9 diagnosis codes related to
unintended effects of drug administration and surgery. The three categories I will include
and some subcategories and common examples are:
1. E930-E949: Drugs, Medicinal And Biological Substances Causing Adverse Effects In
Therapeutic Use
(a) E930: Antibiotics causing adverse effects in therapeutic use
(b) E934: Agents primarily affecting blood constituents causing adverse effects in
therapeutic use
(c) E942: Agents primarily affecting the cardiovascular system causing adverse ef-
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fects in therapeutic use
2. 996-999: Complications Of Surgical And Medical Care, Not Elsewhere Classified
(a) 996.72: Other complications due to other cardiac device, implant, and graft
(b) 997.1: Cardiac complications not elsewhere classified
3. 995: Certain adverse effects not elsewhere classified
(a) 995.0: Other anaphylactic reaction
(b) 995.90: Systemic inflammatory response syndrome, unspecified
(c) 995.91: Sepsis
(d) 995.92: Severe sepsis
I will also present results for the inpatient readmission rate and an overall adverse
outcome rate that measures whether either an error or mortality occurred.
Table 2.1 shows means of characteristics for patients in the sample. Table 2.1 shows
the means of various outcome variables and relationship variables, such as indicators for
whether the patient’s primary and surgical hospitals had the same EHR brand in the year
that the patient had their emergency and whether the hospitals were in the same system
then. It also showswhat shares of the total sample are used in the difference-in-differences
specifications discussed in Section 2.4 (“Treatment Group" and “Always Different EHR"
are indicators for the treatment and control groups, while “Different Primary and Sur-
gical" and “Had Preceding Outpatient Visit" are indicators for situations that should be
controlled for, as previously discussed).
Table 2.2 shows means of characteristics for all U.S. acute care hospitals and is broken
downbyhospitals that are neither a primary nor surgical hospital, only a primary hospital,
only a surgical hospital, or both. Most hospitals appear to have been both a primary and
surgical hospital in the sample, suggesting that when a patient’s primary and surgical
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hospitals differ, it is not due to a flow of patients from smaller to larger hospitals that have
more equipment for surgery; it is more likely to be due to chance and whichever hospital
is nearest to where the patient experienced the acute health event.




90-Day Readmissions Rate 0.22919 0.23089
30-Day Readmission Rate 0.13056 0.13250
7-Day Readmission Rate 0.02943 0.02884
90-Day Error Rate 0.27797 0.28604
30-Day Error Rate 0.18691 0.19605
7-Day Error Rate 0.09429 0.10198
90-Day Mortality Rate 0.18056 0.17755
30-Day Mortality Rate 0.11420 0.11532
7-Day Mortality Rate 0.04830 0.05118
Same EHR 0.62927 0.06821
Same Hospital System 0.65036 0.17407
Same ACO 0.02071 0.00853
Treatment Group 0.02677 0.12209
Always Same EHR 0.56206 0.00000
Always Different EHR 0.19248 0.87791
Different Primary and Surgical 0.38990 0.82816














Other Race 0.00588 0.00586
Native American 0.00320 0.00338
End-Stage Renal Disease 0.01739 0.01741
Plan D Coverage 0.51900 0.53463
Retiree Drug Subsidy 0.14868 0.14514
Dual Eligible 0.17928 0.19013
State Medicaid Buy-In 0.16312 0.17303
Chronic Bone Condition 0.52034 0.51539
Chronic Heart Condition 0.92624 0.93674
Observations 3,640,146 798,102
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Table 2.2: Means of hospital characteristics.
Neither Primary Surgical Both All
Control - Nonprofit 0.26546 0.17708 0.14618 0.56828 0.49141
Control - Government 0.25000 0.21528 0.03987 0.22318 0.21512
Number of Beds 95.78679 106.70732 65.36333 172.51568 156.74847
Critical Access 0.00000 0.02778 0.00000 0.27145 0.21790
Disproportionate Share 0.01546 0.03646 0.00332 0.56477 0.45248
Meaningful Use 0.02062 0.17188 0.01329 0.78692 0.64224
Teaching Hospital 0.06443 0.11111 0.02658 0.23639 0.20334
Multicampus 0.00000 0.01389 0.05316 0.00433 0.00736
Operating Expenses 29.76592 36.50678 29.30136 165.48716 139.03984
Patient Revenue 51.78281 74.08317 86.66940 548.40519 458.24715
Total Discharges 0.13684 0.15116 0.06119 0.65825 0.55223
Medicare Discharges 0.02328 0.04409 0.02829 0.20728 0.17373
Patient Days-Visits 2.07224 2.18877 1.24777 3.17117 2.92285
Employees on Payroll 0.02441 0.02959 0.01600 0.09522 0.08131
Has EHR 0.04897 0.15278 0.59468 0.86737 0.73466
First Time EHR 0.03077 0.12617 0.03125 0.03508 0.03865
Changed EHR 0.00000 0.02804 0.01786 0.07404 0.06875
Observations 388 576 301 4848 6113
Operating expenses and patient revenue are in millions, while discharges, patient
days-visits, and employees are in tens of thousands.
2.4 Identification Strategy
Let E j kt be the indicator for whether primary hospital j and surgical hospital k have
the same EHR in year t. Let jit be i’s observed primary hospital in year t, and let kit be i’s
observed surgical hospital in year t. I assume that kit is a fixed characteristic of it, leaving a
structural model where interoperability may affect where a patient is sent to future work.
To the extent that kit is exogenously assigned by ambulances, this is not a limiting assump-
tion. Let xi j kt be the characteristics of patient i, primary hospital j, and surgical hospital k
in year t, which may include patient chronic conditions and demographics, hospital sizes
and EHR statuses, and various fixed effects. Let ymit be whether negative outcome m oc-
curred for i’s episode in year t.
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Ekit kit t is the variable of interest. The standard, direct OLS regression is given by
ymit = θ
m
OLSEkit jit t + β
m
OLS xi jt + εit . (2.1)
A common endogeneity concern in healthcare is that the primary healthcare provider
may base their referral choice on a patient’s unobserved characteristics, sending more dif-
ficult cases to more skilled or better prepared specialists. By focusing on patients with
an emergency medical condition, for which ambulances determine the surgical hospital
based on distance and their own preferences instead of patient characteristics [Hull, 2018],
I reduce the probability that this is an issue. I control for situations that are more likely
to be due to primary hospital referral than ambulance referral. Namely, I include indica-
tors for whether the patient had a primary hospital admission in the week before their
emergency and whether their primary and surgical hospitals are the same.
Estimating equation 2.1 may still be biased due to correlations between certain EHR
situations and unobservables. There may be endogeneity on the level of both individual
surgical hospitals and/or on the level of hospital pairs. On the individual level, higher
quality surgical hospitals may have more popular EHR brands such that ymit and E jit kit t are
positively correlated through the unobserved quality of kit . On the pair level, it is possi-
ble that jit and kit have the same EHR because they already have a good relationship in
unobservable ways (e.g., a non-MSSP contract that financially incentivizes good commu-
nication). This might make them have good communication regardless of whether they
have compatible EHR, but such pairs might also happen to often have compatible EHR
due to their close relationship.
Individual-level endogeneity may be accounted for by clustering standard errors on
surgical hospitals or by estimating surgical hospital fixed effects. I also control for EHR
brand fixed effects in mymain specification. The described source of pair-level endogene-
ity is not an issue for researchers interested in the effect of general cooperation, which is
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also of importance for patients. Since I am estimating the effect of EHR interoperability
and abstracting away from hospitals’ decision tomake use of it when they have it, I require
an instrument that moves EHR compatibility without being correlated with hospital pair
relationships.
I argue that the EHR Incentive Program provides such an instrument. In 2011, it be-
gan providing financial incentives formeeting certain EHR requirements that necessitated
EHR software with specific features, causing many hospitals to change their EHR brands
without changing relationships amonghospitals. Dranove et al. [2015] shows that the EHR
Incentive Program stimulated EHR adoption that would not have otherwise occurred,
shifting marginal adopters into actually adopting. In the treatment effects framework,
hospital pairs who switched to having the same EHR brand after 2011 would be consid-
ered “compliers," while those who had the same EHR brand neither before nor after 2011
would be considered “never-takers." The treatment group is then patients whose hospital
pairs are compliers and whose hospital admission date is 2011 or later, and I am estimat-
ing the local average treatment effect on compliers. The total average treatment effect from
mandating universal interoperability may differ.
Furthermore, the hospital pairs who switched to having the same EHR in 2011 seem
to have done so unintentionally: though there was a spike in the percentage of hospitals
adopting EHR for the first time or changing EHR brands in 2011 (Figure 2.1), there was no
such spike in the percentage of pairs with compatible EHRs, which increased from 2007-
2014 with a relatively smooth trend (see Figure 2.2). Indeed, in an interview with Arndt
[2017], the CIO for the University of California San Diego healthcare system said that a
new Epic feature for improving patient information flow is unlikely to be the reason that
more hospitals choose Epic. Also note that Figure 2.2 shows that the percent of hospital
pairs in the same system did not sharply increase in 2014, supporting the assumption that
unobservable relationship factors did not change in 2011 with EHR compatibility.
For my difference-in-differences specifications, I define the treatment group to be pa-
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of hospitals that changed EHR brands in each year.
Figure 2.2: Percentage of hospital pairs with the same EHR across time.
tients with primary-surgical hospital pairs that never had the same EHR before 2011 and
always had the same EHR from 2011 and on. I define the control group to be patients with
primary-surgical hospital pairs that never had the same EHR from 2007-2014. My main
results are robust to including patients with primary-surgical hospital pairs that always
had the same EHR in the control group. Let Tkit jit t be an indicator for whether i’s primary-
surgical hospital pair in t qualifies i to be in the treatment group. The DID equation is:
ymit = θ
m
DIDTkit jit t × 1{t ≥ 2011} + β
m
T Tkit jit t + β
m
20111{t ≥ 2011} + β
m
DID xi jt + ξit . (2.2)
Figure 2.3 provides evidence for the identifying assumption that the treatment and
control groups had parallel trends in my primary outcome variables (30-day error and
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(a) 30-day error rate (b) 30-day mortality rate
Figure 2.3: Trends in differences between the treatment and control groups.
mortality rates) before the treatment was activated in 2011. The two groups mostly3 had
no statistically significant differences before the treatment, which is a stronger statement
than having parallel trends. However, they also had no statistically significant differences
after the treatment, suggesting that the treatment effect, if any exists, is too subtle to detect
without pooling data from multiple years.
2.5 Empirical Results
For my main results, I use the 30-day error and mortality rates as outcome vari-
ables. All specifications are linear probability models. All results presented use White’s
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors or clustered standard errors. One star indicates
statistical significance at the 10% level; two at the 5% level; and three at the 0.1% level.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 each present the results of four OLS specifications regressing the
30-day error rate and 30-day mortality rate, respectively, on an indicator for whether the
patient’s hospital pair has the sameEHRbrand. For both outcome variables, the coefficient
on this variable is statistically significant for only the specification with no covariates. The
first specification has no covariates. The second specification includes EHR covariates
32007 is slightly different from 0 for each outcome, but my results are robust to dropping 2007 from my
sample entirely.
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(e.g., it is the first year that a hospital has EHR), patient covariates, hospital covariates,
year fixed effects, and EHR fixed effects. The third and fourth specifications contain the
same covariates as the second. The third clusters standard errors on the surgical hospital
level, while the fourth includes surgical hospital fixed effects and referral region fixed
effects.
Having different primary and surgical hospitals is associated with both higher error
and mortality rates at the 0.1% level for all three specifications that use it as an indepen-
dent variable, which is to be expected since it is intuitively more difficult to coordinate
and send information between primary care and surgical physicians in different hospi-
tals. Having had a outpatient visit within the week before one’s acute inpatient admission
is also associated with higher error and mortality rates. Again, this is intuitive since these
are likely to be the more difficult cases where an outpatient hospital is forced to make a
referral to another hospital that has more inpatient capabilities.
Appendix B.1 contains Tables B.1 and B.2, which show the full sets of estimates for the
error andmortality OLS regressions, including the coefficients on patient and hospital co-
variates. Error rate is negatively correlated with the primary-surgical hospital pair being
in the same system or ACO, indicating that a pair in the same system or ACO coordinates
better than an unconnected pair. Error rate is also positively correlated with the surgi-
cal hospital having EHR for the first time or having just changed its EHR vendor, which
could be due to difficulties arising from healthcare professionals having to learn how to
use new software. Nonprofit and government-owned hospitals are generally associated
with better outcomes. Female beneficiaries withMedicare Plan D (prescription drug) cov-
erage or Retiree Drug Subsidy eligibility have a lower error rate, while beneficiaries with
end-stage renal disease, Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility, and chronic bone or heart
conditions generally have higher error/mortality rates. Older beneficiaries experience a
greater mortality rate.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the DID versions of the four OLS specifications. Table 2.5
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shows that estimated effect of EHR compatibility on the 30-day error rate is roughly 0.8
pp (4% out of the overall rate of 19.6%) and statistically significant for the first three spec-
ifications. It is no longer significantly different from 0 when surgical hospital fixed effects
are included, which could be because the fixed effects either eliminate true endogeneity
due to unobserved hospital quality differences or because the 2,712 surgical hospital fixed
effects absorb much of the variation in a sample with approximately 800,000 observations,
only 97,437 of which are in the treatment group and 50,184 of which are in the treatment
group in the treatment period.
Table 2.6 indicates that the estimated effect on the 30-day mortality rate is roughly -
0.8pp (-7% compared to the overall rate of 11.5%) and statistically significant for the first
three specifications. The effect size is reduced and only significant at the 10% level when
surgical hospital fixed effects are included. Since in both cases, statistical significance is
retained with standard errors clustered on surgical hospitals (specification 3), it is more
likely that the results of specification 4 are due to lack of power. Then, since specifica-
tions 2 and 3 are very similar in terms of the treatment effect estimate and significance but
specification 2 is simpler, I will use specification 2 as my preferred specification.4
Note that the signs of the treatment effect estimates are flipped relative to the OLS
estimates for the correlation between outcomes and having the sameEHR, though theOLS
estimates were only statistically significant when no control variables were included. This
difference suggests that there is some omitted variable bias from not being able to control
for unobserved relationship factors in the OLS specifications. For example, hospital pairs
may endogenously choose to have compatible EHRs because they noticed that they have
historically shared patients with complex cases and/or because they expect to share such
patients soon.
Table 2.7 contains the DID estimates for the preferred specification for various out-
4Because the occurrence of an error for a patient could affect their mortality outcome or vice versa, I tried
specifications in which, for each outcome variable, I controlled for the other or dropped the observations
where they occurred. The results for these specifications are qualitatively identical, and the magnitudes are
roughly similar as well.
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come measures: error rate, mortality rate, readmissions rate, and overall adverse rate, at
90, 30, and 7 days. For all outcome period lengths, the error rate and mortality rate treat-
ment effect estimates are statistically significant and of opposite signs. This result also
holds for specifications that control for the other outcome or omit observations where the
other outcome is equal to 1. The overall adverse rate (where an adverse outcome is de-
fined as experiencing either an error diagnosis or mortality) has no significant treatment
effects, and the readmissions rate is increased at only the 90-day window. The readmis-
sions rate is calculated as whether the patient experienced an inpatient admission in the
relevant window, after and not including the day of inpatient admission for their acute
cardiovascular condition. It also excludes diagnosis codes with ‘V’, which indicate ther-
apeutic/aftercare purposes and not negative health outcomes. Thus, it overlaps with the
error rate, but neither’s conditions are a subset of the other’s. It intuitively makes sense
that overall readmissions, measured by new inpatient conditions, would be significant
only at the longest outcome period length, since error conditions specific to the original
emergency should dominate at shorter windows. This result suggests that it may be use-
ful for public health research to consider more specific outcome measures in addition to
an overall readmissions rate.
The effect size is notmonotonically increasing in the outcome period length. For exam-
ple, the treatment effect estimate magnitude is 0.00547 at 7 days, increases to 0.00807 at 30
days, and then decreases back to 0.00589 at 90 days. This may seem counterintuitive since
if the outcome occurred for a shorter timewindow, it necessarily occurred for a longer time
window, which is corroborated by how themean of each outcome type is increasing in the
outcome period length. However, increasing the outcome period length increases the per-
centage of patients that experienced a specific outcome for not only the treatment group
after treatment takes effect, but also for the treatment group before treatment and for the
control group. Thus, there is no mathematical constraint that forces the treatment effect
estimates to monotonically increase in outcome period length like the outcome variable
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means do.
For the estimates for all three outcome period lengths, the Wald test fails to reject that
the DID treatment effect estimates for the error and mortality rates are of the same mag-
nitude and opposite signs. That the decrease in mortality rate is offset by the increase in
error rate is further corroborated by the lack of treatment effect for the overall adverse
rate. Assuming that all of the new survivors (those who would have experienced mortal-
ity if not for the treatment) experienced errors, these facts imply that the error rate did not
change in the population of those who would have survived regardless.
This result is consistent with the findings in Almond [2006], which models an indi-
vidual’s unobserved underlying health condition hi as being drawn from a continuous
distribution, with higher values representing better health. Adapting his model to my en-
vironment, if hi < d0, where d0 is a survival threshold, then the individual experiences
mortality (ymortit = 1). If d0 < hi ≤ d1, where d1 is a poor health threshold, then the indi-
vidual experiences an error (complication) diagnosis (yerrorit = 1). The question is whether
EHR compatibility shifts the entire distribution upward or simply moves d0 to be lower.
The offsetting, significant estimates for the error and mortality rates indicate that EHR
compatibility moves d0 to be lower, making it harder for individuals to experience mor-
tality but not affecting the percentage of individuals experiencing any adverse outcome.
The assumption that all new survivors experienced errors is sensible, because if it was
not true, then the error rate must have increased in the population of always-survivors.
While not impossible, the phenomenon of a treatment decreasing the variance of hi is not
well-studied, and I leave it to future research.
Consequently, as Almond [2006] notes, it is important for public health research to
account for mortality; otherwise, a treatment can appear detrimental, by raising the rate
of a bad, non-mortality outcome, when in reality it is saving lives. Though this sample
may be different from the total sample of all Medicare patients or all acute cardiovascular
patients, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that out of the roughly 700,000 per
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year acute cardiovascular patients, around 5,600 lives are or can be saved due to their
primary and surgical hospitals having compatible EHR.
Table 2.3: OLS regressions of 30-day error rate on EHR compatibility and covariates.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Same EHR -0.01751∗∗∗ 0.00084 0.00084 -0.00102
[0.00043] [0.00105] [0.00136] [0.00114]
Same Hospital System -0.00236∗∗ -0.00236∗ -0.00200∗
[0.00099] [0.00131] [0.00109]
Same ACO -0.00299∗∗ -0.00299 -0.00277∗
[0.00140] [0.00213] [0.00157]
Different Primary and Surgical 0.00887∗∗∗ 0.00887∗∗∗ 0.00721∗∗∗
[0.00088] [0.00126] [0.00097]
Had Preceding Outpatient Visit 0.02344∗∗∗ 0.02344∗∗∗ 0.02575∗∗∗
[0.00045] [0.00061] [0.00047]
Patient covariates N Y Y Y
Hospital covariates N Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y
EHR FE N Y Y Y
HRR FE N N N Y
Hospital FE N N N Y
Clustered SE N N Y N
Mean of dep. var. 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187
Observations 3,640,146 3,640,146 3,640,146 3,609,726
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the effect of EHR interoperability, the lack of which has been oft
discussed by patient health stakeholders and healthcare-related media outlets, who have
stirred up enough publicity that EHR vendors have established official interoperability
goals. Despite the media attention, there has not been until now a systematic statistical
analysis of the effect of EHR compatibility on patient health outcomes. My results in-
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Table 2.4: OLS regressions of 30-day mortality rate on EHR compatibility and covariates.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Same EHR 0.00175∗∗∗ 0.00002 0.00002 0.00124
[0.00034] [0.00082] [0.00104] [0.00089]
Same Hospital System -0.00131 -0.00131 -0.00157∗
[0.00080] [0.00114] [0.00087]
Same ACO -0.00222∗ -0.00222 -0.00017
[0.00122] [0.00155] [0.00135]
Different Primary and Surgical 0.00338∗∗∗ 0.00338∗∗ 0.00471∗∗∗
[0.00071] [0.00110] [0.00078]
Had Preceding Outpatient Visit 0.01830∗∗∗ 0.01830∗∗∗ 0.01882∗∗∗
[0.00036] [0.00071] [0.00037]
EHR covariates N Y Y Y
Patient covariates N Y Y Y
Hospital covariates N Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y
EHR FE N Y Y Y
HRR FE N N N Y
Hospital FE N N N Y
Clustered SE N N Y N
Mean of dep. var. 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114
Observations 3,640,146 3,640,146 3,640,146 3,609,726
dicate that that EHR compatibility saves a modest but statistically significant number of
lives, shifting Medicare emergency cardiovascular patients from experiencing mortality
to experiencing less bad adverse outcomes. This paper highlights a few factors that re-
quire careful consideration when evaluating the effects of a treatment on patient health
outcome. First, an outcome variable that tracks adverse drug and surgical events may be
more informative than an overall readmissions rate when a study is concernedwithmedi-
cal errors more than general health outcomes. Second, when using an experienced health
status as an outcome variable, it is important to also include mortality as an outcome vari-
able; otherwise, shifts from mortality to a negative health status could make a treatment
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Table 2.5: Difference-in-differences results with 30-day error rate as the outcome
variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Difference-in-Differences 0.00817∗∗ 0.00822∗∗ 0.00822∗∗ 0.00436
[0.00263] [0.00318] [0.00383] [0.00361]
Post-2011 -0.04048∗∗∗ -0.02976∗∗∗ -0.02976∗∗∗ -0.03104∗∗∗
[0.00096] [0.00296] [0.00346] [0.00349]
Treatment Group -0.02536∗∗∗ -0.00682∗∗ -0.00682∗ -0.01319∗∗∗
[0.00196] [0.00240] [0.00356] [0.00351]
Same Hospital System -0.00365∗ -0.00365 -0.00138
[0.00213] [0.00279] [0.00252]
Same ACO -0.00507 -0.00507 -0.00511
[0.00471] [0.00594] [0.00522]
Different Primary and Surgical 0.00224 0.00224 0.00596∗∗
[0.00230] [0.00313] [0.00285]
Had Preceding Outpatient Visit 0.02059∗∗∗ 0.02059∗∗∗ 0.02239∗∗∗
[0.00096] [0.00118] [0.00099]
EHR covariates N Y Y Y
Patient covariates N Y Y Y
Hospital covariates N Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y
EHR FE N Y Y Y
HRR FE N N N Y
Hospital FE N N N Y
Clustered SE N N Y N
Mean of dep. var. 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196
Observations 798,102 798,102 798,102 792,599
look harmful. Third, the difference between my OLS and DID estimates reinforce the idea
that caution is necessary when attributing causal relationships to correlational studies.
Though the size of the estimated effect of EHR compatibility on mortality is moderate,
it may be an underestimate for various reasons. The estimate of the absolute number of
lives that may be saved is an underestimate since it is only for the Medicare emergency
cardiovascular patient population, and there are other payers andmany other health prob-
lems. The estimate of the effect on the mortality rate, in addition to total mortality, may
also be an underestimate. Sometimes an EHR brand is not even interoperablewithin itself,
and having interoperable brands with another hospital does not necessarily mean a hos-
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Table 2.6: Difference-in-differences results with 30-day mortality rate as the outcome
variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Difference-in-Differences -0.00882∗∗∗ -0.00807∗∗ -0.00807∗∗ -0.00542∗
[0.00225] [0.00258] [0.00328] [0.00292]
Post-2011 0.00813∗∗∗ 0.00439∗ 0.00439 0.00042
[0.00076] [0.00242] [0.00285] [0.00284]
Treatment Group 0.01568∗∗∗ 0.00523∗∗ 0.00523 0.00805∗∗
[0.00162] [0.00188] [0.00329] [0.00273]
Same Hospital System -0.00337∗∗ -0.00337 -0.00094
[0.00172] [0.00259] [0.00202]
Same ACO 0.00499 0.00499 0.00954∗∗
[0.00402] [0.00510] [0.00438]
Different Primary and Surgical 0.00615∗∗∗ 0.00615∗ 0.00956∗∗∗
[0.00183] [0.00319] [0.00225]
Had Preceding Outpatient Visit 0.01491∗∗∗ 0.01491∗∗∗ 0.01602∗∗∗
[0.00076] [0.00124] [0.00077]
EHR covariates N Y Y Y
Patient covariates N Y Y Y
Hospital covariates N Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y
EHR FE N Y Y Y
HRR FE N N N Y
Hospital FE N N N Y
Clustered SE N N Y N
Mean of dep. var. 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115
Observations 798,102 798,102 798,102 792,599
pital will share patient information, given competitive reasons or simply organizational
difficulties in setting up and executing a standard process for doing it. Hospitals may
also prefer to conduct their own tests instead of acquiring the results of recent relevant
tests from other hospitals, in order to be able to bill for the tests. Meaningful use data for
2016 and on contain measures of the extent of actual health information exchange on the
hospital-year level, and investigating the connection between these measures and patient
health outcomes will be a potentially important contribution that is left to future work.
The result that the estimated effect of EHR compatibility on the error rate does not
change for patients who would have survived regardless of compatibility depends on the
94
Table 2.7: DID treatment effect estimates for various outcome variables.
Error Mortality Readmissions Adverse
Rate Rate Rate Rate
90-Day 0.01086** -0.00589* 0.00754** 0.00413
[0.00363] [0.00308] [0.00341] [0.00395]
30-Day 0.00822** -0.00807** 0.00361 0.00092
[0.00318] [0.00258] [0.00276] [0.00363]
7-Day 0.00667** -0.00547** 0.00196 0.00177
[0.00239] [0.00180] [0.00140] [0.00283]
Mean of dep. var. 0.286 0.178 0.231 0.401
0.196 0.115 0.132 0.284
0.102 0.051 0.029 0.147
These estimates use specification 2.
assumption that all the new survivors experienced errors. While this assumption is rea-
sonable insofar as it must be the case if we do not think that the treatment could improve
mortality while making the error rate worse for always-survivors, it could be interesting
to empirically test whether it is true. One way might be to match on estimated propensity
scores for mortality between the treatment and control groups, to see the difference in the
error rate between the groups while controlling for mortality propensity. This method
would help account for the impossibility of knowing who in the treatment group after
treatment takes effect is an always-survivor or a new survivor. If this technique finds that
EHR compatibility actually improved mortality while worsening the error rate, it would
be a counterintuitive result that implies that a treatment can not only shift the health dis-
tribution or move the mortality threshold, but also decrease the variance of the health
distribution by moving patients to the middle outcome of an error from both the better
outcome of no error and the worse outcome of mortality. I leave the execution of this
proposal to future research.
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Chapter 3
Physician-Insurer Networks: An Application of Many-to-Many
Matching
3.1 Introduction
In the U.S. healthcare market, many parties makemany decisions that impact the qual-
ity and cost of a health service long before the moment a consumer actually receives that
service. Two sets of suchdecisions thatmay be of interest to economists are howphysicians
choose insurance plans with which to contract and, analogously, how insurance plans
choose which physicians to have in their networks. The observed networks are the result
of bargaining between many physicians and many plans, and to match together, a physi-
cian and a plan must reach an agreement regarding the prices that the plan will pay to
the physician for various services used by the plan’s enrollees. This process is likely to
have a substantial impact on incentives. For example, if plans have much more bargain-
ing power, then they will procure much more of the surplus created by a match, giving
physicians less of an incentive to invest in their own quality, even if it would increase the
match surplus. The relevant prices are not readily available data, so in this paper, I abstract
away from modeling bargaining power and the transfers between plans and physicians.
Ho and Lee [2017] estimate a thorough structural model of employer-insurer bargaining
over premiums, hospital-insurer bargaining over reimbursements, household demand for
insurance, and individual demand for hospitals. However, they do not look at the effects
of non-monetary insurer characteristics such as insurer quality, subsuming all such effects
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in insurer-market fixed effects, and they limit their study to California, where they have
detailed data on admissions, claims, and enrollment.
Instead, I focus on identifying what determines the surplus produced by a physician-
plan match, regardless of how much of that surplus each party receives. Understanding
the joint production function will provide insight into what kinds of plans match with
what kinds of physicians, a major component of understanding the overall network for-
mation process. In particular, I attempt to answer whether there is assortative matching.
Assortative matching has been defined in the one-to-one matching case: positive assorta-
tive matching occurs if higher types are matched with higher types from the other side
of the market, and negative assortative matching occurs if higher types are matched with
lower types. Positive assortative matching is then guaranteed by a well-known super-
modularity condition on the joint surplus function [Becker, 1974]. In the case where the
surplus function is assumed to be a linear function of the interaction of each side’s type,
this condition boils down to a positive coefficient on the interaction term. While there
is currently no broadly accepted definition of assortative matching in the many-to-many
case, it seems that supermodularity would be a sufficient condition for most possible def-
initions of many-to-many assortative matching, so to answer whether there is assortative
matching, I test the sign of the coefficient on the interaction term of interest. My estimates
are too imprecise to rule out either sign or even 0; this is probably due to data and com-
putational limitations.
The empirical literature onmatchingwith transferable utility has largely focused on the
one-to-one case, primarily for the analysis of the marriage market. Choo and Siow [2006]
introduce a model with specific assumptions on the unobserved component of the joint
surplus that would be created bymatching a certain man and certain woman. Specifically,
they assume that the unobserved component generated by the man’s production function
and the unobserved component generated by the woman’s production function do not
interact, as well as that they are independently and identically distributed according to
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the type I extreme value distribution. These assumptions result in a closed-form formula
for the part of joint surplus that is determined by observed characteristics of the man and
woman, based on the empirical number of matches that occur between those types of men
and women, as well as the observed numbers of those types of men and women choosing
to remain single. Galichon and Salanié [2015] and Chiappori et al. [2017] generalize their
second assumption, but maintain the first assumption of separability.
Fox [2018], the main paper on estimation of many-to-many matching models with
transferable utility , also maintains a separability assumption for his main identification
result. His Theorem 1 identifies sufficient conditions on the distribution of the unobserved
components for the identification of parameters of interest in the joint surplus function,
via a maximum score estimator. My paper is a special case of his main model, where I
impose assumptions of specific linear forms on the production functions. His paper has
also been applied to numerous other contexts, including spectrum auctions [Fox and Ba-
jari, 2013], bank mergers [Akkus et al., 2016], and professional sports teams [Yang et al.,
2009].
My paper is also related to the empirical IO healthcare literature on insurer-healthcare
provider network formation. Ho [2009] begins this literature with an analysis of how hos-
pitals and insurers choose their networks and how the process affects hospitals’ incentives
for investment. She finds that hospitals with high consumer demand, hospitals that are
members of systems, and hospitals with capacity constraints receive higher markups, in-
dicating higher bargaining power. Lewis and Pflum [2015] perform a similar analysis fo-
cusing on hospitals andmanaged care organizations, finding that system hospitals’ higher
markups are due more to having higher bargaining power rather than having higher local
market concentration. Prager [2015] examines the effect of tiered pricing for consumers
on insurer-hospital network formation and hospital prices to insurers. Lee et al. [2013] de-
velop a dynamic network formationmodel with externalities and transfers. They estimate
it in the context of insurer-hospital matching, showing that it is possible to estimate un-
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observed bargaining power and transfers with only network information. They find that
static models underestimate the incentives for hospitals to merge by underestimating the
bargaining power of the more concentrated side of the market.
Though the previous literature focuses mostly on insurers’ hospital networks, Nosal
[2016a] also analyzes physician-insurer networks. She similarly uses the matching maxi-
mum score estimator in Fox [2018], but she focuses on Medicare Advantage plans offered
in six counties in Arizona and Nevada, whereas I will focus on a broader array of plans
in New York. Additionally, she does not have direct measures of either plan or physician
quality, instead relying on proxies such aswhether a plan is national, a physician’s number
of years of experience, and whether the physician attended medical school in the United
States. My data sources provide direct measures of both plan and physician quality.
Section 3.2 introduces the data and motivates the structural model with descriptive
analysis. Section 3.3 develops the Fox [2018] many-to-many matching model for this con-
text, and Section 3.4 presents the results of the structural estimation. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Description of Datasets
Physician data comes from the Healthgrades ratings website. For each physician, it
contains their name, gender, age, practice zip code, and ratings on a scale of 1-5 various
dimensions, including the patient satisfaction rating, likelihood of the rater recommend-
ing the physician to friends, ease of scheduling urgent appointments, office environment,
staff friendliness, total wait time, level of trust in the physician’s decisions, how well the
physician explains medical conditions, how well they listen and answer questions, and
whether they spend an appropriate amount of time with each patient. I calculate a wait
time rating from their average wait time category. The wait time categories are “over 45
minutes," “31-45 minutes," “16-30 minutes," “10-15 minutes", and“under 10 minutes," so
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I assign these to numbers 1-5, with 5 representing “under 10 minutes" to be consistent
with the other ratings, which are increasing in their quality dimension. The data also in-
clude the number of ratings and the number of written reviews, as well as the insurance
plans accepted by the physician. I supplement the physician characteristics data with zip
code-level income and demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2014 American
Community Survey. From the ACS, I also have the number of seniors and number of peo-
ple living below the poverty line in each zip code.
The profile data are entered by the physicians themselves, the hospitals with which
they are affiliated, orHealthgrades, which “obtains information fromhundreds of govern-
ment and commercially available sources.” Ratings and reviews are supposedly provided
by patients. Healthgrades checks whether a review is spam, and physicians can contest
reviews as being falsified, irrelevant, or inappropriate. However, there is no procedure
for verifying that review authors are actual patients, and there is essentially no screening
procedure for ratings.
The data are sampled from the Healthgrades website in May 2016, via a search for
family medicine specialists near zip code 14850 (Ithaca, New York). Ithaca was selected
since it is not only a major city in the state of New York, but also it is a more isolated
market for physician services, in the sense that other cities, such as New York and Buffalo,
are more likely to have complicating factors such as consumers, physicians, and insurance
plans fromNew Jersey or Canada. After dropping observations of physicians who do not
have ratings information or whose practices are outside of New York state, I have around
220 remaining physicians. Further limiting the sample by those who have more complete
covariates, the remaining sample consists of around 180 physicians. They are in 30 unique
insurance plans that are available in New York and available in the the insurer data.
Insurer data comes from the National Committee for Quality Assurance. For 2015, I
have the states inwhich the plan operates, the type of plan, its profit source (whether it is a
commercial, Medicare, orMedicaid plan) andwhether it is NCQA accredited. The type of
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for physician variables.
mean
Physician Quality 4.01
Number of Responses 6.70
Number of Reviews 0.24
Ease of scheduling urgent appointments 4.02
Office environment, cleanliness, comfort, etc. 4.29
Staff friendliness and courteousness 4.11
Wait time rating 3.68
Level of trust in provider’s decisions 4.09
How well provider explains medical condition(s) 4.12
How well provider listens and answers questions 4.11
Spends appropriate amount of time with patients 4.12
Total zipcode population 22,990.48
Senior population 3,342.32
Poverty population 4,458.85
Zipcode median household income 54,594.51
Number of plans 11.32
Observations 188












plan can be designated as HMO, HMO/POS, HMO/POS/PPO, or PPO. The “types” with
multiple actual types occur when NCQA allows the insurer to combine the data for mul-
tiple plans into one listing in the ratings data. Additionally, the data contain consumer
satisfaction, prevention, treatment, and overall NCQA ratings on a scale of 1-5, based
on HEDIS (Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set) and CAHPS (Consumer
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems) data. The data also contain measures
of customer service (for Medicare/Medicaid plans) and quality of claims processing (for
commercial plans).
The plan names listed on Healthgrades do not exactly match those in the NCQA data,
so in creating the network data, I make a few assumptions. The Healthgrades plan iden-
tity information is sometimes coarser than than the NCQA plan identity information. For
example, in Healthgrades, sometimes simply “Aetna PPO” will be listed, but Aetna has
multiple possible matching plans in the NCQA data, such as a commercial PPO and a
Medicare PPO. In these cases, I assume that the physician is matched to all plans in the
NCQA data to which the Healthgrades name may refer. Sometimes the NCQA has mul-
tiple plans for a given insurer-type-profit source triple; in these cases, I assume that the
physician is matched to the one that operates in New York and exclude the non-NY plans
from my insurer data.
For simplicity, I will take a physician’s quality to be his patient satisfaction rating. This
is the overall, main rating on Healthgrades that should be the most complete summary
of a physician’s quality. I will take a plan’s quality to be its “satisfaction with health plan
services” rating, which is a subcategory under consumer satisfaction and includes cus-
tomer service and quality of claims processing. I do not use the plan’s overall rating or
even just its consumer satisfaction rating because theNCQA computes those ratings based
on the quality of in-network physicians, so a plan with a high overall rating by definition
must have high-quality physicians. The factors incorporated in “satisfaction with health
plan services” are related directly to only the plan, and the plan can provide high- or low-
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quality customer service and claims processing regardless of the quality of its physicians.
Note that both the plan and physician quality measures are on a scale of 1-5 points.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show summary statistics for the physician and plan characteristics
that I will include in my analysis (others are omitted for having too many missing obser-
vations). Physician ratings are skewed upward at an average of around 4 stars. The lowest
average rating is for wait time, while the highest is for office environment. Physicians
match with an average of 11 plans, almost half of the 30 in the sample. Plan ratings are
not skewed, with a mean of roughly 3. Most plans are NCQA accredited, and almost half
are Medicare or HMO plans. Plans match with an average of 83 physicians, again almost
half of the available 188 in the sample.
3.2.2 Quality Correlations
To get an idea of the correlations that exist in the data between quality and other char-
acteristics, I run OLS regressions of physician quality and plan quality on own charac-
teristics and/or the average characteristics of their partners. In the results tables of this
section, one star indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; two at the 5% level; and
three at the 0.1% level.
Table 3.3 contains the results for physicians. Their overall quality rating depends on
staff friendliness, wait time, level of trust in their decision-making, listening skills, and
amount of time spent with patients; it does not appear to depend on the ease of schedul-
ing appointments, the office environment, or how well the physician explains medical
conditions. Physician quality is not correlated with the number of responses from which
their average ratingwas calculated, suggesting that the average rating does not suffer from
bias in one direction when a physician was rated by few patients. In column (2), which
regresses physician quality on only plan partner characteristics, physician quality is pos-
itively correlated with number of plans, indicating that high-quality physicians may like
to match with more plans. This may be because they accept more patients’ insurance,
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making more patients happy with their experience with that physician.1
Table 3.4 contains the results for plans. Their quality appears to be largely uncorrelated
with their own characteristics, but it is negatively correlatedwith the number of physicians
they accept and positively correlated with their average physician quality. This suggests
that while patients like physicians who accept many plans, they do not mind if their plan
restricts them to a smaller network of higher quality physicians. This may be due to when
each side affects the patient. The plan’s restricted network can steer patients to better
physicians–patients may even like to be referred to better physicians–but once a patient is
with a givenphysician already, theywouldprefer that the physician accept their insurance.
Plan quality is positively correlated with the average population size of their physi-
cians’ zip codes, perhaps because plan competition ismore intense in largermarketswhere
more profits are available. Plan quality is negatively correlated with the average numbers
of seniors and those living below the poverty line in their physicians’ zip codes. This
may be due to difficulties in managing care for these populations. Seniors tend to re-
quire a larger amount of services, so insurers may have to deny a higher proportion of
their claims. Those in poverty often face financial and time-related obstacles in follow-
ing treatment plans consistently. Additionally, areas with a high number of low income
people may not be very profitable markets and thus do not have enough competition. In-
terestingly, plan quality is negatively correlatedwith the average of themedian household
incomes of their physicians’ zip codes. This may be because wealthier populations have
higher expectations for service and thus tend to rate their plans lower.
1See Appendix C.1 for specifications including the number of HMO plans that the physician accepts. I
omit them from the main text because of the structure of the data, which makes interpretation difficult. The
excluded category for plan types is HMO/POS/PPO, and in addition to the HMO-only type, there is also
an HMO/POS type.
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Table 3.3: OLS regressions of physician quality on physician characteristics and/or the
average characteristics of the plans to which they match.
(1) (2) (3)
Phys Q Phys Q Phys Q
Number of Responses -0.00334 -0.00208
[0.00309] [0.00313]
Number of Reviews 0.03370 0.03094
[0.02954] [0.02876]
Ease of scheduling urgent appointments 0.01983 0.00703
[0.03496] [0.03425]
Office environment, cleanliness, comfort, etc. -0.06484 -0.03938
[0.04070] [0.04062]
Staff friendliness and courteousness 0.09220∗∗ 0.06594
[0.04271] [0.04312]
Wait time rating 0.04601∗ 0.06122∗∗
[0.02509] [0.02511]
Level of trust in provider’s decisions 0.27157∗∗∗ 0.35333∗∗∗
[0.07867] [0.08306]
How well provider explains medical condition(s) -0.03018 -0.10056
[0.08408] [0.08536]
How well provider listens and answers questions 0.44555∗∗∗ 0.42175∗∗∗
[0.07798] [0.07803]
Spends appropriate amount of time with patients 0.29114∗∗∗ 0.30640∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
Phys Q Phys Q Phys Q
[0.06221] [0.06525]
Total Population 0.00000 -0.00000
[0.00001] [0.00001]
Senior Population -0.00001 0.00000
[0.00003] [0.00004]
Poverty Population -0.00000 0.00000
[0.00002] [0.00002]
Zipcode Median Household Income -0.00000 -0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000]
N Plans -0.00285 0.07850∗ -0.00268
[0.00511] [0.04011] [0.00890]
Avg Plan Q -0.31017 0.02153
[0.39148] [0.07950]
% Medicare Plans -4.52860∗ -0.14636
[2.38101] [0.52048]
% Medicaid Plans -3.95767 0.66633
[2.71558] [0.56778]
% HMO 1.44674 0.05936
[1.55481] [0.32579]
% PPO 3.99563∗∗ 0.64860
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
Phys Q Phys Q Phys Q
[1.93328] [0.39882]
Constant -0.16620 4.48660∗∗∗ -0.57673∗
[0.15406] [1.28704] [0.30737]
Observations 186 183 181
3.2.3 Testing for the Index Model
Like in Chapter 1, I follow Chiappori et al. [2012] in running SUR regressions of part-
ners’ covariates on each other. Physician-plan matching is many-to-many, so the sample
consists of all physician-plan pairs whose matches were observed in the network data. I
regress both physician characteristics on plan characteristics and vice versa.
Table 3.5 displays the results of SUR regression of physician characteristics on plan
characteristics. Not much is significantly correlated. Only the size of the physician’s zip
code’s low income population is negatively correlated with plan quality and the size of
the plan’s physician network. Table 3.6 displays the results of SUR regression of plan
characteristics on physician characteristics. Again, few estimates are significantly different
from zero. Plan quality is negatively correlated with physician zip code senior and low
income populations, as well as physician zip code median household income, and plan
quality is positively correlated with physician zip code population size, consistent with
the results of the OLS correlations in Tables 3.4.
The marginal rate of substitution between two characteristics is infinite in magnitude
when one is different from zero and the other is zero, and in both sets of SUR estimates,
only one column even has any estimates of statistical significance, such that the other
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Table 3.4: OLS regressions of plan quality on plan characteristics and/or the average
characteristics of the physicians to which they match.
(1) (2) (3)













N Physicians -0.00452 -0.01944*** -0.02009***
[0.00332] [0.00413] [0.00479]
Avg Phys Q 1.79157** 1.76404
[0.84257] [1.09450]
Avg Phys Income -0.00037*** -0.00037***
[0.00007] [0.00009]
Avg Phys Senior Pop -0.01032*** -0.01061**
[0.00216] [0.00265]
Avg Phys Poverty Pop -0.00652*** -0.00655***
[0.00118] [0.00149]
Avg Phys Population 0.00314*** 0.00320***
[0.00061] [0.00075]
Constant 3.48982** 17.49634*** 18.65455***
[1.41861] [2.76630] [3.29790]
Observations 30 29 29
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columns essentially have zero marginal rates of substitution. Thus, this data also rejects
the indexmodel. Intuitively, theremay be important gains in surplus from certain types of
physicians andplansmatchingwith each other rather than others; for example, aMedicare
or Medicaid plan may be more valuable to a physician in a zip code with large senior and
low income populations. This motivates my estimation of the many-to-many matching
model of Fox [2018], which allows for interactions between characteristics across sides.
Note that since most physicians and most plans appear in the sample more than once,
there is an obvious correlation in errors across pairs. When running the OLS version with
standard errors clustered on the dependent variable entity (either physician or plan), no
estimates are statistically significant. However, this could simply be due to the small sam-
ple size, as will be discussed in Section 3.5. While this may mean that the index model
assumption is not necessarily rejected by this data, such that it may not be necessary to
estimate a model with interactions, Section 3.2.4 provides an example that illustrates the
importance of accounting for the many-to-many nature of matching in this context.
3.2.4 Many-to-Many Example
The evidence for assortativity on quality appears tenuous. The coefficient estimate
related to this assortativity is not statistically significantly different from zero in Tables
3.3, 3.5, and 3.6. In Table 3.4, the coefficient estimate for using a plan’s average physician
quality to predict the plan’s quality is statistically significant and positive only when plan
characteristics are not included as controls.
However, it is possible that the lack of correlation in these linear models is due to in-
accurate ratings. Figure 3.1 shows that high quality plans still tend to match with high
quality physicians; the negative correlation comes from low quality plans also matching
with high quality physicians. Figure 3.2 shows that there is a high number of physicians
who are rated 5 stars, the maximum rating. Since both high and low quality plans match










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































correlation between physician and plan quality, it is likely that low quality plans match
with asmany 5-star physicians as high quality plans do. Physicians with an average rating
of 5 stars onHealthgrades do not necessarily have the highest true quality; often they have
such a high rating due to having few ratings. However, despite the potential importance of
the number of reviews and the interaction between quality and the number of ratings, the
coefficient estimate for the number of ratings may be insignificant for predicting physi-
cian quality (Table 3.3) because both 5-star physicians and low quality physicians have
few ratings. The average number of ratings for 5-star physicians is 3.09. For non-5-star
physicians, it is 7.63, and for physicians in the bottom quartile, it is 1.55.
While the structural model cannot fully account for the possibility that a substantial
amount of 5-star physicians are not truly high quality, it can reduce the bias caused by
this issue through controlling for the number of partners. If low quality physicians are
more likely to have 5 stars than high quality physicians are (possibly due to gaming on
their part), the fact that plan quality and number of physicians are negatively correlated
may lead to a negative correlation between plan quality and average physician stars even
when there is positive assortative matching in terms of plan quality and true physician
quality. For illustrative purposes, suppose that there are one high quality plan and one
low quality plan. Let true quality be binary–it is 5 for high quality physicians and 1 for low
quality physicians. Suppose that there are 8 5-star physicians, 2 of which are high quality
and 6 of which are low quality. Suppose also that there are a 4-star high quality physician
and a 3-star low quality physician. The high quality plan contracts with two high quality
physicians. If they are drawn randomly from all high quality physicians, regardless of
stars, then the high quality plan’s expected average number of physician stars is given
by 23 (4.5) +
1
3 (5) = 4.67. If the low quality plan contracts with all physicians, its average
number of physician stars is then given by 110 (3 + 4 + 8 · 4) = 4.7. The low quality plan has
a high star average, but its average true physician quality is clearly lower.
The structural model I will use asks, “Holding fixed the number of in-network physi-
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cians, why did this plan choose any physician in its network over any physician not in
its network?” The framework makes the fact that the low quality plan contracted with
one 3-star physician much more important; it does not allow this physician’s rating to be
averaged out by the other physicians’ ratings. While the 5-star average low quality physi-
cians will make it difficult to find evidence of positive assortative matching regardless of
the model, the structural model removes one more channel of bias than the reduced form
analysis does, making it more likely to find such evidence.
This toy example can also be used to demonstrate the multiplicity of possibilities for
defining positive assortative matching in the context of many-to-many matching. It could
be defined as a high quality agent matching with more high quality partners if quantity
is particularly desirable–in this case, it could be valuable for a plan to have a higher total
number of high quality physicians because consumers value variety due to having het-
erogeneous tastes. It could be defined as higher quality agents having partner quality
distributions that first-order stochastically dominate those of lower quality agents. This
would be a valuable definition if agents find value in having partner distributions with a
tail for some reason, though it would present difficulties since many distributions would
not be comparable. In this descriptive section, I view positive assortative matching as a
high quality agent having a higher partner quality average since many factors unrelated
to assortative matching may determine preferences over the number of partners. In my
structural model, I will view it as higher quality physicians producingmore surplus when
matched with higher quality plans than they would if matched with lower quality plans.
Rigorously definingmany-to-many assortative matching is behind the scope of this paper,
and I leave it to future work.
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Figure 3.1: Visualization of the matches between plans and physicians as a network.
The top row of nodes represents plans, and the bottom row represents physicians. Blue
nodes represent agents with higher-than-average quality, and magenta nodes represent
agents with lower-than-average quality. Edges represent empirically observed matches.
Green edges indicate high quality agents matching together or low quality agents match-
ing together, as indicative of positive assortative matching, while red edges indicate an
uneven match, as indicative of negative assortative matching.
3.3 Model
Themodel is a special case of Fox [2018], which is based onAzevedo andLeshno [2016].
An insurance plan is described by a vector of characteristics x ∈ X ⊆ RKX , and a physician
is similarly described by y ∈ Y ⊆ RKY . An outcome to the many-to-many matching game
is a measure µ on the space Ω ≡ X × ({0, 1} ×R)Y , which is restricted as necessary if agents
have quotas. An element of this space is characterized by an insurance plan x, indicators
for being matched to each y, and transfers from x to each y. Let < x, y, t > be a match,
< x, y > a physical match, and {x, y1, . . . , yN } be a (possibly infinite) physical partner list.
Let M be a set of physical matches, and let µA be the set of physical partner lists implied
by measure µ.
Suppose x matcheswith a setY ′ of physicians under some µ, and let Mx = ∪y∈Y ′{< x, y >
}. Then, at µ, x gets profit πX(M)−
∑
y∈Y ′ t<x,y>, where πX(M) is the insurer revenue function
and t<x,y> is the monetary transfer from x to y in the match < x, y, t >. Analogously, y gets
profit πY (My) +
∑
x∈X ′ t<x,y> when he matches with the set X′ of insurers. The solution
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Figure 3.2: The distribution of plan quality and the distribution of physician quality.
concept I will use is pairwise stability. An outcome µ is pairwise stable if:
1. Let ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω be partner and transfer lists for x1 and x2, and let y1 be a physician
to which x1 is matched under ω1 and y2 be the same for ω2. Let Mx1 be the set of matches
with x1 under ω1 and My2 the set of matches with y2 under ω2. For all ω1 and ω2 in the
support of µ, we have
πX(Mx1) − t<x1,y1> ≥ π
X((Mx1\{< x1, y1 >}) ∪ {< x1, y2 >}) − t̃<x1,y2>, (3.1)
where t̃<x1,y2> = πY ((My2\{< x2, y2 >}) ∪ {< x1, y2 >}) − (πY (My2) − t<x2,y2>).
2. Inequality 3.1 holds if < x1, y1 >=< x1, 0 > and/or < x2,y2 >=< 0, y2 >, with the
corresponding transfers equal to 0.
3. For all < x, y, t > formed under any ω in the support of µ, where Mx = {< x, y1 >
, . . . , < x, yN >} is the set of matches with x under ω and y ∈ {y1, . . . , yN }, we have
πX(Mx) − t<x,y> ≥ πX(Mx\{< x, y >}).
4. For all < x, y, t > formed under any ω in the support of µ, where My = {< x1, y >
, . . . , < xN, y >} is the set of matches with y under ω and x ∈ {x1, . . . , xN }, we have
πY (My) + t<x,y> ≥ πY (My\{< x, y >}).
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Part 1means that no planswant to trade an in-network physician for an out-of-network
physician, contingent on having to pay the out-of-network physician just enough to get
him to leave one of his current plans. Part 2 means that part 1 applies to plans and physi-
cians with unfilled quotas. Parts 3 and 4 are individual rationality conditions that say that
beingmatched to each partner to which one is matched is better than simply not matching
with him.
Plugging t̃<x1,y2> into inequality 3.1 gives
πX(Mx1) + t<x1,y1> + π
Y (My2) ≥
πX((Mx1\{< x1, y1 >}) ∪ {< x1, y2 >}) + π
Y ((My2\{< x2, y2 >}) ∪ {< x1, y2 >}) + t<x2,y2>.
A symmetric inequality holds for x2 not wanting to replace y2 with y1. Adding these
inequalities cancels the transfers, giving
πX(Mx1) + π
Y (My1) + π
X(Mx2) + π
Y (My2) ≥
πX((Mx1\{< x1, y1 >}) ∪ {< x1, y2 >}) + π
Y ((My1\{< x1, y1 >}) ∪ {< x2, y1 >}) +
πX((Mx2\{< x2, y2 >}) ∪ {< x2, y1 >}) + π
Y ((My2\{< x2, y2 >}) ∪ {< x1, y2 >}). (3.2)
I now assume a specific functional form for πX(M), where M is the set of physicians




θX,k · zX,k(M) + ε x̃M,
where zX,k(M) is a determinant of plan revenue that is a function of M , θX,k are param-
eters to be estimated, and ε x̃M is an unobserved component of revenue, which depends on
an unobserved type x̃ ∈ X̃ . Let ε x̃ be the vector of all ε x̃M ; note that it has the same di-
mension as the power set of Y . I assume that F(ε x̃ | x̃) has full support on Rdim(ε x̃), that it
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has bounded, continuous derivatives, and that, for all x ∈ X , F(ε x̃ | x̃) is an exchangeable
distribution. This means that for any permutation ρ(ε x̃), F(ε x̃ | x̃) = F(ρ(ε x̃) | x̃). Note that
this assumption is quite restrictive. While it does not restrict F(ε x̃ | x̃) to be homoskedas-
tic (same across x̃), it rules out specifications such as the random coefficients logit model.
Thus, for example, I assume that all tastes for quality are explained by the observed co-
variates. Additionally, this restriction does not allow the distribution of ε x̃M to vary much
across M , even as the size of M varies. For example, if there are two physicians in Y , such
that ε x̃ has four elements (one for each of ∅, {y1}, {y2}, {y1, y2}), the assumption requires
that F((0, 0.1, 0.1, 1) | x̃) = F((0, 1, 0.1, 0.1) | x̃), which would not be the case if larger sets
had errors with different means or variances.
I define everything analogously for physicians. Themodel now satisfies the rank order
property defined in Fox [2018]. By his Theorem 1, the set of maximizers of the expectation
of the maximum score objective function contains the true θ. Additionally assuming that
at least one zX,k or zY,k is continuous with full support over a possibly bounded region
(which will be the case for my specification), the model satisfies the conditions for the




θX,k · [zX,k(Mx1) + zX,k(Mx2)
−zX,k(((Mx1\{< x1, y1 >}) ∪ {< x1, y2 >}))




θY,k · [zY,k(My1) + zY,k(My2) (3.3)
−zY,k((My1\{< x1, y1 >}) ∪ {< x2, y1 >})
−zY,k((My2\{< x2, y2 >}) ∪ {< x1, y2 >})] ≥ 0
⇐⇒ Z′gθ ≥ 0,
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where g indentifies a specific inequality with four specific agents. There are several
limitations as to what kinds of coefficients can be identified with this model. First note
that I cannot identify any coefficients on covariates dependent only on individual agents’
characteristics, as the contribution of such covariates to the revenue gets differenced out
in the inequality.
Additionally, any coefficients on covariates that are non-linear functions of character-
istics of multiple agents from the other side are subject to endogeneity issues. For exam-
ple, let j = 1, . . . , NY index the number of physicians, and let 1{X is matched to j} be an
indicator for insurer X being matched to physician j. Let qY,0, j be the quality of physi-
cian j. One might be interested in the coefficient on zX,k =
∑NY
j=1[1{X is matched to j} · qY,0, j ·∑
j ′, j
1
N−1 qY,0, j ′]–perhaps having a higher-quality physician increases insurer revenuemore
when the insurer has a network with high-quality physicians, i.e., high-quality physicians




N−1 q j ′, so we would not be able to
tell whether a positive θY,k would be due to complementarities or an unobserved variable




N−1 q j ′.
A final limitation of note is that for any zX,k that is a sum of products of variables, each
of which depending only on one physician or plan, only θX,k+θY,k is identified if zX,k = zY,k ′
for some k′ (and the same holds true for similar zY,k). Let qA,k, j be individual characteristic
k of agent j on side A ∈ {X,Y }, and Mj be a set of matches for agent j. I focus on covariates
of the form zA,k(Mj) =
∑N−A
i=1 1{i ∈ Mj} · q−A,k,i · qA,k, j . For example, let qX,0,i be the quality of
plan i. I will let zX,0 be the sum of qX,0,i · qY,0, j over all j to whom i is matched. However,
I will also use as a zY,0 the sum of cover all i. As 3.3 clearly shows, each qX,0,i · qY,0, j will
appear next to both θX,0 and θY,0, so I can only identify θX,0+θY,0. This is not an issue since I
am primarily interested in the determinants of joint surplus and not specifically πX or πY ,
but it should be kept in mind when interpreting the estimates. Since I will not distinguish
between zX,k and zY,k in the remaining, I drop the A subscript.
Let G be the set of all possible inequalities, and let GN ⊆ G be some subset. The match-
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As Fox [2018] shows, θ̂ is consistent for θ if each inequality is selected to be in GN with
equal probability, as I will do for my estimation.
The inequalities in the estimator are derived from pairwise stability, the inability of
any physician-insurer pair that is not matched to each other to do better by trading one
of their partners for each other. There are various possible other solution concepts and
corresponding inequalities, such as coalition-proofness, the inability of any coalition of
physicians and insurers to do better by trading some subset of their partners for each
other. In many contexts, including one-to-one matching with transferable utility, pairwise
stability implies coalition-proofness, so the additional inequalities derived from coalition-
proofness would not provide more information than pairwise stability in those cases.
Whether this implication applies to many-to-many matching with transferable utility has
not yet been theoretically analyzed and may be an interesting topic for future work.
3.4 Estimation Results
Asymptotics are in the number of inequalities, which equals the number of coalitions
of two plans (x1, x2) and two physicians (y1, y2) such that y1 ∈ µ(x1), y2 ∈ µ(x2), and y1 , y2.
There are 1,454,116 available inequalities, so to construct construct GN , I sample 15,000
inequalities without replacement from G. I obtain θ̂ by maximizing the objective function
withMathematica’sNMaximize function, which uses differential evolution. I obtain a 95%
confidence region via subsampling, as described in Politis et al. [1999] and recommended
by Fox and Santiago [2015]. Table 3.7 presents the estimates and confidence regions when
I normalize the coefficient on z7, the interaction of being a Medicare plan and the number
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of seniors in a physician’s zip code. Following Fox [2018], I estimate the parameters for
both when θ7 is restricted to be 1 and for when it is restricted to be -1 and then compare
the number of inequalities satisfied for each assumption to select the model. Note that
the other parameters must be interpreted accordingly. For example, if we set θ8 = 1, an
estimate of θ̂1 = 1 would mean that an increase in the interaction between a plan’s quality
and aphysician’s number of reviews by 1would contribute just asmuch to the joint surplus
as an increase in z7 by 1. This normalization makes the coefficients difficult to interpret,
since one of the elements of z7 is an indicator for being aMedicare plan. However, I choose
to normalize θ7 over other parameters, since it is the only one that has an ex-ante clear
sign. Holding other factors constant, the effect of z7 should clearly be positive, which is
supported by the results in Table 3.7, since the specificationwith θ7 = 1 results in estimates
that satisfy more inequalities than θ7 = −1 satisfies. Appendix C.2 presents the results of
an alternative specification normalizing θ0 to±1, providing further evidence that θ7 is truly
positive. Regardless of the interpretation of the magnitude, the sign of each coefficient
has a clear interpretation: whether an increase in the covariate increases or decreases joint
surplus.
Note that I do not observe every possible value of my continuous covariates (e.g., the
interaction of plan quality and physicianmedian age), so though themodel is theoretically
point identified, it is possible that in practice, θ̂ is a set rather than a point. However, run-
ning the optimization routine several times results in the same estimates, so there appears
to be sufficient variation for point identification.
Table 3.7 shows that all of the parameters are too imprecisely estimated even to take
a stance on their signs. This issue might be eliminated by using all available inequalities





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Physician-insurer networks are of interest to economists, as the determinants of how
they are formed affect not only prices between physicians and insurers, but also prices
for consumers. Such endogeneous network formation can be viewed as a many-to-many
matching market with transferable utility, for which Fox [2018] provides a consistent es-
timator. The model in Fox [2018] allows for the identification of various parameters of
interest in the joint surplus production function. When attempting to address questions
such as whether there is positive assortative matching, this structural model accounts for
more bias than regressions do; however, it is still limited by data quality. Physician ratings
in Healthgrades data may not be sufficiently correlated with true quality, as they are pro-
vided by consumers on a voluntary basis. The empirical results of this paper are largely
null, but the context highlights the lack of a formal definition of assortativematching in the
many-to-many matching case. Though the relevance of various definitions may depend
mostly on the application, this may be an interesting direction for future research.
Themain limitation of this paper in achieving its goal of identifying assortative match-
ing is the quality of the Healthgrades physician quality measure. Zocdoc is a website that
also contains patient ratings of physicians. However, its physician quality measure may
be more reliable since it is also an appointment scheduling website. This feature enables
it to restrict ratings and reviews to “verified patients” who actually had an appointment
with the physician being rated. Though this system is still gameable, it is much harder to
do so. Additionally, Zocdoc tends to have more ratings per physician than Healthgrades
does, so inaccurate individual 5-star ratings have much less of an impact on most physi-
cians’ ratings. These two characteristics likely make Zocdoc’s physician quality measure
more accurate than that of Healthgrades. The Medicare Physician Compare dataset also
contains manymore measures of physician quality, including more objective ones regard-
ing clinical practices. However, it is separate from insurance network data, while Zocdoc
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has detailed information on which plans from which insurers each physician accepts.
This paper was limited in the questions it could attempt to answer, since the hand-
collected Healthgrades data are not very rich. It was feasible to collect data from physi-
cians in only one specialty near one city, at one point in time. The Zocdoc data would be
muchmore comprehensive, includingphysicians inmultiple specialties all over theUnited
States, possibly at multiple points in time. In these data, there would at least be the same
variables as in the Healthgrades data, but they may also contain measures of physician
demand through the appointment scheduling feature. With this additional data, I would
be able to investigate more questions, such as whether high-quality physicians across or
within specialties are substitutes or complements. Expanding this paper to use Zocdoc
data would be an interesting direction for future research.
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Table A.4: SUR regressions of hospital mortality rate and process of care measures on
only regional HHIs, as well as network membership variables.
(9)
PN HF HF1 HF2
MortalityMortality Share Share
System Regional HHI -0.00001 -0.00000 0.00013 0.00030**
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00021] [0.00012]
System Reg HHI × In System -0.00002 -0.00003* -0.00012 -0.00031**
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00019] [0.00011]
EHR Regional HHI 0.00001 0.00006** 0.00038* 0.00022*
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00020] [0.00012]
EHR Reg HHI × Has EHR 0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00038* -0.00021*
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00020] [0.00012]
ACO Regional HHI 0.00001 -0.00003 -0.00007 -0.00004
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00018] [0.00010]
ACO Reg HHI × In ACO -0.00001 0.00001 -0.00017 -0.00003
[0.00006] [0.00005] [0.00054] [0.00031]
Dep. var lags 1 and 2 Y
Hospital covariates Y
Year trend Y






Table A.5: SUR regressions of hospital mortality rate and process of care measures on
only national HHIs, as well as network membership variables.
(10)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
System National HHI -0.10263*** 0.01839* 0.30820** 0.03870
[0.01195] [0.01049] [0.11466] [0.06551]
System Nat HHI × In System 0.00562 0.00365 -0.05718 -0.01969
[0.00398] [0.00349] [0.03823] [0.02183]
EHR National HHI 0.00492*** -0.00141** -0.01267** 0.00183
[0.00054] [0.00048] [0.00520] [0.00297]
EHR Nat HHI × Has EHR 0.00023 0.00012 -0.00241 0.00159
[0.00031] [0.00027] [0.00295] [0.00169]
ACO National HHI 0.60061*** 0.58219*** -1.43640** -0.69193*
[0.06717] [0.05899] [0.64515] [0.36873]
ACO Nat HHI × In ACO -0.02204 -0.41115** 1.17931 0.12472
[0.20459] [0.17971] [1.96496] [1.12279]
Dep. var lags 1 and 2 Y
Hospital covariates Y
Year trend Y





Table A.6: SUR regressions of hospital mortality rate and process of care measures on
only system HHIs, as well as network membership variables.
(11)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
System National HHI 0.03033*** 0.02244*** -0.05774 0.06420**
[0.00459] [0.00403] [0.04393] [0.02506]
System Regional HHI 0.00002 0.00001 0.00014 0.00031***
[0.00002] [0.00001] [0.00016] [0.00009]
System Nat HHI × In System 0.00452 -0.00093 -0.05130 -0.01019
[0.00396] [0.00348] [0.03792] [0.02164]
System Reg HHI × In System -0.00003* -0.00003* -0.00013 -0.00032**
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00018] [0.00010]
Dep. var lags 1 and 2 Y
Hospital covariates Y
Year trend Y





Table A.7: SUR regressions of hospital mortality rate and process of care measures on
only EHR HHIs, as well as network membership variables.
(12)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
EHR National HHI 0.00191*** 0.00016 -0.00409 0.00165
[0.00032] [0.00028] [0.00308] [0.00176]
EHR Regional HHI -0.00001 0.00003* 0.00038** 0.00026**
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00019] [0.00011]
EHR Nat HHI × Has EHR 0.00016 0.00063** -0.00187 0.00149
[0.00030] [0.00027] [0.00290] [0.00166]
EHR Reg HHI × Has EHR 0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00037* -0.00023**
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00020] [0.00011]
Dep. var lags 1 and 2 Y
Hospital covariates Y
Year trend Y





Table A.8: SUR regressions of hospital mortality rate and process of care measures on
only ACO HHIs, as well as network membership variables.
(13)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
ACO National HHI 0.58393*** 0.54469*** -1.43986** 0.05239
[0.05242] [0.04588] [0.50250] [0.28716]
ACO Regional HHI 0.00000 -0.00002* 0.00006 0.00009
[0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00012] [0.00007]
ACO Nat HHI × In ACO -0.17508 -0.35174* 1.81859 0.15921
[0.20647] [0.18085] [1.97749] [1.12994]
ACO Reg HHI × In ACO -0.00004 -0.00001 -0.00030 -0.00016
[0.00006] [0.00005] [0.00055] [0.00031]
Dep. var lags 1 and 2 Y
Hospital covariates Y
Year trend Y





Table A.9: SUR regressions of hospital mortality rate and process of care measures on
HHIs, network membership variables, and EHR popularity variables (1/2).
(14)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
System National HHI -0.10688*** 0.01821 0.30901** 0.03869
[0.01335] [0.01175] [0.11784] [0.06433]
System Regional HHI -0.00002 -0.00001 0.00011 0.00022*
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00022] [0.00012]
System Nat HHI × In System 0.00589 0.00439 -0.08831** -0.04816**
[0.00429] [0.00378] [0.03795] [0.02071]
System Reg HHI × In System -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00013 -0.00017
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00019] [0.00011]
EHR National HHI 0.00537*** -0.00130** -0.01569** 0.00365
[0.00058] [0.00051] [0.00515] [0.00281]
EHR Regional HHI 0.00004** 0.00004*** -0.00002 -0.00003
[0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00012] [0.00006]
ACO National HHI 0.62035*** 0.57758*** -1.51119** -0.65281*
[0.07430] [0.06540] [0.65635] [0.35840]
ACO Regional HHI 0.00001 -0.00004** -0.00006 -0.00001
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00019] [0.00010]
ACO Nat HHI × In ACO -0.11058 -0.65962** 1.36245 0.35141
[0.26789] [0.23593] [2.36670] [1.29224]
ACO Reg HHI × In ACO -0.00001 0.00007 0.00024 -0.00004
[0.00007] [0.00006] [0.00060] [0.00033]
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Table A.9: SUR regressions of hospital mortality rate and process of care measures on
HHIs, network membership variables, and EHR popularity variables, continued (2/2).
(11)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
In System=0 × Has EHR=1 × In ACO=0 0.30019 -1.80351** -0.09547 -1.34659
[0.94357] [0.83094] [8.33612] [4.55110]
In System=0 × Has EHR=1 × In ACO=1 0.27372 0.20526 -3.72292* -3.13802**
[0.25085] [0.22086] [2.21718] [1.21046]
In System=1 × Has EHR=1 × In ACO=0 0.11378 -1.92296** 4.02633 0.66383
[0.93150] [0.82029] [8.22986] [4.49347]
Join Sys=0 × Join EHR=0 × Join ACO=1 0.33020 -0.30433 0.14371 -0.08583
[0.37184] [0.32742] [3.28489] [1.79337]
Join Sys=0 × Join EHR=1 × Join ACO=0 0.00292 0.03400 -1.70055*** 0.00103
[0.03279] [0.02886] [0.28961] [0.15809]
Join Sys=0 × Join EHR=1 × Join ACO=1 0.23530 -0.12211 -0.98414 -1.68264
[0.51864] [0.45675] [4.58216] [2.50161]
Join Sys=1 × Join EHR=0 × Join ACO=0 -0.02320 -0.06103 -1.22419** -0.24396
[0.07052] [0.06209] [0.62301] [0.34010]
Join Sys=1 × Join EHR=1 × Join ACO=0 0.04130 0.07909 -0.14308 0.77622*
[0.08696] [0.07656] [0.76824] [0.41938]
EHR Regional Popularity (Hospitals) 0.00366 0.01366 0.17060 -0.08095
[0.06794] [0.05983] [0.60020] [0.32771]
EHR National Popularity (Hospitals) 0.19411 -0.08263 8.03786 1.48511
[0.55788] [0.49130] [4.92880] [2.69077]
Dep. var lags 1 and 2 Y
Hospital covariates Y
Year trend Y





A.3 Influence of Assortativity
Table A.10: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure
lags of the systems they just joined. Specification with two lags, HHI controls, and
same-period means, with means restricted to hospitals in the same HRR as the target
hospital.
(15)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag (HRR) -0.00313
[0.10725]
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 2 (HRR) 0.00553
[0.08690]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i (HRR) 0.06212
[0.08255]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag (HRR) 0.07160
[0.11448]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 2 (HRR) -0.10099
[0.08755]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i (HRR) 0.08416
[0.07910]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag (HRR) -0.16504*
[0.09563]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 2 (HRR) 0.10696
[0.07933]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i (HRR) 0.13346*
[0.07756]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag (HRR) -0.03824
[0.09412]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 2 (HRR) -0.13796**
[0.06774]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i (HRR) 0.08126
[0.12719]
Has EHR=1 × In ACO=0 -0.01666 -0.18630 0.00935 2.26389**
[0.17586] [0.17340] [1.59524] [0.82041]
Has EHR=1 × In ACO=1 -0.15622 0.54150 -3.60985 1.47165
[1.01412] [0.99690] [9.07027] [4.67098]






Table A.11: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure lags
of the EHRs they just joined. Specification with two lags, HHI controls, and same-period
means, with means restricted to hospitals in the same HRR as the target hospital.
(15)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag (HRR) -0.00990
[0.06010]
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 2 (HRR) 0.07311
[0.04837]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i (HRR) -0.00382
[0.05056]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag (HRR) 0.06276
[0.06148]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 2 (HRR) 0.02284
[0.04979]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i (HRR) 0.04514
[0.05238]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag (HRR) 0.13317**
[0.05790]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 2 (HRR) -0.04651
[0.04435]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i (HRR) -0.01601
[0.05109]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag (HRR) 0.06172
[0.04705]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 2 (HRR) -0.03730
[0.03894]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i (HRR) 0.01180
[0.03545]
In System=1 × In ACO=0 0.03084 -0.05081 0.81195 1.07748**
[0.09227] [0.07986] [1.04955] [0.51626]
In System=1 × In ACO=1 -0.00044 -0.23056 1.82933 0.29927
[0.48140] [0.41535] [5.36569] [2.60928]






Table A.12: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure lags
of the ACOs they just joined. Specification with two lags, HHI controls, and same-period
means, with means restricted to hospitals in the same HRR as the target hospital.
(15)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag (HRR) -0.13214
[0.12728]
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 2 (HRR) 0.01857
[0.11657]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i (HRR) 0.10332
[0.11973]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag (HRR) 0.18384
[0.11532]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 2 (HRR) 0.17573*
[0.09967]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i (HRR) -0.27308**
[0.10120]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag (HRR) 0.21577**
[0.08018]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 2 (HRR) 0.00738
[0.09919]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i (HRR) 0.04294
[0.12644]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag (HRR) -0.07005
[0.10351]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 2 (HRR) 0.09818
[0.09161]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i (HRR) -0.36431**
[0.13277]
In System=0 × Has EHR=1 1.01857 -0.98582 -17.82529** 2.47224
[0.94542] [0.81091] [8.40221] [1.72193]
In System=1 × Has EHR=0 0.68227 -1.54247** -18.49617** 2.77570
[0.99185] [0.77857] [8.71368] [1.69148]
In System=1 × Has EHR=1 0.92443 -0.90431 -19.49650** 2.83493*
[0.96060] [0.75865] [8.60072] [1.69164]






Table A.13: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure
lags of the systems they just joined. Specification with two lags, no HHI controls, and
same-period means.
(16)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 0.05265
[0.10264]
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 2 -0.01366
[0.08432]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i 0.08260
[0.07498]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.19624
[0.12392]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 2 -0.11671
[0.09064]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i -0.08414
[0.07779]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag -0.01235
[0.09254]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 2 0.11022
[0.07226]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i 0.18522**
[0.08790]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag -0.09455
[0.09901]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 2 0.25704***
[0.07168]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i 0.07904
[0.09567]
Has EHR=1 × In ACO=0 -0.05625 -0.04599 1.05765 1.88467**
[0.13465] [0.12912] [1.34419] [0.82530]
Has EHR=1 × In ACO=1 -0.69855 0.78475 -3.16660 0.96434
[0.72854] [0.69306] [7.13581] [4.34097]






Table A.14: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure
lags of the EHRs they just joined. Specification with two lags, no HHI controls, and
same-period means.
(16)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 0.07767
[0.20298]
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 2 0.05151
[0.19282]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i 0.04896
[0.13146]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.32516**
[0.13617]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 2 -0.44237**
[0.14410]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i 0.05169
[0.13112]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag -0.24611
[0.17965]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 2 0.19654*
[0.11223]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i 0.11334
[0.10947]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag -0.36834***
[0.10860]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 2 0.34040***
[0.07996]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i 0.13754**
[0.05660]
In System=0 × In ACO=1 -0.86168 0.44201 10.86405 -5.22080
[1.04848] [0.89954] [12.15847] [6.44488]
In System=1 × In ACO=0 -0.00396 -0.11444* 0.68811 0.91926**
[0.06983] [0.06055] [0.80619] [0.44533]
In System=1 × In ACO=1 -0.00191 -0.41827* 0.62236 0.28624
[0.28728] [0.24923] [3.18392] [1.75835]






Table A.15: SUR regressions of hospitals’ quality measures on mean quality measure
lags of the ACOs they just joined. Specification with two lags, no HHI controls, and
same-period means.
(16)
PN HF HF1 HF2
Mortality Mortality Share Share
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag -0.17778
[0.18080]
Mean PN Surv Perc Lag 2 -0.00820
[0.14383]
Mean PN Surv Perc -i 0.11270
[0.13820]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 0.41871**
[0.20997]
Mean HF Surv Perc Lag 2 0.16186
[0.14370]
Mean HF Surv Perc -i -0.34996**
[0.14773]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 0.15303
[0.11002]
Mean HF1 Percentage Lag 2 -0.00889
[0.13248]
Mean HF1 Percentage -i 0.12156
[0.13901]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag -0.37987**
[0.16291]
Mean HF2 Percentage Lag 2 0.26591**
[0.10941]
Mean HF2 Percentage -i -0.37551**
[0.13334]
In System=0 × Has EHR=1 1.01190 -1.43791* -7.82860 5.17023***
[0.89316] [0.83535] [6.91828] [1.42154]
In System=1 × Has EHR=0 1.37234 -1.26897 -9.10853 5.73466***
[0.90673] [0.83333] [7.01158] [1.40108]
In System=1 × Has EHR=1 1.23382 -1.02776 -8.06580 5.82614***
[0.90753] [0.83543] [7.02146] [1.41575]







B.1 Full Results for Ordinary Least Squares Specification
Table B.1: OLS regressions of error rate on EHR compatibility and covariates, full table.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Same EHR -0.01751∗∗∗ 0.00084 0.00084 -0.00102
[0.00043] [0.00105] [0.00136] [0.00114]
Same Hospital System -0.00236∗∗ -0.00236∗ -0.00200∗
[0.00099] [0.00131] [0.00109]
Same ACO -0.00299∗∗ -0.00299 -0.00277∗
[0.00140] [0.00213] [0.00157]
Different Primary and Surgical 0.00887∗∗∗ 0.00887∗∗∗ 0.00721∗∗∗
[0.00088] [0.00126] [0.00097]
Had Preceding Outpatient Visit 0.02344∗∗∗ 0.02344∗∗∗ 0.02575∗∗∗
[0.00045] [0.00061] [0.00047]
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Year=2008 0.00504∗∗∗ 0.00504∗∗∗ 0.00576∗∗∗
[0.00094] [0.00102] [0.00096]
Year=2009 0.02747∗∗∗ 0.02747∗∗∗ 0.02827∗∗∗
[0.00095] [0.00115] [0.00099]
Year=2010 0.03217∗∗∗ 0.03217∗∗∗ 0.03264∗∗∗
[0.00096] [0.00120] [0.00101]
Year=2011 -0.01492∗∗∗ -0.01492∗∗∗ -0.01430∗∗∗
[0.00095] [0.00112] [0.00104]
Year=2012 -0.02366∗∗∗ -0.02366∗∗∗ -0.02327∗∗∗
[0.00106] [0.00134] [0.00120]
Year=2013 -0.03002∗∗∗ -0.03002∗∗∗ -0.02970∗∗∗
[0.00119] [0.00163] [0.00139]
Year=2014 -0.02231∗∗∗ -0.02231∗∗∗ -0.02141∗∗∗
[0.00128] [0.00175] [0.00151]
Always Same EHR -0.00524∗∗∗ -0.00524∗∗∗ -0.00117
[0.00088] [0.00142] [0.00122]
Always Different EHR -0.00352∗∗∗ -0.00352∗∗ -0.00206∗∗
[0.00072] [0.00108] [0.00080]
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Treatment Group -0.00205 -0.00205 -0.00408∗∗
[0.00140] [0.00226] [0.00207]
First Time EHR - S 0.00386∗∗ 0.00386∗∗ 0.00109
[0.00149] [0.00194] [0.00160]
Changed EHR - S 0.00296∗∗ 0.00296∗∗ 0.00088
[0.00109] [0.00148] [0.00115]
First Time EHR - P -0.00074 -0.00074 -0.00087
[0.00141] [0.00150] [0.00143]
Changed EHR - P -0.00136 -0.00136 -0.00156
[0.00106] [0.00120] [0.00107]
Has EHR - S 0.05742 0.05742∗∗∗ 0.04105
[0.09146] [0.00358] [41.52478]
Has EHR - P 0.00162 0.00162 0.00187
[0.00112] [0.00129] [0.00115]
Control - Nonprofit - S -0.00781∗∗∗ -0.00781∗∗∗ -0.00445∗∗
[0.00086] [0.00174] [0.00207]
Control - Nonprofit - P -0.00400∗∗∗ -0.00400∗∗∗ -0.00365∗∗∗
[0.00086] [0.00119] [0.00090]
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Control - Government - S -0.00596∗∗∗ -0.00596∗∗ -0.00358
[0.00111] [0.00225] [0.00322]
Control - Government - P -0.00643∗∗∗ -0.00643∗∗∗ -0.00345∗∗
[0.00106] [0.00132] [0.00110]
Critical Access - S -0.02363∗∗∗ -0.02363∗∗∗ 0.02206
[0.00170] [0.00288] [0.06962]
Critical Access - P -0.00861∗∗∗ -0.00861∗∗∗ -0.00045
[0.00129] [0.00193] [0.00136]
Disproportionate Share - S 0.00157∗∗ 0.00157 -0.00317∗∗
[0.00078] [0.00167] [0.00145]
Disproportionate Share - P -0.00234∗∗ -0.00234∗∗ 0.00288∗∗∗
[0.00079] [0.00114] [0.00083]
Meaningful Use - S 0.00036 0.00036 0.00185∗
[0.00095] [0.00140] [0.00104]
Meaningful Use - P 0.00093 0.00093 0.00077
[0.00093] [0.00100] [0.00094]
Teaching Hospital - S 0.00341∗∗∗ 0.00341∗∗ 0.00136
[0.00066] [0.00139] [0.00196]
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Teaching Hospital - P -0.00022 -0.00022 -0.00192∗∗
[0.00067] [0.00095] [0.00070]
Multicampus - S -0.00208 -0.00208 0.00134
[0.00238] [0.00545] [0.00299]
Multicampus - P 0.00028 0.00028 -0.00129
[0.00244] [0.00356] [0.00255]
Number of Beds - S -0.00001∗∗ -0.00001 0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Number of Beds - P -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00001∗∗ -0.00000∗∗
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Operating Expenses - S 0.00001∗∗ 0.00001 0.00001
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Operating Expenses - P -0.00000∗∗ -0.00000∗∗ -0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Patient Revenue - S 0.00000∗∗ 0.00000 -0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Patient Revenue - P 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Total Discharges - S -0.00177∗∗ -0.00177 0.00315∗∗
[0.00086] [0.00220] [0.00113]
Total Discharges - P 0.00074 0.00074 -0.00166∗
[0.00090] [0.00137] [0.00093]
Medicare Discharges - S -0.01498∗∗∗ -0.01498∗∗∗ 0.00953∗
[0.00168] [0.00425] [0.00497]
Medicare Discharges - P 0.00886∗∗∗ 0.00886∗∗∗ 0.00939∗∗∗
[0.00171] [0.00238] [0.00181]
Patient Days-Visits - S 0.00144∗∗∗ 0.00144∗∗ -0.00086∗∗
[0.00019] [0.00048] [0.00043]
Patient Days-Visits - P -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00001
[0.00019] [0.00030] [0.00020]
Employees on Payroll - S -0.00019 -0.00019 -0.00008
[0.00015] [0.00021] [0.00016]
Employees on Payroll - P -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00004
[0.00016] [0.00017] [0.00016]
Age -0.00143∗∗∗ -0.00143∗∗∗ -0.00143∗∗∗
[0.00002] [0.00003] [0.00002]
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Female -0.01404∗∗∗ -0.01404∗∗∗ -0.01403∗∗∗
[0.00043] [0.00046] [0.00043]
Black -0.00180∗∗ -0.00180∗ -0.00944∗∗∗
[0.00073] [0.00108] [0.00079]
Asian 0.00537∗∗ 0.00537∗∗ 0.00171
[0.00211] [0.00224] [0.00223]
Hispanic 0.00745∗∗∗ 0.00745∗∗∗ 0.00014
[0.00116] [0.00142] [0.00128]
Other Race -0.00046 -0.00046 -0.00335
[0.00271] [0.00283] [0.00272]
Native American 0.01154∗∗ 0.01154∗∗ 0.01433∗∗∗
[0.00377] [0.00383] [0.00385]
End-Stage Renal Disease 0.17015∗∗∗ 0.17015∗∗∗ 0.16828∗∗∗
[0.00194] [0.00211] [0.00195]
Plan D Coverage -0.00499∗∗∗ -0.00499∗∗∗ -0.00505∗∗∗
[0.00049] [0.00052] [0.00050]
Retiree Drug Subsidy -0.00719∗∗∗ -0.00719∗∗∗ -0.00785∗∗∗
[0.00063] [0.00070] [0.00064]
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Dual Eligible 0.01705∗∗∗ 0.01705∗∗∗ 0.01559∗∗∗
[0.00138] [0.00153] [0.00141]
State Medicaid Buy-In 0.00098 0.00098 0.00077
[0.00143] [0.00158] [0.00146]
Chronic Bone Condition 0.01956∗∗∗ 0.01956∗∗∗ 0.01831∗∗∗
[0.00042] [0.00045] [0.00042]
Chronic Heart Condition 0.07527∗∗∗ 0.07527∗∗∗ 0.07346∗∗∗
[0.00067] [0.00080] [0.00067]
Patient covariates N Y Y Y
Hospital covariates N Y Y Y
EHR FE N Y Y Y
HRR FE N N N Y
Hospital FE N N N Y
Clustered SE N N Y N
Mean of dep. var. 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187
Observations 3,640,146 3,640,146 3,640,146 3,609,726
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Table B.2: OLS regressions of mortality rate on EHR compatibility and covariates, full
table.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Same EHR 0.00175∗∗∗ 0.00002 0.00002 0.00124
[0.00034] [0.00082] [0.00104] [0.00089]
Same Hospital System -0.00131 -0.00131 -0.00157∗
[0.00080] [0.00114] [0.00087]
Same ACO -0.00222∗ -0.00222 -0.00017
[0.00122] [0.00155] [0.00135]
Different Primary and Surgical 0.00338∗∗∗ 0.00338∗∗ 0.00471∗∗∗
[0.00071] [0.00110] [0.00078]
Had Preceding Outpatient Visit 0.01830∗∗∗ 0.01830∗∗∗ 0.01882∗∗∗
[0.00036] [0.00071] [0.00037]
Year=2008 -0.00149∗∗ -0.00149∗ -0.00181∗∗
[0.00075] [0.00078] [0.00076]
Year=2009 0.00223∗∗ 0.00223∗∗ 0.00187∗∗
[0.00074] [0.00078] [0.00077]
Year=2010 0.00249∗∗∗ 0.00249∗∗ 0.00194∗∗
[0.00074] [0.00082] [0.00079]
Year=2011 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00399∗∗∗
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00076] [0.00088] [0.00084]
Year=2012 0.00632∗∗∗ 0.00632∗∗∗ 0.00418∗∗∗
[0.00086] [0.00105] [0.00098]
Year=2013 0.00640∗∗∗ 0.00640∗∗∗ 0.00350∗∗
[0.00098] [0.00127] [0.00114]
Year=2014 0.00602∗∗∗ 0.00602∗∗∗ 0.00238∗
[0.00107] [0.00140] [0.00125]
Always Same EHR 0.00282∗∗∗ 0.00282∗∗ 0.00368∗∗∗
[0.00071] [0.00112] [0.00097]
Always Different EHR 0.00193∗∗∗ 0.00193∗∗ 0.00406∗∗∗
[0.00056] [0.00087] [0.00062]
Treatment Group 0.00035 0.00035 0.00692∗∗∗
[0.00116] [0.00209] [0.00166]
First Time EHR - S -0.00081 -0.00081 0.00175
[0.00116] [0.00141] [0.00125]
Changed EHR - S 0.00017 0.00017 0.00091
[0.00086] [0.00104] [0.00091]
First Time EHR - P 0.00047 0.00047 -0.00043
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00109] [0.00121] [0.00111]
Changed EHR - P 0.00109 0.00109 0.00064
[0.00084] [0.00095] [0.00085]
Has EHR - S 0.00470 0.00470 -0.03645
[0.07453] [0.00302] [28.65589]
Has EHR - P -0.00023 -0.00023 0.00293∗∗
[0.00087] [0.00110] [0.00089]
Control - Nonprofit - S -0.00038 -0.00038 -0.00006
[0.00067] [0.00142] [0.00166]
Control - Nonprofit - P -0.00274∗∗∗ -0.00274∗∗ 0.00051
[0.00067] [0.00101] [0.00070]
Control - Government - S 0.00630∗∗∗ 0.00630∗∗∗ 0.00109
[0.00088] [0.00177] [0.00260]
Control - Government - P -0.00232∗∗ -0.00232∗∗ -0.00191∗∗
[0.00083] [0.00116] [0.00086]
Critical Access - S 0.01333∗∗∗ 0.01333∗∗∗ 0.03489
[0.00148] [0.00247] [0.09935]
Critical Access - P -0.00318∗∗ -0.00318∗∗ -0.00082
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00104] [0.00150] [0.00109]
Disproportionate Share - S 0.00594∗∗∗ 0.00594∗∗∗ 0.00054
[0.00062] [0.00134] [0.00119]
Disproportionate Share - P 0.00024 0.00024 -0.00028
[0.00062] [0.00090] [0.00065]
Meaningful Use - S 0.00056 0.00056 0.00184∗∗
[0.00078] [0.00117] [0.00085]
Meaningful Use - P -0.00066 -0.00066 -0.00073
[0.00076] [0.00092] [0.00077]
Teaching Hospital - S -0.00115∗∗ -0.00115 0.00012
[0.00052] [0.00109] [0.00161]
Teaching Hospital - P -0.00242∗∗∗ -0.00242∗∗ -0.00146∗∗
[0.00053] [0.00076] [0.00055]
Multicampus - S -0.00087 -0.00087 0.00514∗∗
[0.00182] [0.00557] [0.00232]
Multicampus - P -0.00044 -0.00044 -0.00211
[0.00188] [0.00401] [0.00195]
Number of Beds - S 0.00000∗∗ 0.00000 -0.00000
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Number of Beds - P -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Operating Expenses - S -0.00000∗∗ -0.00000 0.00001∗
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Operating Expenses - P -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Patient Revenue - S 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000∗∗
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Patient Revenue - P -0.00000∗∗ -0.00000 -0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Total Discharges - S -0.00048 -0.00048 -0.00007
[0.00067] [0.00158] [0.00092]
Total Discharges - P 0.00074 0.00074 0.00079
[0.00071] [0.00109] [0.00074]
Medicare Discharges - S -0.02413∗∗∗ -0.02413∗∗∗ -0.02882∗∗∗
[0.00130] [0.00277] [0.00388]
Medicare Discharges - P 0.00910∗∗∗ 0.00910∗∗∗ 0.00895∗∗∗
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00133] [0.00204] [0.00140]
Patient Days-Visits - S 0.00104∗∗∗ 0.00104∗∗ 0.00015
[0.00015] [0.00043] [0.00033]
Patient Days-Visits - P -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00019
[0.00015] [0.00025] [0.00016]
Employees on Payroll - S -0.00003 -0.00003 0.00009
[0.00012] [0.00009] [0.00013]
Employees on Payroll - P -0.00012 -0.00012 -0.00013
[0.00012] [0.00011] [0.00012]
Age 0.00463∗∗∗ 0.00463∗∗∗ 0.00466∗∗∗
[0.00002] [0.00003] [0.00002]
Female -0.01481∗∗∗ -0.01481∗∗∗ -0.01524∗∗∗
[0.00034] [0.00040] [0.00035]
Black -0.01558∗∗∗ -0.01558∗∗∗ -0.01700∗∗∗
[0.00052] [0.00072] [0.00058]
Asian -0.02128∗∗∗ -0.02128∗∗∗ -0.01811∗∗∗
[0.00167] [0.00197] [0.00175]
Hispanic -0.02399∗∗∗ -0.02399∗∗∗ -0.02112∗∗∗
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00085] [0.00114] [0.00094]
Other Race -0.00778∗∗∗ -0.00778∗∗∗ -0.00568∗∗
[0.00199] [0.00207] [0.00200]
Native American -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00340
[0.00286] [0.00296] [0.00291]
End-Stage Renal Disease -0.01053∗∗∗ -0.01053∗∗∗ -0.01086∗∗∗
[0.00109] [0.00112] [0.00109]
Plan D Coverage 0.04747∗∗∗ 0.04747∗∗∗ 0.04869∗∗∗
[0.00039] [0.00052] [0.00039]
Retiree Drug Subsidy 0.04768∗∗∗ 0.04768∗∗∗ 0.04945∗∗∗
[0.00052] [0.00062] [0.00053]
Dual Eligible 0.06292∗∗∗ 0.06292∗∗∗ 0.06467∗∗∗
[0.00126] [0.00165] [0.00128]
State Medicaid Buy-In -0.02092∗∗∗ -0.02092∗∗∗ -0.02282∗∗∗
[0.00129] [0.00167] [0.00130]
Chronic Bone Condition -0.03949∗∗∗ -0.03949∗∗∗ -0.03933∗∗∗
[0.00034] [0.00040] [0.00034]
Chronic Heart Condition 0.04548∗∗∗ 0.04548∗∗∗ 0.04575∗∗∗
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00047] [0.00057] [0.00048]
Patient covariates N Y Y Y
Hospital covariates N Y Y Y
EHR FE N Y Y Y
HRR FE N N N Y
Hospital FE N N N Y
Clustered SE N N Y N
Mean of dep. var. 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114
Observations 3,640,146 3,640,146 3,640,146 3,609,726
B.2 Full Results forDifference-in-Differences Specification
Table B.3: Difference-in-differences results with 30-day error rate as the outcome
variable, full table.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Difference-in-Differences 0.00817∗∗ 0.00822∗∗ 0.00822∗∗ 0.00436
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00263] [0.00318] [0.00383] [0.00361]
Post-2011 -0.04048∗∗∗ -0.02976∗∗∗ -0.02976∗∗∗ -0.03104∗∗∗
[0.00096] [0.00296] [0.00346] [0.00349]
Treatment Group -0.02536∗∗∗ -0.00682∗∗ -0.00682∗ -0.01319∗∗∗
[0.00196] [0.00240] [0.00356] [0.00351]
Same Hospital System -0.00365∗ -0.00365 -0.00138
[0.00213] [0.00279] [0.00252]
Same ACO -0.00507 -0.00507 -0.00511
[0.00471] [0.00594] [0.00522]
Different Primary and Surgical 0.00224 0.00224 0.00596∗∗
[0.00230] [0.00313] [0.00285]
Had Preceding Outpatient Visit 0.02059∗∗∗ 0.02059∗∗∗ 0.02239∗∗∗
[0.00096] [0.00118] [0.00099]
Year=2008 0.00077 0.00077 0.00162
[0.00207] [0.00211] [0.00211]
Year=2009 0.02449∗∗∗ 0.02449∗∗∗ 0.02527∗∗∗
[0.00209] [0.00219] [0.00217]
Year=2010 0.02334∗∗∗ 0.02334∗∗∗ 0.02369∗∗∗
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00210] [0.00230] [0.00222]
Year=2011 0.00920∗∗∗ 0.00920∗∗∗ 0.01116∗∗∗
[0.00234] [0.00263] [0.00255]
Year=2012 -0.00075 -0.00075 0.00013
[0.00191] [0.00210] [0.00201]
Year=2013 -0.00925∗∗∗ -0.00925∗∗∗ -0.00916∗∗∗
[0.00178] [0.00177] [0.00181]
First Time EHR - S 0.00747∗∗ 0.00747∗∗ 0.00383
[0.00258] [0.00301] [0.00283]
Changed EHR - S 0.00517∗∗ 0.00517∗∗ 0.00236
[0.00195] [0.00245] [0.00212]
First Time EHR - P -0.00147 -0.00147 -0.00121
[0.00224] [0.00230] [0.00230]
Changed EHR - P 0.00117 0.00117 0.00008
[0.00192] [0.00202] [0.00197]
Has EHR - S 0.04717 0.04717∗∗∗ 0.09666
[0.07154] [0.00485] [0.09123]
Has EHR - P 0.00160 0.00160 0.00133
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00172] [0.00190] [0.00188]
Control - Nonprofit - S -0.00704∗∗∗ -0.00704∗∗ -0.00366
[0.00144] [0.00253] [0.00427]
Control - Nonprofit - P -0.00574∗∗∗ -0.00574∗∗ -0.00580∗∗
[0.00143] [0.00201] [0.00180]
Control - Government - S -0.00147 -0.00147 -0.00434
[0.00196] [0.00340] [0.00674]
Control - Government - P -0.00925∗∗∗ -0.00925∗∗∗ -0.00501∗∗
[0.00171] [0.00220] [0.00209]
Critical Access - S -0.02256∗∗∗ -0.02256∗∗∗ -0.04001
[0.00323] [0.00517] [0.04419]
Critical Access - P -0.00615∗∗ -0.00615∗∗ 0.00098
[0.00208] [0.00283] [0.00248]
Disproportionate Share - S 0.00319∗∗ 0.00319 -0.00088
[0.00138] [0.00239] [0.00335]
Disproportionate Share - P -0.00151 -0.00151 0.00436∗∗
[0.00144] [0.00196] [0.00168]
Meaningful Use - S 0.00143 0.00143 0.00290
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00163] [0.00214] [0.00186]
Meaningful Use - P -0.00009 -0.00009 -0.00012
[0.00154] [0.00171] [0.00162]
Teaching Hospital - S 0.00536∗∗∗ 0.00536∗∗ 0.00800∗
[0.00115] [0.00195] [0.00481]
Teaching Hospital - P -0.00095 -0.00095 -0.00459∗∗
[0.00121] [0.00175] [0.00153]
Multicampus - S -0.00755∗ -0.00755 0.00443
[0.00414] [0.00918] [0.00557]
Multicampus - P 0.00165 0.00165 0.00304
[0.00453] [0.00513] [0.00505]
Number of Beds - S -0.00001∗∗ -0.00001 -0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Number of Beds - P -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00001] [0.00000]
Operating Expenses - S 0.00001∗∗ 0.00001 -0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00001] [0.00001]
Operating Expenses - P 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001∗∗
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Patient Revenue - S 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Patient Revenue - P 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Total Discharges - S 0.00026 0.00026 -0.00169
[0.00150] [0.00337] [0.00259]
Total Discharges - P -0.00080 -0.00080 -0.00309
[0.00167] [0.00241] [0.00196]
Medicare Discharges - S -0.01248∗∗∗ -0.01248∗∗ 0.01088
[0.00271] [0.00572] [0.01001]
Medicare Discharges - P 0.00831∗∗ 0.00831∗ 0.00915∗∗
[0.00292] [0.00435] [0.00387]
Patient Days-Visits - S 0.00088∗∗ 0.00088 -0.00043
[0.00032] [0.00073] [0.00091]
Patient Days-Visits - P -0.00012 -0.00012 -0.00062∗
[0.00033] [0.00047] [0.00037]
Employees on Payroll - S -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00010
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00032] [0.00029] [0.00033]
Employees on Payroll - P 0.00022 0.00022 0.00021
[0.00045] [0.00033] [0.00046]
Age -0.00124∗∗∗ -0.00124∗∗∗ -0.00125∗∗∗
[0.00004] [0.00005] [0.00005]
Female -0.01220∗∗∗ -0.01220∗∗∗ -0.01213∗∗∗
[0.00093] [0.00098] [0.00093]
Black -0.00188 -0.00188 -0.00967∗∗∗
[0.00159] [0.00192] [0.00173]
Asian 0.01154∗∗ 0.01154∗∗ 0.00540
[0.00488] [0.00498] [0.00518]
Hispanic 0.01293∗∗∗ 0.01293∗∗∗ 0.00412
[0.00263] [0.00298] [0.00288]
Other Race -0.00137 -0.00137 -0.00486
[0.00586] [0.00587] [0.00589]
Native American 0.00589 0.00589 0.00497
[0.00786] [0.00755] [0.00806]
End-Stage Renal Disease 0.16998∗∗∗ 0.16998∗∗∗ 0.16797∗∗∗
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00415] [0.00446] [0.00416]
Plan D Coverage -0.00642∗∗∗ -0.00642∗∗∗ -0.00635∗∗∗
[0.00107] [0.00105] [0.00109]
Retiree Drug Subsidy -0.00684∗∗∗ -0.00684∗∗∗ -0.00758∗∗∗
[0.00139] [0.00150] [0.00141]
Dual Eligible 0.01951∗∗∗ 0.01951∗∗∗ 0.01814∗∗∗
[0.00290] [0.00311] [0.00295]
State Medicaid Buy-In 0.00033 0.00033 0.00069
[0.00300] [0.00322] [0.00305]
Chronic Bone Condition 0.01949∗∗∗ 0.01949∗∗∗ 0.01822∗∗∗
[0.00091] [0.00098] [0.00092]
Chronic Heart Condition 0.07975∗∗∗ 0.07975∗∗∗ 0.07701∗∗∗
[0.00154] [0.00167] [0.00156]
Patient covariates N Y Y Y
Hospital covariates N Y Y Y
EHR FE N Y Y Y
HRR FE N N N Y
Hospital FE N N N Y
Clustered SE N N Y N
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Error Error Error Error
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Mean of dep. var. 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196
Observations 798,102 798,102 798,102 792,599
Table B.4: Difference-in-differences results with 30-day mortality rate as the outcome
variable, full table.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Difference-in-Differences -0.00882∗∗∗ -0.00807∗∗ -0.00807∗∗ -0.00542∗
[0.00225] [0.00258] [0.00328] [0.00292]
Post-2011 0.00813∗∗∗ 0.00439∗ 0.00439 0.00042
[0.00076] [0.00242] [0.00285] [0.00284]
Treatment Group 0.01568∗∗∗ 0.00523∗∗ 0.00523 0.00805∗∗
[0.00162] [0.00188] [0.00329] [0.00273]
Same Hospital System -0.00337∗∗ -0.00337 -0.00094
[0.00172] [0.00259] [0.00202]
Same ACO 0.00499 0.00499 0.00954∗∗
[0.00402] [0.00510] [0.00438]
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Different Primary and Surgical 0.00615∗∗∗ 0.00615∗ 0.00956∗∗∗
[0.00183] [0.00319] [0.00225]
Had Preceding Outpatient Visit 0.01491∗∗∗ 0.01491∗∗∗ 0.01602∗∗∗
Year=2008 -0.00235 -0.00235 -0.00290∗
[0.00159] [0.00161] [0.00162]
Year=2009 0.00070 0.00070 0.00031
[0.00158] [0.00167] [0.00165]
Year=2010 0.00127 0.00127 0.00077
[0.00159] [0.00168] [0.00171]
Year=2011 0.00134 0.00134 0.00387∗
[0.00196] [0.00219] [0.00212]
Year=2012 0.00114 0.00114 0.00279
[0.00162] [0.00169] [0.00170]
Year=2013 -0.00014 -0.00014 0.00070
[0.00152] [0.00152] [0.00154]
First Time EHR - S -0.00253 -0.00253 0.00024
[0.00200] [0.00232] [0.00221]
Changed EHR - S -0.00175 -0.00175 -0.00028
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00155] [0.00172] [0.00168]
First Time EHR - P 0.00057 0.00057 0.00028
[0.00175] [0.00190] [0.00180]
Changed EHR - P 0.00083 0.00083 -0.00010
[0.00153] [0.00159] [0.00157]
Has EHR - S -0.03947 -0.03947∗∗∗ -0.05878
[0.04751] [0.00401] [0.06633]
Has EHR - P 0.00192 0.00192 0.00369∗∗
[0.00133] [0.00166] [0.00146]
Control - Nonprofit - S -0.00019 -0.00019 0.00290
[0.00114] [0.00201] [0.00338]
Control - Nonprofit - P -0.00489∗∗∗ -0.00489∗∗ 0.00175
[0.00113] [0.00155] [0.00141]
Control - Government - S 0.00631∗∗∗ 0.00631∗∗ 0.00611
[0.00156] [0.00302] [0.00537]
Control - Government - P -0.00258∗ -0.00258 -0.00080
[0.00135] [0.00177] [0.00163]
Critical Access - S 0.02820∗∗∗ 0.02820∗∗∗ 0.06655
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00277] [0.00464] [0.04505]
Critical Access - P -0.00650∗∗∗ -0.00650∗∗ -0.00215
[0.00166] [0.00226] [0.00197]
Disproportionate Share - S 0.00848∗∗∗ 0.00848∗∗∗ 0.00207
[0.00109] [0.00225] [0.00268]
Disproportionate Share - P -0.00107 -0.00107 -0.00183
[0.00114] [0.00181] [0.00132]
Meaningful Use - S 0.00227∗ 0.00227 0.00379∗∗
[0.00135] [0.00186] [0.00152]
Meaningful Use - P -0.00077 -0.00077 -0.00041
[0.00128] [0.00152] [0.00134]
Teaching Hospital - S -0.00013 -0.00013 -0.00576
[0.00091] [0.00163] [0.00388]
Teaching Hospital - P -0.00147 -0.00147 0.00083
[0.00095] [0.00143] [0.00119]
Multicampus - S -0.00805∗∗ -0.00805 0.00476
[0.00315] [0.00834] [0.00433]
Multicampus - P 0.00154 0.00154 0.00134
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00357] [0.00459] [0.00396]
Number of Beds - S 0.00001∗∗ 0.00001 -0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Number of Beds - P -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Operating Expenses - S -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00001∗
[0.00000] [0.00001] [0.00000]
Operating Expenses - P -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00001∗∗ -0.00001∗∗
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Patient Revenue - S 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Patient Revenue - P 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000∗
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Total Discharges - S 0.00079 0.00079 -0.00174
[0.00114] [0.00247] [0.00189]
Total Discharges - P 0.00035 0.00035 -0.00077
[0.00135] [0.00196] [0.00159]
Medicare Discharges - S -0.02458∗∗∗ -0.02458∗∗∗ -0.02999∗∗∗
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30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
[0.00212] [0.00374] [0.00791]
Medicare Discharges - P 0.00716∗∗ 0.00716∗∗ 0.00427
[0.00230] [0.00328] [0.00299]
Patient Days-Visits - S 0.00063∗∗ 0.00063 0.00086
[0.00025] [0.00064] [0.00070]
Patient Days-Visits - P 0.00005 0.00005 0.00026
[0.00028] [0.00035] [0.00032]
Employees on Payroll - S 0.00006 0.00006 0.00005
[0.00023] [0.00015] [0.00025]
Employees on Payroll - P 0.00015 0.00015 0.00019
[0.00035] [0.00029] [0.00036]
Age 0.00469∗∗∗ 0.00469∗∗∗ 0.00471∗∗∗
[0.00004] [0.00005] [0.00004]
Female -0.01312∗∗∗ -0.01312∗∗∗ -0.01382∗∗∗
[0.00073] [0.00080] [0.00074]
Black -0.01164∗∗∗ -0.01164∗∗∗ -0.01456∗∗∗
[0.00115] [0.00143] [0.00127]
Continued on next page
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Table B.4 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Asian -0.02793∗∗∗ -0.02793∗∗∗ -0.02199∗∗∗
[0.00374] [0.00423] [0.00394]
Hispanic -0.02076∗∗∗ -0.02076∗∗∗ -0.01924∗∗∗
[0.00192] [0.00228] [0.00210]
Other Race -0.00091 -0.00091 0.00250
[0.00445] [0.00441] [0.00445]
Native American -0.00203 -0.00203 -0.00309
[0.00590] [0.00585] [0.00604]
End-Stage Renal Disease -0.01209∗∗∗ -0.01209∗∗∗ -0.01202∗∗∗
[0.00234] [0.00229] [0.00235]
Plan D Coverage 0.04770∗∗∗ 0.04770∗∗∗ 0.04891∗∗∗
[0.00084] [0.00096] [0.00085]
Retiree Drug Subsidy 0.04857∗∗∗ 0.04857∗∗∗ 0.05038∗∗∗
[0.00114] [0.00127] [0.00115]
Dual Eligible 0.06180∗∗∗ 0.06180∗∗∗ 0.06265∗∗∗
[0.00262] [0.00301] [0.00265]
State Medicaid Buy-In -0.01947∗∗∗ -0.01947∗∗∗ -0.02000∗∗∗
[0.00268] [0.00303] [0.00271]
Continued on next page
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Table B.4 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30-Day 30-Day 30-Day 30-Day
Mortality Mortality Mortality Mortality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Chronic Bone Condition -0.03941∗∗∗ -0.03941∗∗∗ -0.03981∗∗∗
[0.00073] [0.00081] [0.00074]
Chronic Heart Condition 0.04772∗∗∗ 0.04772∗∗∗ 0.04823∗∗∗
[0.00107] [0.00130] [0.00109]
Patient covariates N Y Y Y
Hospital covariates N Y Y Y
EHR FE N Y Y Y
HRR FE N N N Y
Hospital FE N N N Y
Clustered SE N N Y N
Mean of dep. var. 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115
Observations 798,102 798,102 798,102 792,599
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Appendix C
C.1 Physician RegressionswithNumber of HMOs or PPOs
In Section 3.2.2, I regress physician quality on physician characteristics and summary
statistics of their plan partners. (Table 3.3). Here, in Table C.1, I present specifications that
include the number of HMO plans that a physician accepted, since HMOs are more selec-
tive and thus may be more positively correlated with physician quality. Surprisingly, the
results show that it is negatively correlated with physician quality, though it is statistically
significant in only the third specification at the 10% level. This may be because the plan
type indicator variables available are HMO, HMO/POS, HMO/POS/PPO, or PPO. For
the Number of HMO Plans variable, I included only those that were only HMOs.
In Table C.2, I exchange the Number of HMO Plans covariate for the Number of PPO
Plans, since it is the only plan type available in only the pure form, so it may be less noisy.
The estimates are not significantly affected regardless of which is included, if any, so I omit
both in the main text.
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Table C.1: OLS regressions of physician quality on physician characteristics and/or the
average characteristics of the plans to which they match, including the number of HMO
plans.
(1) (2) (3)
Phys Q Phys Q Phys Q
Number of Responses -0.00347 -0.00223
[0.00310] [0.00311]
Number of Reviews 0.03088 0.02472
[0.02975] [0.02875]
Ease of scheduling urgent appointments 0.02376 0.01418
[0.03530] [0.03423]
Office environment, cleanliness, comfort, etc. -0.06278 -0.03308
[0.04081] [0.04047]
Staff friendliness and courteousness 0.08731∗∗ 0.05333
[0.04313] [0.04336]
Wait time rating 0.04469∗ 0.05996∗∗
[0.02516] [0.02494]
Level of trust in provider’s decisions 0.26938∗∗∗ 0.34966∗∗∗
[0.07878] [0.08248]
How well provider explains medical condition(s) -0.03944 -0.12282
[0.08486] [0.08562]
How well provider listens and answers questions 0.45291∗∗∗ 0.43581∗∗∗
[0.07853] [0.07785]
Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
Phys Q Phys Q Phys Q
Spends appropriate amount of time with patients 0.29563∗∗∗ 0.31956∗∗∗
[0.06249] [0.06518]
Total Population 0.00000 -0.00000
[0.00001] [0.00001]
Senior Population -0.00001 0.00001
[0.00003] [0.00004]
Poverty Population -0.00000 0.00000
[0.00002] [0.00002]
Zipcode Median Household Income -0.00000 -0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000]
N Plans -0.00270 0.07771∗ -0.00382
[0.00511] [0.04034] [0.00886]
N HMO Plans -0.00809 -0.01157 -0.01724∗
[0.00957] [0.04710] [0.00944]
Avg Plan Q -0.29750 0.04073
[0.39590] [0.07962]
% Medicare -4.49201∗ -0.09437
[2.39203] [0.51751]
% Medicaid -3.91012 0.74126
[2.72973] [0.56517]
Continued on next page
181
Table C.1 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
Phys Q Phys Q Phys Q
% HMO 1.43536 0.04883
[1.55967] [0.32349]
% PPO 4.01501∗∗ 0.67498∗
[1.94006] [0.39620]
Constant -0.13585 4.47159∗∗∗ -0.59046∗
[0.15832] [1.29193] [0.30525]
Observations 186 183 181
Table C.2: OLS regressions of physician quality on physician characteristics and/or the
average characteristics of the plans to which they match, including the number of PPO
plans.
(1) (2) (3)
Phys Q Phys Q Phys Q
Number of Responses -0.00296 -0.00209
[0.00317] [0.00320]
Number of Reviews 0.03364 0.03095
[0.02960] [0.02885]
Ease of scheduling urgent appointments 0.02027 0.00700
[0.03504] [0.03440]
Office environment, cleanliness, comfort, etc. -0.06578 -0.03935
[0.04082] [0.04080]
Continued on next page
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Table C.2 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
Phys Q Phys Q Phys Q
Staff friendliness and courteousness 0.09442∗∗ 0.06588
[0.04298] [0.04349]
Wait time rating 0.04417∗ 0.06127∗∗
[0.02536] [0.02540]
Level of trust in provider’s decisions 0.27783∗∗∗ 0.35314∗∗∗
[0.07962] [0.08446]
How well provider explains medical condition(s) -0.03310 -0.10048
[0.08441] [0.08586]
How well provider listens and answers questions 0.44055∗∗∗ 0.42187∗∗∗
[0.07865] [0.07879]
Spends appropriate amount of time with patients 0.29259∗∗∗ 0.30639∗∗∗
[0.06239] [0.06546]
Total Population 0.00000 -0.00000
[0.00001] [0.00001]
Senior Population -0.00001 0.00000
[0.00003] [0.00004]
Poverty Population -0.00000 0.00000
[0.00002] [0.00002]
Zipcode Median Household Income -0.00000 -0.00000
[0.00000] [0.00000]
Continued on next page
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Table C.2 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
Phys Q Phys Q Phys Q
N Plans -0.00296 0.07648∗ -0.00269
[0.00512] [0.04018] [0.00894]
N PPO Plans 0.00652 -0.05339 -0.00016
[0.01163] [0.05700] [0.01171]
Avg Plan Q -0.28117 0.02167
[0.39284] [0.08040]
% Medicare -4.59066∗ -0.14610
[2.38276] [0.52247]
% Medicaid -3.89171 0.66689
[2.71744] [0.57106]
% HMO 1.46363 0.05910
[1.55546] [0.32739]
% PPO 4.10311∗∗ 0.64871
[1.93735] [0.40016]
Constant -0.19163 4.63699∗∗∗ -0.57654∗
[0.16090] [1.29747] [0.30868]
Observations 186 183 181
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C.2 Alternative Structural Specification
Table C.3 presents the estimates and confidence regions when I normalize the coeffi-
cient on interacted qualities, z0, to ±1. Note that the estimates provide evidence that θ7 is
highly likely to be positive. Regardless of the normalization, the point estimates of θ7 are
positive, and the 95% confidence region has much larger positive portions than negative
portions.
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